Johnson v. Schrader, 4084
| Decision Date | 03 November 1972 |
| Docket Number | No. 4084,4084 |
| Citation | 502 P.2d 371 |
| Parties | Daniel JOHNSON et al., Appellants, v. Robert SCHRADER, State Superintendent of Public Instruction, et al., Appellee. |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
John J. Rooney, of Rooney & Horiskey, Cheyenne, for appellants.
Jerome F. Statkus, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., Cheyenne, for appellee.
Before McINTYRE, C. J., and PARKER, McEWAN and GUTHRIE, JJ.
This case involves action initiated by citizens and taxpayers of Goshen County School Districts 3, 5, 8 and 12. The purpose of the action was to set aside as void a decision and order of the State Committee on School District Organization.
The state committee's order which is questioned approved and purported to make final a plan submitted by the county committee of Goshen County. The plan called for the organization of all school districts in Goshen County into a single countywide unified district. The objectors sought review in the district court under the administrative procedure act. The district court upheld, with minor exceptions, all actions of the state committee.
Having found that certain errors existed in the description of boundaries and that further action was necessary with regard to a fair and equitable distribution of debts and assets, the district court ordered correction to be made in the boundary descriptions and proper distribution of debts and assets to be made. In other respects, action of the state committee was affirmed and approved. The objectors who sought review in the district court have appealed to our court.
The first assignment made by appellants is that there is no statutory authority for county committees or for the state committee to reorganize or unify school districts which are already unified according to the definition contained in § 21.1-20, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp. In this connection, appellants point out that all eight districts in Goshen County had high schools prior to any attempted reorganization. They therefore claim all districts involved were already unified and could not be reorganized.
A decision on this first assignment is not necessary for our disposition of the matter before us. However, we have concluded the case should be remanded for further proceedings, and we think it might be helpful in connection with such further proceedings for us to comment briefly on the first assignment.
Counsel for appellants points to the declaration in § 21.1-20, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp., to the effect that every school district with grades one through twelve is a 'unified school district.' He also points to the purpose expressed in § 21.1-106 of replacing the different types and kinds of school districts with unified school districts 'as defined in this chapter.' Additionally, counsel cites a number of sections in the reorganization law which indicate the legislature intended school districts of county to be organized into one or more unified school districts, with the plural of districts being used rather consistently.
Counsel for the state committee emphasizes the provisions of § 21.1-109, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp., and argues school districts are not free from reorganization (even if they have a high school) unless they meet the criteria standards specified by the legislature in § 21.1-109.
We think the implications of § 21.1-135 of the reorganization law cannot be overlooked. It provides:
'The state committee may exempt from the procedures of this chapter any county-wide unified school district in existence prior to the effective date of this act which reasonably complies with the criteria of this chapter.' (Emphasis supplied.)
This section strongly suggests that no school district is excluded from reorganization procedures except a countywide district which was already unified before the reorganization law, and then only if such district reasonably complies with the criteria of the law.
All things considered, we are unpersuaded that there is any merit in appellants' first assignment of error to the effect that all territory in Goshen County was already in unified districts and the county committee lacked the power to consolidate such districts.
We turn our attention then to another of the assignments which has to do with whether the state committee has the power, by rejecting a county plan with full criteria standards, to compel reorganization of all the county into a single countywide district.
Plan 1 which was submitted by the county committee in Goshen County contemplated that Goshen County and its eight school districts would be reorganized into a county with four new and unified districts. The state committee rejected Plan 1 and, as the law required, 1 recommended what was necessary to put the plan into proper compliance with the law. Thereupon, the county committee submitted Plan 2. However, that plan was soon withdrawn by the county committee itself.
At this point Plan 3 was submitted by the county committee to the state committee. It again was for four unified districts in Goshen County. Appellants claim Plan 3 was such that each unified district therein would meet all of the criteria requirements of § 21.1-109, W.S.1957, 1971 Cum.Supp. Appellants also claim Plan 3 contained all of the changes recommended by the state committee when it rejected Plan 1 and specified the changes necessary to put the plan into compliance with the criteria standards specified by law.
Plan 3 was rejected by the state committee. However, if that plan did meet the criteria standards specified by law (regardless of whether it followed all recommendations of the state committee), then and in that event it should have been accepted and not rejected by the state committee; and if the rejection was without proper reason or authority, it was arbitrary and void.
This court made it clear in School District No. 9, in County of Fremont v. District Boundary Board In and For Fremont County, Wyo., 351 P.2d 106, 111, that an administrative board must have before it sufficient information for the finding of those facts upon which it pretends to act, otherwise its action will be arbitrary. 2 In keeping with that theory, we pointed out in Pan American Petroleum Corporation v. Wyoming Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, Wyo., 446 P.2d 550, 555, that it is the duty of courts on review to ascertain whether the administrative board's findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. We also said findings of basic facts will not be implied from ultimate findings or conclusions of law; and failure of an agency to meet its responsibilities makes its determination susceptible to the charge that its order is contrary to law.
Let us make it very clear at this point, no law says Goshen County has to be a single countywide school district. If the state committee made that determination and for that reason refused approval of a plan submitted by the county committee, it acted without authority and in excess of its power. Counsel for appellants argues the state committee decided it would settle for nothing less than a single countywide unified district in Goshen County; that it therefore rejected Plan 3; and that it prepared on its own initiative Plan 4 and 'forced' the county committee to accept such plan by threatening that, if the county committee did not submit Plan 4, the state committee could and would put it into effect.
We doubt that the allegation to the effect that the county committee was 'forced' has been substantiated, because the county committee must be presumed to know the law and the extent of the state committee's powers. However, if Plan 3, which was submitted by the county committee before and in preference to Plan 4, reasonably met the minimum criteria requirements as prescribed in § 21.1-109 of the school district organization law, then and in that event it should have been approved and not rejected by the state committee. 3
Section 21.1-109 requires unified school districts to be organized as efficient administrative units; it requires all territory within a district to be contiguous; it specifies requirements for trustee residence areas; it requires that consideration is to be given to a ratio between membership and assessed valuation 'as nearly equalized as practicable' among the unified districts in the county; and it requires reasonable equality for educational opportunity and services within each unified district.
We fail to find anything in the record which would justify a conclusion that Plan 3 would not have reasonably met all of the criteria requirements set forth in § 21.1-109. We have heretofore made it clear that the state committee, as an administrative agency, had to have sufficient information before it to justify its determination that Plan 3 would not meet the necessary criteria requirements, otherwise its action must be considered arbitrary.
If such evidence and information had been offered to the state committee, the record fails to disclose it. Not only do the appellants contend there was an absence of evidence and information before the state committee with respect to crtieria considerations, but they point out that during review by the district court they attempted to offer evidence tending to show that Plan 3 reasonably met all criteria requirements. They also claim and...
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