Johnson v. Allen

Decision Date15 April 2005
Docket NumberNo. A05A0235.,No. A05A0236.,A05A0235.,A05A0236.
Citation613 S.E.2d 657,272 Ga. App. 861
PartiesJOHNSON v. ALLEN et al. Atlas Cold Storage USA, Inc. et al. v. Allen et al.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Blasingame, Burch, Garrard, Bryant & Ashley, M. Steven Heath, Josh B. Wages, Athens, Fisher & Phillips, F. Kytle Frye III, Rhonda R. Wilcox, for appellants.

Orr & Orr, E. Wycliffe Orr, Sr., Spence Johnson, Gainesville, for appellees.

BLACKBURN, Presiding Judge.

These related cases regard the alleged improper video surveillance of a bathroom stall in the women's restroom located at Atlas Cold Storage USA, Inc. from approximately 1998 to early 2001.1 Over 20 women who used the restroom during this period subsequently filed suit against both Atlas and Timothy L. Johnson, Sr., Atlas's manager of operations, contending that they had been inappropriately monitored by Johnson while they were in the Atlas women's restroom. 2

In Case No. A05A0235, the plaintiffs sued Johnson, in his individual capacity, for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud and deceit. In Case No. A05A0236, the plaintiffs, mainly pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior, sued Atlas for invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, premises liability, fraud and deceit, and punitive damages.

After hearing arguments in both cases, the trial court denied both the motion for summary judgment brought by Johnson in Case No. A05A0235 and the separate motion brought by Atlas in Case No. A05A0236. Both Johnson and Atlas now appeal the trial court's rulings, and due to their close relation, we consider both cases together in this consolidated appeal.

Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56(c). A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant.

Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp.3

Viewed in this light, the record shows that, from 1997 until March 2001, Johnson acted as Atlas's manager of operations. Johnson's personal office and his attached restroom shared an adjoining wall with the women's restroom. In 1999, Atlas installed a video surveillance system in response to rumors that drugs were being sold on the premises, specifically in the women's restroom. During his tenure, Johnson was in sole control of the video surveillance used within the company, although the general security system was not in use for this entire time. Atlas admits that Johnson had been authorized to operate the video system to prevent theft and drug use within the facility. And, within the time period in question, Johnson made several comments to different employees regarding the extent of his monitoring capabilities. For example, Johnson told employees, "There's not going to be any place in this facility that I'm not going to be able to see you." He further admonished, "There's nowhere in this building or on these premises that I can't watch you and know what you're doing." In addition, Johnson said, "I'm going to watch you everywhere — everywhere you go, I'm going to be able to watch you." Also, Johnson stated, "There's cameras places where y'all don't know about."

Tina Carter deposed that, at one time, Michelle Massey, an Atlas employee, confronted Johnson and told him that she believed that there was a camera hidden behind a ceiling tile in the bathroom. Massey's suspicion had been aroused because she had noticed that a particular tile in the bathroom ceiling had been moved back and forth from its proper position to a position in which it was pushed slightly back, thereby creating an opening to the space above. Carter further deposed that when Massey described her suspicion that there was a camera above the bathroom stall to Johnson, he replied: "ha, ha, ha, there is." Johnson then entered the women's restroom and, using a stepladder replaced the tile without checking for a camera.

In addition, Darrell Moore, an Atlas maintenance man, testified that, on two separate occasions in 1999, he saw a video monitor in the ceiling of Johnson's own restroom. When Moore asked Johnson about the monitor, Johnson told him that it was none of his business.

In the fall of 2001, after Johnson's departure from the company, Atlas decided that, due to security concerns, it should reactivate its camera surveillance system which had been installed in 1999 but was no longer in use at that time. While the system was being reactivated, a technician discovered a video camera, monitor, videocassette recorder, and modem above the women's restroom. At the time that it was discovered, the camera was not hooked up to the general security system, and, rather than being an indoor camera, the camera in question was one designed for outdoor use.

In response to the discovery of the camera, Atlas issued a memorandum to its employees stating that a serious breach of security probably occurred in the building. In addition, it offered counseling to any employees who felt that they needed it in light of this security breach.

Case No. A05A0235

1. Johnson contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiff's claims for invasion of privacy.

Under Georgia case law, the concept of invasion of privacy encompasses four loosely related but distinct torts, as follows: (1) intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs; (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff; (3) publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name and likeness.

Sun v. Langston.4 This case centers solely around the plaintiffs' claims that Johnson inappropriately intruded upon their seclusion while they were in the restroom.

In order to recover for intrusion upon seclusion, it is necessary to show "a physical intrusion analogous to a trespass." (Punctuation omitted.) Davis v. Emmis Publishing Corp.5 "Like assault and battery, this tort is analyzed under an objective standard. The intrusion aspect of this type of invasion of privacy involves a prying or intrusion, which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person." (Punctuation omitted.) Everett v. Goodloe.6

An individual certainly retains a right of privacy regarding their use of a restroom, an immensely intimate act. See Wylie v. State.7

However, the law recognizes that the right of privacy is not absolute. . . . [I]t . . . must be kept within its proper limits, and in its exercise must be made to accord with the rights of those who have other liberties, as well as the rights of any person who may be properly interested in the matters which are claimed to be of purely private concern.

(Punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Elmore v. Atlantic Zayre.8 Thus, "a stall in a public restroom is not a private place when it is used for other than its intended purpose." In re C.P.9 (no expectation of privacy in high school bathroom stall being used for sexual activity). See also Elmore, supra (no invasion of privacy when store bathroom stall being used for sodomy); Wylie, supra (no invasion of privacy when two persons occupying single stall are facing each other).

Based on the facts of this case, however, the alleged continual monitoring of the women's restroom would constitute an invasion of privacy, irrespective of rumors of drug use and sales. Unlike those cases cited directly above, the alleged monitoring in this case was not conducted as short-term surveillance in response to specific information of illegal activity being performed within a restroom stall. To the contrary, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, this case regards the continuous observation of private matters occurring in the women's restroom. And, as such observation would surely be offensive to the reasonable person, the trial court did not err by denying Johnson's motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' claims for invasion of privacy.

Nonetheless, Johnson argues that there was insufficient evidence to show either that the camera in question was ever operational or that he had any control over the camera. Our standard of review, however, requires this Court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and the plaintiffs' claims survive summary judgment if there is sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable inference that Johnson used the camera to improperly monitor the women's restroom.

Viewed under the proper standard of review, the record shows that, on several different occasions, Johnson bragged to a number of employees that he could watch them at any place in the facility, including places that they would not suspect. Indeed, he admitted to one person that a camera had been installed in the women's restroom. In addition, a video monitor was seen in Johnson's bathroom adjoining the women's restroom, and Johnson had an opportunity to investigate the placement of the camera but suspiciously failed to do so. All of this evidence raises at least a reasonable inference both that Johnson may have known about the camera and that it was operational.

Accordingly, this enumeration lacks merit.

2. Johnson contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion for summary judgment regarding the plaintiffs' claims that they suffered from the intentional infliction of emotional distress due to the breach of their privacy.

The four elements which must be proved in order to sustain a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress are: (1) The conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) The conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3) There must be a causal connection between the...

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