Reed v. State

• Decision Date: 29 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. A10-39.,A10-39.
• Citation: 793 N.W.2d 725
• Parties: Ronald Lindsey REED, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

793 N.W.2d 725 Ronald Lindsey REED, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. No. A10-39. Supreme Court of Minnesota. Dec. 29, 2010.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Appellant's claim that he was denied his constitutional right to self-representation is barred by Knaffla because appellant argued the same issue on direct appeal.

2. The affirmative defense that the statute of limitations bars prosecution of a specific offense is a claim-processing rule, which is subject to waiver.

3. There is no distinction between liability as a principal and liability for aiding and abetting for the purpose of calculating the limitations period under a statute of limitations.

4. The postconviction court did not commit reversible error when it denied appellant's ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims.

5. The postconviction court did not commit reversible error when it denied appellant's recanted-testimony claim.

Howard Bass, Bass Law Firm, PLLC, Burnsville, MN, for appellant.

Lori Swanson, Minnesota Attorney General, St. Paul, MN; and Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant Ramsey County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.

OPINION

ANDERSON, G. BARRY, Justice.

Ronald Lindsey Reed was convicted of conspiracy and aiding and abetting the murder of a police officer. On direct appeal, we affirmed Reed's convictions. State v. Reed (Reed I), 737 N.W.2d 572 (Minn.2007). Reed then sought postconviction relief, asserting that the district court violated his constitutional right to self-representation, the statute of limitations barred his prosecution, trial and appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance, and a new trial was required because a witness recanted her testimony. The postconviction court denied Reed's petition without a hearing. We affirm.

We fully discussed the facts of this case in Reed's direct appeal. See Reed I, 737 N.W.2d at 578-79. We focus here on the facts relevant to this proceeding.

Police officer James Sackett was shot and killed while responding to a false emergency call on May 22, 1970. Soon after the killing, the caller, Constance Trimble-Smith, was tried for the killing and testified that someone told her to make the fictitious report, but did not identify the person. She was acquitted. Much later, on January 12, 2005, Reed was indicted for conspiracy to commit murder in violation of Minn.Stat. § 609.175, subd. 2 (2010), and aiding and abetting murder under Minn.Stat. §§ 609.05, subd. 1, and 609.185(a)(1) (2010).

On February 7, 2006, two weeks before opening statements were delivered in his trial, Reed requested the district court to appoint new counsel, stating that he was unhappy with his representation. The court denied the motion, holding that Reed's attorneys had, in the court's view, "presented a zealous defense on behalf of Mr. Reed." Reed asked if he could readhis motion into the record. The court accepted Reed's written motion, but refused to read it into the record, stating, "I have indicated for the record exactly what his request is and that it is based on his feeling that the defense counsel have not adequately presented or prepared their case for trial." The court filed Reed's motion under seal.

Trimble-Smith testified for the State at Reed's trial. Trimble-Smith stated that Reed told her to make the 1970 telephone call that lured Sackett to the location of the shooting. There were some inconsistencies between the testimony she provided at trial and the testimony she provided to the grand jury that indicted Reed, which the prosecution highlighted during direct examination. At trial, she testified that it was impossible for Reed to have been the shooter and that Reed did not know the shooting would result from the phone call.

The State also presented testimony from John Griffin, who stated that Reed essentially confessed to shooting Sackett when Griffin and Reed met in the early 1980s. Another witness, Anthony Foster, testified that he, Reed, and two others were together in Foster's apartment two or three days after the murder. Foster stated that Reed was acting "more subdued," but that Reed did not say anything about the murder when the topic arose.

Reed was found guilty of conspiracy to commit murder and aiding and abetting murder. Based on Reed's conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, the district court sentenced Reed to life imprisonment. The court did not impose a sentence for the conspiracy charge.

On direct appeal, we affirmed Reed's conviction for aiding and abetting first-degree murder. Reed I, 737 N.W.2d at 590. The postconviction court denied Reed's petition for postconviction relief. Reed now appeals from the postconviction court's denial of postconviction relief.

I.

In his petition for postconviction relief, Reed argued that the district court violated his constitutional right to self-representation when it denied his February 7, 2006, motion for substitute counsel.¹ The postconviction court denied this claim as procedurally barred under State v. Knaffla, 309 Minn. 246, 252, 243 N.W.2d 737, 741 (1976), and, in the alternative, denied the claim as lacking factual support.

We review the denial of postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. Quick v. State, 692 N.W.2d 438, 439 (Minn.2005). Under this standard of review, a matter will not be reversed unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings. Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Minn.2010). We review issues of law de novo. Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 338 (Minn.2003).

The Knaffla rule provides that "where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief." Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. This bar also applies to claims that should have beenknown on direct appeal. King v. State, 649 N.W.2d 149, 156 (Minn.2002). There are two exceptions to the Knaffla bar: "(1) if the claim presents a novel legal issue or (2) if fairness requires review of the claim and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue on direct appeal," a postconviction court may consider the claim. Quick, 692 N.W.2d at 439. The second prong requires that the "claim must have merit and must be asserted without deliberate or inexcusable delay." Wright v. State, 765 N.W.2d 85, 90 (Minn.2009).

Reed raised the self-representation claim on direct appeal in Reed I. His supplemental brief to this court summarized the basic contents of the February 7, 2006, motion. We rejected Reed's self-representation claim on direct appeal. Reed I, 737 N.W.2d at 587. Consequently, we conclude that the postconviction court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Knaffla barred the claims raised in his February 7, 2006, motion because the record demonstrates that Reed raised the same issue on direct appeal.

Relying on the second exception to the Knaffla rule, Reed argues that Knaffla does not bar the claims because he could not adequately argue the self-representation claim raised in his motion. Reed contends he could not raise the issue completely because the motion was drafted by his brother, sealed by the court, not used by appellate counsel, and unseen by Reed until after his direct appeal. Reed asserts that State v. Lopez, 587 N.W.2d 26 (Minn.1998), supports his contention. We disagree.

In Lopez, the defendant was essentially unable to prepare a pro se supplemental brief on direct appeal because the trial transcripts had not been translated into his native language. Id. at 27 n. 1. We noted that "[i]n the interest of justice, Lopez will not be precluded from raising any of the issues related to the translation of his trial transcript or his pro se claims in a postconviction petition." Id. Reed's analogy to Lopez is not persuasive. Trial transcripts are prepared by others and are not otherwise available to the defendant, whereas Reed's brother drafted the two-page motion pursuant to Reed's direction. Because Reed directed the creation of the motion, Reed knew the contents of his motion. Thus, unlike the defendant in Lopez, nothing prevented Reed from raising on direct appeal the claim raised in his February 7, 2006, motion, and he actually raised the claim. The interests of justice exception to the Knaffla bar does not apply when a party simply believes an argument actually raised on direct appeal could have been more complete.

II.

Reed argues that the statute of limitations applicable at the time of the killing prohibits prosecution. See Minn.Stat. § 628.26 (1974) ² (stating the limitations period for all crimes, except murder, is three years). The postconviction court denied the claim as barred by Knaffla. We will not reverse the denial of postconviction relief unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings. Dobbins v. State, 788 N.W.2d 719, 725 (Minn.2010).

Reed knew of, but did not raise, the statute-of-limitations defense in his direct appeal. Because Reed offers no reason for his failure to raise the issue on direct appeal, the statute-of-limitations claimwould ordinarily be barred by Knaffla, 309 Minn. at 252, 243 N.W.2d at 741. Reed contends, however, that a valid statute-of-limitations defense deprives the district court of subject matter jurisdiction and therefore cannot be barred. We disagree.

There is "a critical difference between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule." Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). Subject-matter-jurisdiction claims relate to "the courts' statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S....