Jessie D. v. Dep't of Child Safety

• Decision Date: 08 October 2021
• Docket Number: No. CV-19-0321-PR,CV-19-0321-PR
• Citation: 54 Arizona Cases Digest 26,495 P.3d 914
• Parties: JESSIE D., Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, F.V., M.D., M.D., C.D., Appellees.
• Court: Arizona Supreme Court

54 Arizona Cases Digest 26

495 P.3d 914

JESSIE D., Appellant,

v.DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, F.V., M.D., M.D., C.D., Appellees.

No. CV-19-0321-PR

Supreme Court of Arizona.

Filed October 8, 2021

Thomas A. Vierling (argued), Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix, Attorney for Jessie D.

Mark Brnovich, Arizona Attorney General, Drew C. Ensign, Section Chief Counsel, Civil Appeals Section, Dawn R. Williams (argued), Toni M. Valadez, Sandra L. Nahigian, Assistant Attorneys General, Phoenix, Attorneys for Department of Child Safety

JUSTICE BEENE authored the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF JUSTICE BRUTINEL, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, JUSTICE LOPEZ, and JUDGE STARING^* joined.^** JUSTICE BOLICK concurred in part and in the judgment.

JUSTICE BEENE, Opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4), a court may terminate a parent-child relationship if the parent is convicted of a felony and the resulting prison sentence "is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years." In Michael J. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security , 196 Ariz. 246, 251–52 ¶ 29, 995 P.2d 682, 687-88 (2000), we set forth the relevant factors a juvenile court should consider in making this determination. Those factors include, but are not limited to:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the relationship between the child's age and the likelihood that incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.

Id. These have come to be known as the " Michael J. factors."

¶ 2 Although the juvenile court misapplied two Michael J . factors in this case, substantial evidence exists to support termination. Accordingly, we affirm the court's order terminating the parent-child relationship.

BACKGROUND

¶ 3 Jessie D. ("Father") and Joana V. ("Mother") had four children together. In August 2016, while Father was living with Mother and the children, their house caught fire, and they became homeless. Mother and the children moved into a homeless shelter, but Father was not permitted to live there due to an outstanding warrant. In December, Father was arrested, and in July 2017, he was convicted of two counts of aggravated driving under the influence and sentenced to seven years’ incarceration with a maximum release date of December 2022. At the time of his incarceration, the children ranged in age from 1.5 to 7 years old.

¶ 4 In August 2017, the Department of Child Safety ("DCS") removed the children from Mother's care because of homelessness, domestic violence, and substance-abuse issues. A month later, the court found the children dependent as to Father.

¶ 5 In June 2018, DCS moved to terminate Father's parental rights to the children under § 8-533(B)(4).¹ The juvenile court held a termination hearing in November, during which the DCS case manager and Father testified. Following the hearing, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that Father's sentence was of sufficient length to deprive the children of a normal home for a period of years. The court further found that DCS had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of Father's parental rights would be in the children's best interests. Accordingly, the juvenile court terminated Father's rights to the children.

¶ 6 Father appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the juvenile court's termination. Jessie D. v. Dep't of Child Safety , No. 1 CA-JV 19-0073, 2019 WL 6003238, at *1 ¶ 1 (Ariz. App. Nov. 14, 2019) (mem. decision). In conducting its review, the court of appeals analyzed the juvenile court's application of the Michael J. factors. Id. at *2–3 ¶¶ 6–16. It found that reasonable evidence supported each finding and concluded that the court did not abuse its discretion in evaluating the factors. Id. at *3 ¶ 14. The court also concluded that reasonable evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that severance was in the children's best interests. Id. at ¶ 19.

¶ 7 We granted review on the following issues: (1) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the juvenile court's finding that Father's conviction and length of sentence of imprisonment was of such a length as to deprive the children of a normal home for a period of years, and (2) whether substantial evidence exists in the record to support the juvenile court's finding that termination of Father's parental rights would be in the children's best interests. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona Constitution.

DISCUSSION

¶ 8 Parents enjoy a fundamental liberty interest in "the care, custody, and management" of their children. Santosky v. Kramer , 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). But this right is not inalienable. See, e.g. , In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JD-561 , 131 Ariz. 25, 27–28, 638 P.2d 692, 694-95 (1981) ("The state has a vital interest in the status of the parent-child relationship and, because of the importance of this interest, the state may intrude into the parent-child relationship to protect the welfare of the child and the state's own interest in the welfare of its citizens."). A court may terminate "parental rights under certain circumstances, so long as the parents whose rights are to be severed are provided with ‘fundamentally fair procedures’ that satisfy due process requirements." Kent K. v. Bobby M. , 210 Ariz. 279, 284 ¶ 24, 110 P.3d 1013, 1018 (2005) (quoting Santosky , 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388 ). "Arizona's severance statute satisfies due process because the statutory grounds are ‘synonymous with parental unfitness.’ " Jessica P. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 249 Ariz. 461, 470 ¶ 31, 471 P.3d 672, 681 (App. 2020) (quoting Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety , 245 Ariz. 146, 150 ¶ 9, 425 P.3d 1089, 1093 (2018) ), vacated on other grounds by Jessica P. v. Dep't of Child Safety , CV-20-0241-PR, 2020 WL 8766053, at *1 (Ariz. Dec. 15, 2020). In Arizona, "[t]o justify termination of the parent-child relationship, the [juvenile] court must find, by clear and convincing evidence, at least one of the statutory grounds set out in section 8-533, and also that termination is in the best interest of the child." Michael J. , 196 Ariz. at 249 ¶ 12, 995 P.2d at 685.

¶ 9 As previously indicated, under § 8-533(B)(4), a juvenile court may terminate the parent-child relationship if the parent is convicted of a felony and "the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years." "The ‘normal home’ ... relates to [Father's] obligation to provide a normal home, a home in which the ... father has a presence, and it does not refer to a ‘normal home’ environment created by [others]." In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-5609 , 149 Ariz. 573, 575, 720 P.2d 548, 550 (App. 1986). There is "no ‘bright line’ definition of when a sentence is sufficiently long to deprive a child of a normal home for a period of years." Michael J. , 196 Ariz. at 251 ¶ 29, 995 P.2d at 687. Rather, the inquiry is individualized and fact specific. The juvenile court must consider "all relevant factors," including the previously mentioned Michael J. factors. Id. at 251–52 ¶29, 995 P.2d at 687-88. Termination, however, may be appropriate even if some of the Michael J. factors do not support the severance of parental rights. Indeed, "[a] lack of evidence on one or several of the Michael J. factors may or may not require reversal or remand on a severance order." Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 214 Ariz. 445, 450 ¶ 15, 153 P.3d 1074, 1079 (App. 2007).

¶ 10 We review the court's termination decision for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless no reasonable evidence supports the court's findings. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. , 207 Ariz. 43, 47 ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004). "Because the juvenile court is in the best position to weigh evidence and assess witness credibility, we accept the juvenile court's findings of fact if reasonable evidence and inferences support them, and will affirm a severance order unless it is clearly erroneous." Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F. , 239 Ariz. 1, 3 ¶ 9, 365 P.3d 353, 355 (2016). However, "we review de novo legal issues requiring the interpretation and application of § 8-533." Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J. , 234 Ariz. 437, 440 ¶ 12, 323 P.3d 720, 723 (App. 2014).

I.

¶ 11 The first Michael J. factor requires a juvenile court to consider "the length and strength of any parent-child relationship existing when incarceration begins." Michael J. , 196 Ariz. at 251–52 ¶ 29, 995 P.2d at 687-88. When considering the temporal aspect of this factor, the court should take into account the time the parent and child had spent together before incarceration. Additionally, when evaluating the stability of the parent-child relationship, the court should consider whether the parent cared for the child, both physically and financially, and whether the parent resided with the child or regularly visited the child if they did not live together.

¶ 12 Here, the juvenile court found that the evidence regarding this factor was "limited and conflicting," but concluded that "the relationship was not particularly strong." The court based its decision on the following evidence: (1) Father did not live with the children before his incarceration; (2) Father's description of his relationship with the children before he was incarcerated—taking them to the park, building things with them, and teaching them to draw—suggested that Father was not the "primary caretaker" for the children; (3) Father was absent for a large portion of the lives of two of his children...