Johnson v. City of Woodward

• Decision Date: 09 October 2001
• Docket Number: No. 95,042.,95,042.
• Citation: 38 P.3d 218,2001 OK 85
• Parties: Don L. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. CITY OF WOODWARD, State Insurance Fund, Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

38 P.3d 218

2001 OK 85

Don L. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. CITY OF WOODWARD, State Insurance Fund, Workers' Compensation Court, Respondents.

No. 95,042.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

October 9, 2001.

As Corrected December 6, 2001.

Rehearing Denied December 4, 2001.

Duke Halley, Duke Halley Law Firm, P.L.L.C., Woodward, OK, attorney for petitioner Don L. Johnson.

James C. Ferguson, Bruce V. Winston, Walker, Ferguson and Ferguson, Oklahoma City, OK, attorneys for respondents City of Woodward and State Insurance Fund.

WINCHESTER, J.

¶ 1 This matter concerns a workers' compensation claim filed by claimant/ petitioner Don L. Johnson (hereinafter "Johnson") for injuries arising from an attack of stress-induced angina. The Workers' Compensation Court trial tribunal, D. Craig Johnston, trial judge, denied Johnson's claims for medical expenses and temporary total disability. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, sustained the trial tribunal's order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 The record reflects the following facts to be undisputed. Johnson began his employment as a firefighter with the City of Woodward, Oklahoma in October, 1980. Johnson's pre-employment physical showed no respiratory or heart problems. On November 29, 1995, Johnson was admitted to the Woodward Hospital and Health Center with anterior chest pain radiating to the left arm. The record reflects that Johnson had cardiac catherization, angioplasty and placement of a stent in the mid-right coronary artery on December 1, 1995. The medical record reflects coronary artery disease involving the mid-right coronary artery as of December 1, 1995.

¶ 3 The record on appeal reveals that on May 6, 1999, Johnson experienced stress induced angina while fighting a structural fire at a residence in Woodward. The following morning, Johnson sought medical treatment. The record shows he was admitted to Presbyterian Hospital in Oklahoma City. A left heart catheterization was performed and it was discovered that Johnson's right coronary had a ninety-five percent (95%) stenotic lesion. Johnson had a post coronary angiogram with angioplasty and stent placement to the right coronary artery. The record reflects that as of July 6, 1999, Johnson suffered from fixed coronary artery disease, post stent (2) placement. Johnson subsequently retired from service as a firefighter. The record reflects that he no longer could wear a respirator due to his heart condition and that exercise exacerbated this condition.

¶ 4 Johnson filed his amended Form 3 on May 5, 2000, alleging injury from a single incident and cumulative injury. The amended Form 3 stated his "heart and entire body" were injured or affected and the nature of his injury or illness was "heart problems." The trial tribunal found as a matter of law that the provisions of 11 O.S.Supp.2000, § 49-110¹ and the presumption contained therein were inapplicable to claims filed pursuant to the Workers' Compensation Act. The trial tribunal also concluded there must be physical injury to the heart to constitute a compensable injury, under 85 O.S.Supp.2000, § 3 (10)(b) and (c), and no physical injury to Johnson's heart occurred as a result of the May 6, 1999, incident. The Court of Civil Appeals, Division I, affirmed the judgment of the trial tribunal denying workers' compensation benefits to Johnson.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 5 At issue herein is the trial tribunal's interpretation of these aforementioned statutes which constitutes a legal ruling. Therefore, our review is de novo. "An appellate court claims for itself plenary, independent and non-deferential authority to re-examine a trial court's legal rulings." Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 22, n. 30, 989 P.2d 448, 456, n. 30. "A compensation tribunal's legal rulings like those by a district court judge, are on review subject to an appellate court's plenary, independent and nondeferential reexamination." Arrow Tool and Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 6, 16 P.3d 1120, 1123 (emphasis original) (footnote omitted.) The first impression issues we address on appeal are: (1) Does the presumption contained in 11 O.S.Supp.2000, § 49-110 (A) apply to proceedings before the Worker's Compensation Court trial tribunal? (2) Do the definitions of "injury" contained in 85 O.S.Supp.2000, § 3 (10)(a), (b) and (c), require actual physical injury to the heart be established for Johnson to obtain workers' compensation benefits? Our determination of these issues is dispositive of the case at bar and is premised solely upon independent issues of state law and not upon federal constitutional considerations. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983).

STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

¶ 6 The intent of the legislature controls when interpreting statutes. Tulsa County Deputy Sheriff's Fraternal Order of Police v. Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County, 2000 OK 2, ¶ 10, 995 P.2d 1124, 1125, reh'g. denied, (June 30, 1998), appeal after remand, 2000 OK 2, 995 P.2d 1124. It is presumed that the law-making body has expressed its intent in a statute and that it intended what it so expressed. TXO Production Corp. v. Okl. Corp. Comm'n, 1992 OK 39, ¶ 7, 829 P.2d 964, 969. Rules of statutory construction are employed only when legislative intent cannot be ascertained from the language of a statute, as in cases of ambiguity or conflict with other statutes. Cooper v. State ex rel. Dep't. of Public Safety, 1996 OK 49, ¶ 10, 917 P.2d 466, 468. The primary goal of rules of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislature's intent. Ledbetter v. Alcoholic Bev. Laws Enforcement, 1988 OK 117, ¶ 7, 764 P.2d 172, 179. Such intent must be gleaned from the statute in view of its general purpose and object. TXO Production Corp., 1992 OK 39 at ¶ 7, 829 P.2d at 968. When legislative intent is expressed clearly in the statute, there is no room for further judicial inquiry. George E. Failing Co. v. Watkins, 2000 OK 76, ¶ 8, 14 P.3d 52, 56. "The best evidence of legislative intent is the statutory language itself." Upton v. State Department of Corrections, 2000 OK 46, ¶ 6, 9 P.3d 84, 86 (footnote omitted.) In the instant case, statutory construction is unnecessary because the legislature's intent can be ascertained from the plain language of the statutes.

"INJURY" OR "PERSONAL INJURY"

¶ 7 Our inquiry begins with the interpretation of 85 O.S.Supp.2000, § 3 (10)(a), (b) and (c), defining "injury" or "personal injury" for purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act.² It is important to note the legislature amended § 3 in November, 1997.³ The definitions of "injury" or "personal injury" were reconfigured and moved from subsection (7) to subsection (10).

When construing a statute which has been amended, we are mindful that the legislature may have intended either (a) to clarify that which previously appeared doubtful or (b) to effect a change in the existing law. Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 1120, 1126.

¶ 8 The Workers' Compensation Court trial tribunal concluded Johnson suffered from angina induced by preexisting coronary artery disease. Order Denying Compensability at p. 2, Finding 4. It also found Johnson was in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the angina attack and the evidence supported a finding that "the physical stress at the time the angina pain initiated was in excess of that experienced by a person in the conduct of everyday living." Order Denying Compensability at p. 2, Findings 5 and 6, respectively. In Finding 7, page 2, the trial tribunal apparently applied § 3(10)(c) to the instant set of facts, stating:

"[Johnson] failed to establish by a preponderance of the medical evidence that a physical injury to the heart has occurred, as angina pain alone is insufficient to establish a compens[a]ble injury. Claimant's claim is therefore denied."

On page one of its order, Finding 2, the trial tribunal concludes:

"However, angina pain alone is insufficient without actual physical injury to the heart to constitute an accidental injury Haynes v. Pryor High School, 1977 OK 1, 566 P.2d 852, 854." (Emphasis original.)

¶ 9 These findings establish the trial tribunal denied Johnson's claims for medical expenses and temporary total disability benefits because it concluded he did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that physical injury to his heart occurred during the May 6, 1999, incident. In the current version of § 3(10)(b), (amended effective November 1, 1997), "injury" or "personal injury" includes heart-related or vascular injury or illness if it results from (1) stress in excess of that experienced by a person in the conduct of everyday living and (2) which stress arises out of and in the course of a claimant's employment. (numbering added). We decided the Haynes case on November 30, 1976, and denied rehearing July 12, 1977, prior to the legislature's amendments to both statutes. At the time, compensation awards for heart-related injuries were limited to injuries attributable to coronary occlusion, thrombosis or myocardial infarction. Haynes, 1977 OK 1, ¶ 17, 566 P.2d 852, 855. This limitation on compensable injuries was lifted by the legislative amendments of November 1, 1977, that resulted in the current § 3(10)(a) and (b). Today, under Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act, coronary artery disease such as that suffered by Johnson is, indeed, a heart-related illness.⁴

¶ 10 Based upon the medical record in this case, coronary artery disease undermines and weakens a person's constitution and is not a temporary condition. The record allows that this illness affects the general soundness of the heart and its health. As such, coronary artery disease constitutes a heart-related illness within the confines of (10)(b). The trial tribunal held Johnson's stress met the criteria set forth in (10)(a) and (b) and stated:

"THAT the treating physicians who were cardiac specialists, diagnosed claimant's condition as Angina induced by pre-existing

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