Johnson v. Dep't of State Police

Decision Date24 January 2020
Docket NumberDocket No. 124213
Citation2020 IL 124213,443 Ill.Dec. 37,161 N.E.3d 161
Parties Shawna JOHNSON, Appellee, v. The DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, Appellant.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Springfield (Jane Elinor Notz, Solicitor General, and Katelin B. Buell, Assistant Attorney General, of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Rebecca M. Blakeslee, of Lawrenceville, and David D. Jensen, of David Jensen PLLC, of New York, New York, for appellee.

JUSTICE THEIS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 This direct appeal involves the interplay of state and federal firearms laws. The Department of State Police (Department) revoked Shawna Johnson's Firearm Owner's Identification (FOID) card under the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (FOID Card Act) ( 430 ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2012)) due to her conviction for a misdemeanor crime involving domestic violence. That conviction prohibited her from possessing firearms under federal law. Johnson brought a petition in the circuit court of Wabash County seeking relief from the Department's determination. The circuit court held that section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun Control Act of 1968 (Gun Control Act), as amended ( 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2006) ), and several provisions of the FOID Card Act ( 430 ILCS 65/8(n), 10(b), 10(c)(4) (West 2012)), which incorporate that federal statute, were unconstitutional as applied to Johnson. The circuit court ordered the Department to reinstate and reissue Johnson's FOID card. The Department appealed directly to this court as a matter of right. Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court, albeit on different grounds, and we vacate the circuit court's findings that the state and federal statutes are unconstitutional as applied to Johnson.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In June 2001, Johnson pleaded guilty to misdemeanor battery ( 720 ILCS 5/12-3(a)(1) (West 2000)) after striking her then-husband in the head, causing bodily harm.1 She was sentenced to two days in jail (time served in pretrial detention), a fine, and a one-year term of conditional discharge.

¶ 4 In 2010, Johnson applied for and received a FOID card after answering "no" to the question of whether she had previously been convicted of a crime of domestic violence. She thought, based on advice from the local sheriff, that her conviction for misdemeanor battery did not qualify as a crime of domestic violence. Thereafter, she was denied the right to purchase a handgun because of her 2001 conviction.

¶ 5 The Department subsequently revoked Johnson's FOID card pursuant to section 8(n) of the FOID Card Act ( 430 ILCS 65/8(n) (West 2012)), which authorizes the Department to revoke a FOID card where the person is "prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by * * * federal law." The Department informed Johnson that section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun Control Act was the basis for the federal prohibition. Johnson subsequently sought a pardon from the Governor in 2012, but that request was denied.

¶ 6 In August 2013, Johnson filed a petition in the circuit court seeking relief from the Department's revocation of her FOID card under section 10 of the FOID Card Act. Thereafter, the Department filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, inter alia , that Johnson's requested relief would be contrary to the public interest and would violate federal law and that the FOID Card Act prohibited the circuit court from ordering the issuance of a FOID card to anyone prohibited by federal law from acquiring or possessing firearms or ammunition. In response, Johnson argued, inter alia , that granting her relief under the FOID Card Act would not be contrary to federal law because she was entitled to the "civil rights restored" exemption under federal law. The circuit court ultimately ruled that it could not grant Johnson relief by compelling the Department to issue her a card under the current construction of the FOID Card Act, but the court granted her leave to replead to assert her constitutional claims.

¶ 7 In her second amended petition, Johnson asserted that the perpetual ban on her ability to possess firearms under the current state law framework violated her second amendment right by permanently denying her firearms rights. She argued that she readily met the applicable standards set forth in sections 10(c)(1)-(3) of the FOID Card Act because the circumstances of her conviction, criminal history, and reputation indicate that she "will not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety" and, further, that "relief would not be contrary to the public interest." 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(1)-(3) (West 2012). She maintained that her ongoing inability to obtain relief due to the federal disability made the revocation of her FOID card unconstitutional as applied to her.

¶ 8 The case proceeded to an evidentiary hearing, at which the circuit court considered documentary evidence, various stipulations of fact, and testimony from multiple witnesses in support of Johnson's petition. These witnesses included Johnson, her current husband, and several law enforcement personnel from the community who knew Johnson personally. The Department had an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses.

¶ 9 After taking the matter under advisement, the circuit court granted Johnson relief. Initially, the court found that the statutory factors set forth under sections 10(c)(1)-(3) strongly supported granting Johnson's petition and reinstating her FOID card. Specifically, the court found that Johnson had not committed a forcible felony within 20 years, that her criminal history and her reputation indicated that she was not likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety, and that granting relief was not contrary to the public interest. But for her federal disability, as incorporated into section 10(c)(4) of the FOID Card Act, she would have been eligible to have her FOID card reinstated.

¶ 10 The circuit court ruled that substantial justice had not been done and that, due to the perpetual denial of Johnson's right to possess and use firearms, section 922(g)(9) of the federal Gun Control Act; sections 8(n), 10(b), and (c)(4) of the FOID Card Act; and title 20, section 1230.20, of the Illinois Administrative Code ( 20 Ill. Adm. Code 1230.20 (2013) ) violated Johnson's rights under the second and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, as applied to the specific facts and circumstances of her case. Accordingly, the court ordered the Director of State Police to reinstate and reissue a FOID card to Johnson. The Department appealed the circuit court's order directly to this court. Ill. S. Ct. R. 302(a) (eff. Oct. 4, 2011).

¶ 11 ANALYSIS

¶ 12 By all accounts Johnson's FOID card would have been reinstated under Illinois law but for the provisions in the FOID Card Act that prohibit a court from granting relief when it would be contrary to federal law. 430 ILCS 65/10(b), (c)(4) (West 2012) (as amended by Pub. Act 97-1131 (eff. Jan. 1, 2013) (adding 430 ILCS 65/10(c)(4) )). Johnson contends that under a proper construction of the state and federal statutes the federal prohibition is no longer applicable. Specifically, she argues that the restoration of her right to keep and bear arms under Illinois's regulatory scheme is a restoration of her "civil rights," as that term is applied under the federal Gun Control Act, so that she falls within the exception to the federal disability. And as a matter of constitutional avoidance, Johnson maintains that this court should first address this argument.

¶ 13 We are cognizant of the long-standing rule that "cases should be decided on nonconstitutional grounds whenever possible, reaching constitutional issues only as a last resort." In re E.H. , 224 Ill. 2d 172, 178, 309 Ill.Dec. 1, 863 N.E.2d 231 (2006). This principle has been applied even in cases where the court acquires jurisdiction because a constitutional question is involved. People v. Waid , 221 Ill. 2d 464, 473, 303 Ill.Dec. 785, 851 N.E.2d 1210 (2006). Thus, we will look first to Johnson's nonconstitutional claim as a basis for upholding the trial court's judgment. Because questions related to the interpretation of a statute present issues of law, our review proceeds de novo . People v. Manning , 2018 IL 122081, ¶ 16, 425 Ill.Dec. 490, 115 N.E.3d 45.

¶ 14 We note that this court has not considered the precise issue that Johnson presents. In Coram v. State , 2013 IL 113867, 375 Ill.Dec. 1, 996 N.E.2d 1057, this court interpreted the preamended version of the FOID Card Act. The lead opinion found that the prior version of the FOID Card Act permitted courts to override a federal disability, reasoning that a state's ability to restore firearm rights was necessarily implied by Congress. Id. ¶ 69. The specially concurring opinion found that, under the prior version of the FOID Card Act, there was no statutory bar from granting relief under section 10, which at that time did not incorporate federal law. Id. ¶¶ 100, 107 (Burke, J., specially concurring, joined by Freeman, J.).

¶ 15 To answer the question presented—whether granting Johnson relief would be contrary to federal law—we begin with a review of the state statutory framework and the interplay between state and federal law. We then consider whether Johnson's civil rights have been restored under the relevant federal statute, triggering an exception to the federal law.

¶ 16 FOID Card Act

¶ 17 Since 1967, Illinois law has provided that an individual must obtain a FOID card in order to acquire or possess a firearm. 430 ILCS 65/2(a)(1) (West 2018); 1967 Ill. Laws 2599. Under section 8 of the FOID Card Act, the Department is authorized to deny an application for or revoke a card based on certain disqualifying criteria, including a Department finding that the person "is prohibited from acquiring or possessing firearms or firearm ammunition by any ...

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