Joe Z. v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 29 December 1970
• Citation: 3 Cal.3d 797,478 P.2d 26,91 Cal.Rptr. 594
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 478 P.2d 26 Joe Z., a Minor, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE et al., Real Parties in Interest. * L.A. 29806.

Page 594

91 Cal.Rptr. 594

3 Cal.3d 797, 478 P.2d 26

Joe Z., a Minor, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent;

The PEOPLE et al., Real Parties in Interest. ^*

L.A. 29806.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Dec. 29, 1970.

Richard S. Buckley, Public Defender, Richard Santwier and Kathryn J. McDonald, Deputy Public Defenders, for petitioner.

John D. Maharg, County Counsel, Douglas C. Miller, Deputy County Counsel, evelle J. Younger, Dist. Atty., Harry Wood and Donald J. Kaplan, Deputy Dist. Attys., for respondent and for real parties in interest.

BURKE, Justice.

In this case we discuss the extent to which juveniles in delinquency proceedings are entitled to the benefit of pretrial discovery. We have concluded that the juvenile courts have the inherent and discretion power to permit pretrial discovery upon a showing of good cause, that in the instant case the court exceeded its discretion in denying petitioner inspection of his own statements and admissions to the police and the recordings of his conversations with them, but that petitioner has failed to establish good cause for inspection of the statements, admissions and recorded conversations of his former codefendants.

Petitioner, a 15-year-old juvenile, was arrested on May 16, 1970, for allegedy violating Penal Code sections 187 (murder) and 217 (assault with intent to commit murder--two counts). Pursuant to sections 602 and 650 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, proceedings were initiated to declare petitioner a ward of the juvenile court. On May 21, at the detention hearing (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 632), a deputy public defender was appointed to represent petitioner, who was ordered detained pending adjudication of delinquency. On June 3, petitioner's counsel filed a motion for pretrial discovery, together with a declaration of counsel and memorandum of points and authorities, seeking inspection of material falling principally in these two categorise: (1) All oral and written statements and admissions of petitioner and the recorded or transcribed conversations with him, together with all notes or memoranda regarding such conversations, and (2) all statements, admissions and conversations of petitioner's 'codefendants,' the minors Joe S. and Robert A. Counsel's declaration in support of the motion alleged that the goregoing information was necessary in order to prepare for the adjudication hearing, was relevant and material to the case, was solely under the control of the police or district attorney, and was 'not known to the minor or his counsel.'

The court, proceeding upon the assumption that it had the inherent power to order discovery, nevertheless denied without prejudice petitioner's request to inspect his own statements, admissions and conversations. The court indicated, however, that it would grant a renewed motion to inspect such material if supported by an affidavit of petitioner averring that he could not recall the contents of his statements or conversations and therefore sought inspection to refresh his recollection. ¹ The court denied with prejudice petitioner's request to inspect the statements, admissions and conversations of Joe S. and Robert A. Petitioner now seeks mandate to compel respondent court to grant pretrial inspection as to both categories of material. Real parties in interest and respondent (through county counsel) apparently concede that mandate is the appropriate remedy to enforce an asserted right to pretrial discovery. (See Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal.2d 159, 167--168, 49 Cal.Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838.)

As a preliminary matter, we must determine to what extent, if any, a juvenile is entitled to invoke pretrial discovery in delinquency proceedings in juvenile court. The provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code which establish and define the scope of these proceedings (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 500 et seq.) are silent regarding this question, and there appear to be no reported decisions in California which have considered it.

Initially, we do not believe that the extensive discovery procedures generally applicable to 'civil' proceedings are or should be available to minors in juvenile court. Section 2035 of the Code of Civil Procedure in effect makes civil discovery applicable to special proceedings of a civil nature 'whenever it is necessary so to do.' Since proceedings in juvenile court are not criminal proceedings (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 503), presumably they are 'civil' (see Code Civ.Proc., § 24) or 'essentially civil,' as they have been previously described (In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 462, 75 Cal.Rptr. 1, 450 P.2d 296). However, the "civil' label-of-convenience' (In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527) cannot obscure the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings, involving as they often do the possibility of a substantial loss of personal freedom. Moreover, the need for expeditious and informal adjudications in juvenile court (see Welf. & Inst.Code, § 680) belies the wisdom or necessity of any indiscriminate application of civil discovery procedures. (See In re Juvenile Delinquents, 60 Misc.2d 355, 303 N.Y.S.2d 406; Boches, Juvenile Justice in California: A re-evaluation, 19 Hast.L.J. 47, 86--87.)

Nevertheless, the quasi-criminal character of delinquency proceedings does lead us to conclude that the juvenile courts should have the same degree of discretion as a court in an ordinary criminal case to permit, upon a proper showing, discovery between the parties. Authority for such discovery derives not from statute but from the inherent power of every court to develop rules of procedure aimed at facilitating the administration of criminal justice and promoting the orderly ascertainment of the truth. (See Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56, 59--60, 22 Cal.Rptr. 879, 372 P.2d 919; Powell v. Superior Court, 48 Cal.2d 704, 708, 312 P.2d 698; cf. Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal.2d 475, 478--480, 55 Cal.Rptr. 217, 421 P.2d 65.) To assist us in determining whether the juvenile court exceeded the bounds of its discretion in denying petitioner's motion herein, we turn to the cases which have passed upon similar motions in the context of a criminal proceeding.

1. Statements, Admissions and Conversations of Defendant.

This court has on several occasions sanctioned the inspection of statements, admissions or recorded conversations of the defendant in a criminal case. In Powell v. Superior Court, Supra, 48 Cal.2d 704, 707, 312 P.2d 698, 699, we set forth the rationale underlying such discovery, stating that 'to deny inspection of defendant's statements would * * * be to lose sight of the objective of ascertainment of the facts, and would be out of harmony with the policy of this state that the goal of criminal prosecutions is not to secure a conviction in every case by an expedient means, however odious, but rather, only through establishing the truth upon a public trial fair to defendant and the state alike.' We took notice in Powell (p. 708, 312 P.2d p. 700) of 'a widely recognized rule that application for pretrial inspection of a signed ² confession or admission or transcript of statements of an accused may be made by the latter and is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, which has inherent power to order such an inspection in the interest of justice. (Citations.)' Accordingly, having concluded that such discovery was appropriate in Powell, we granted mandate to enable defendant to inspect his statements prior to trial. We reached similar results in Vance v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.2d 92, 330 P.2d 773, People v. Cartier, 51 Cal.2d 590, 335 P.2d 114, and Cash v. Superior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72, 346 P.2d 407, which cases involved tape recordings of defendants' statements or conversations with police.

In each of the foregoing cases, defendant or his attorney had supported the request for inspection with an affidavit which stated, among other things, that defendant was unable to recall the substance of his statement or conversation and that pretrial inspection thereof was necessary to refresh his recollection. The People herein urge that such an affidavit is a prerequisite to discovery, or at least that the trial court should have discretion to require it as a condition to discovery. Indeed, some cases and authorities appear to make that assumption. (See Vance v. Superior Court, Supra, 51 Cal.2d 92, 93, 330 P.2d 773; People v. Cartier, Supra, 51 Cal.2d 590, 594, 335 P.2d 114; Cordry v. Superior Court, 161 Cal.App.2d 267, 268, 326 P.2d 222; Louisell, Modern California Discovery, § 13.05, pp. 409--410; Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 228, 244.) However, such a requirement would necessarily be founded upon the false premise that the only good cause for pretrial inspection of such material is to refresh defendant's memory. On the contrary, inspection is ordinarily vital for the intelligent and efficient preparation of one's defense, quite apart from assisting the defendant in remembering what he said to police officers.

First of all, due to the obvious incriminatory effect of a confession or admission, it becomes 'uniquely important' that defense counsel be permitted to inspect and copy the statement to assist him in determining its voluntary character and its admissibility. (Moore, Criminal Discovery, 19 Hast.L.J. 865, 882; see Note, Developments in the Law--Discovery, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 940, 1055.) In addition, counsel will need to know the precise words used by defendant in his statement in order to determine its probable impact upon the trier of fact, its relevance to the penalty or sentencing phase of the proceedings, its completeness and accuracy, and its possible prejudicial effect. (See Moore, Supra, 19 Hast.L.J. 865, 883, fn. 103; Fletcher, Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 12 Stan.L.Rev. 293, 306--307.)

Pretrial inspection affords the defendant an opportunity to clarify and correct...