Lane v. Montgomery Elevator Co.

• Decision Date: 24 February 1997
• Docket Number: No. A96A1942,A96A1942
• Parties: , 97 FCDR 1009 LANE v. MONTGOMERY ELEVATOR COMPANY.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 249

484 S.E.2d 249

225 Ga.App. 523, 97 FCDR 1009

LANE v. MONTGOMERY ELEVATOR COMPANY.

No. A96A1942.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 24, 1997.

Reconsideration Denied March 18, 1997.

Dozier, Lee, Graham & Sikes, Neal B. Graham, Macon, for appellant.

Buzzell & Pinkston, R. William Buzzell II, Loretta L. Pinkston, Macon, Paige J. Lee, Lokey & Smith, Sue K. Nichols, Jon W. Burton, Atlanta, for appellee.

HAROLD R. BANKE, Senior Appellate Judge.

Vernice L. Lane sued Montgomery Elevator Company ("Montgomery") to recover for injuries allegedly sustained in a elevator accident occurring at Macon Northside Hospital, formerly known as Charter Northside Hospital (the "Hospital"). Lane alleged that Montgomery negligently installed, operated, and maintained the elevator at issue. Lane appeals the summary judgment in favor of Montgomery.

To prevail at summary judgment, the moving party must show that no genuine issues of material fact remain to be tried and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-movant, warrant summary judgment as a matter of law. Lau's Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491, 405 S.E.2d 474 (1991). Viewed in that light, the evidence was as follows. Lane, a licensed practical nurse, was sent to another floor to obtain some medical supplies. When she arrived at the ground floor, the elevator malfunctioned, stopping several inches above the designated floor. As Lane exited, she did not observe the drop-off and she fell forward injuring her back and leg.

Lane contended that the cause of the accident was Montgomery's failure to properly maintain and adjust the leveling vein of the elevator that malfunctioned. Lane testified that the subject elevator had failed to level properly on other occasions prior to the incident at issue here. Ralph Pate, a deputy state inspector from the Georgia Department of Labor, testified that a properly working elevator would not stop short of its intended floor and the failure to stop properly indicates a malfunction. The repair and maintenance records show some leveling problems with the Hospital elevators less than five months earlier.

It is undisputed that Montgomery installed the elevator at issue and provided certain maintenance and repair services under a contract between Montgomery and the Hospital. In moving for summary judgment, Montgomery primarily argued that Lane failed to offer any evidence of a negligent act or omission on its part which caused the elevator not to level at the time in question. Montgomery contended that a state inspection just prior to the incident showed no problem with the elevator at issue and a state inspection afterwards was similarly favorable.

Montgomery's employee, elevator mechanic Fred Blume testified that the elevator was shut down and removed from service almost immediately after Lane's fall until the completion of a state inspection by Pate, five days later. On that day, Blume and Pate jointly performed tests on the elevator and could not find any reason for the apparent malfunction. According to Pate's official report it was "not clear what caused occurrence." Pate approved the elevator's return to service. According to a Department of Labor semi-annual report completed two days prior to the incident, elevator # 1 passed its inspection with no violations noted. ¹ Held:

1. Montgomery claims that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law and fact because pursuant to its contract with the Hospital, the Hospital had sole liability for the operation and use of the elevator equipment and because Lane failed to produce any evidence that it failed to exercise due care in its inspection and maintenance of the elevator. We disagree.

A building owner, here presumably the corporation owning the Hospital, "owes a duty of extraordinary diligence to elevator passengers and cannot delegate this duty to an independent contractor engaged to repair the elevator. [Cits.]" Gaffney v. EQK Realty Investors, 213 Ga.App. 653, 655, 445 S.E.2d 771 (1994); OCGA § 46-9-132; see Hughes v. Hosp. Auth. of Floyd County, 165 Ga.App. 530, 531(2), 301 S.E.2d 695 (1983). Under OCGA § 51-2-5(4), an employer is liable for the negligence of an independent contractor who is performing the employer's nondelegable statutory duty. Perry v. Soil Remediation, 221 Ga.App. 386, 388(2), 471 S.E.2d 320 (1996). Nevertheless, Montgomery, regardless of its contractual obligations to the Hospital, had a duty not to act negligently toward Lane and other elevator users. See Griffin v. AAA Auto Club South, 221 Ga.App. 1, 4(4), 470 S.E.2d 474 (1996); Chapman v. Turnbull Elevator, 116 Ga.App. 661, 158 S.E.2d 438 (1967); see Jones v. Otis Elevator Co., 861 F.2d 655, 665(IV) (11th Cir.1988); see 26 AmJur2d 283, Elevators & Escalators, § 20 (1996).

Georgia has not addressed the issue of whether Montgomery, in its capacity as the elevator maintenance contractor, is held to the same duty as the premises owner, that of extraordinary diligence. Other jurisdictions are divided on the issue. See, e.g., Tait v. Armor Elevator Co., 958 F.2d 563, 567 (3rd Cir.1992). However, even if Montgomery's duty to Lane is one of ordinary care, such a standard would be heightened due to the inherent risk of injury posed to those traveling on an elevator. See Millar Elevator Svc. Co. v. O'Shields, 222 Ga.App. 456, 475 S.E.2d 188 (1996). For these reasons, we reject Montgomery's contention that it was entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.

Having addressed the legal issues, we next examine the parties' evidentiary burdens. State law requires that "[a]ny elevator ... involved in an accident described in subsection (a) or (b) of this Code section shall be removed from service at the time of the accident. The equipment shall not be repaired, altered, or placed back in service until inspected by a certified inspector for the enforcement authority." OCGA § 8-2-106(c). If it is proven that Montgomery violated OCGA § 8-2-106(c), then such conduct would constitute a form of spoliation of evidence, because by working on the elevator, the evidence would have been tampered with, altered or destroyed. See Chapman v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 220 Ga.App. 539, 542, 469 S.E.2d 783 (1996) (destruction of electrical parts and other items removed after fire before opponent's opportunity to examine same, necessitates remedial action); compare OCGA § 24-4-22. See, e.g., Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. Lakewood Engineering, etc., Corp., 982 F.2d 363 (9th Cir.1992) (rebuttable presumption created against party who destroyed boat and space heater may be insufficient to cure prejudice to other side); Northern Assur. Co. v. Ware, 145 F.R.D. 281 (D.Me.1993) (plaintiff's expert's destruction of physical evidence before its examination by opposing party precluded use of expert's testimony).

Spoliation or destruction of evidence creates the presumption that the evidence would have been harmful to the spoliator. Greer v. Andrew, 138 Ga. 663, 664(3), 75 S.E. 1050 (1912); Bennett v. Assoc. Food Stores, 118 Ga.App. 711, 716(2), 165 S.E.2d 581 (1968). Proof of such conduct would raise a rebuttable presumption against Montgomery that the evidence favored Lane, a fact rendering summary judgment inappropriate. American Cas. Co., etc. v. Schafer, 204 Ga.App. 906, 909(3), 420 S.E.2d 820 (1992).

In this case, Montgomery's service records create material issues of fact as to whether Montgomery obeyed the law. One record shows that elevator # 3 experienced a blown fuse in a control circuit several hours after the accident at issue. ² If the elevator had been removed from service, it is not clear how it could have experienced a blown fuse. Further, the time inscribed on the service ticket for that service call is after the accident, creating the impression this elevator was not removed from service.

Another Montgomery service record dated October 12, three days after the accident and two days before the state inspection, shows that one of Montgomery's elevator mechanics performed routine maintenance on elevators # 1 through # 3, including the subject elevator. Such maintenance, by the mechanic's own admission, encompassed among other things, greasing, oiling, inspecting motor brushes, generator brushes, contacts on relays and fixing whatever needed repair. Although Blume testified that he did not touch the elevator until after the state inspection, the service record directly contradicts this testimony.

If Georgia law permitted repairs and maintenance to be performed prior to the time of the state inspection, plaintiffs would never be able to show what malfunctioned and caused their injuries. Thus, the fact that Tate, the state inspector, could not identify precisely what caused the misleveling can hardly be surprising in light of the evidence that Montgomery's employee subjected the elevator to maintenance procedures before the state inspection. Whether Montgomery tampered with the evidence must be resolved by a jury.

Also, we find it perplexing that the evidence Montgomery provided is inconsistent as to whether the elevator at issue is # 1 or # 3. The state inspection report which Montgomery offered from two days before the accident was for elevator # 1. However, Montgomery's repair ticket denoted the elevator involved in the accident as elevator # 3. Montgomery's repairman, Blume, claimed that despite the fact that the service ticket on which he had described the accident specified the elevator as being # 3, it was really # 1. According to Montgomery's service record, the state inspector conducted tests on elevator # 1 not elevator # 3, even though it was elevator # 3 which Blume reported as malfunctioning and which was supposedly removed from service after Lane fell. Further, the service records fail to support Montgomery's assertion, as well as Blume's testimony, that Montgomery performed routine maintenance on the elevators approximately once every week. These records raise issues...