Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 28 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | NO. 14-18-00361-CR,14-18-00361-CR |
| Citation | 602 S.W.3d 50 |
| Parties | Jacob Matthew JOHNSON, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Appellant Jacob Matthew Johnson appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana. In two issues, he challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence on the basis that it was obtained pursuant to an unlawful detention. We reverse and remand.
Appellant was charged with possession of marijuana in an amount of two ounces or less, a Class B misdemeanor. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.121(b)(1). He filed a motion to suppress. At the suppression hearing, Officer Robert Cox of the Brazoria County Sherriff's Office was the only witness.
Officer Cox testified he was on patrol around midnight on August 28, 2016, when he noticed a "suspicious vehicle" in a park-and-ride parking lot (the "Parking Lot"). Officer Cox shined his spotlight twice across the vehicle, saw movement inside the vehicle, and could tell that that two people occupied it. The vehicle had no headlights or other lights turned on. Officer Cox stopped his marked patrol car within ten to fifteen yards of the vehicle and activated his overhead emergency lights. He cautiously approached the driver's side of the vehicle. When the vehicle's window came down and Officer Cox made contact with appellant, Officer Cox detected the odor of marijuana, and he noticed that appellant's shorts were unbuttoned and unzipped.
The State offered the video recording from Officer Cox's patrol car, but appellant objected that this exhibit was not relevant. The trial court sustained the objection and did not admit the exhibit into evidence. No other exhibit was admitted into evidence at the suppression hearing, so Officer Cox's testimony was the only evidence before the trial court for the motion to suppress.
The trial court signed an order denying appellant's motion to suppress in June 2017, and in August 2017, signed the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
At a bench trial in May 2018, appellant entered a plea of "guilty." The trial court found appellant guilty and assessed his punishment at three days' confinement in jail with a three-day credit and a $500 fine. Appellant filed a timely appeal.
Appellant argues under his first issue that the interaction between Officer Cox and appellant was a seizure rather than a consensual encounter. Under his second issue, appellant asserts that Officer Cox lacked reasonable suspicion to lawfully detain him.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we apply an abuse-of-discretion standard, and we overturn the trial court's ruling only if it falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. Martinez v. State , 348 S.W.3d 919, 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We apply a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to a trial court's determination of historical facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely upon the credibility of a witness, but applying a de novo standard of review to pure questions of law and mixed questions that do not depend on credibility determinations. Id. at 922–23. In a motion-to-suppress hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Baird v. State , 398 S.W.3d 220, 226 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Thus, the trial court may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness's testimony, even if that testimony is not controverted. Id.
When a trial court makes written findings of fact, as it did in this case, we examine the record in the light most favorable to the ruling and uphold those fact findings so long as the record supports them. Id. We then determine de novo the legal significance of the facts as found by the trial court. Id. We will sustain the trial court's ruling if the record reasonably supports that ruling and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Valtierra v. State , 310 S.W.3d 442, 447–48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Under his first issue appellant asserts a Fourth Amendment seizure had occurred before the car window was lowered. The law recognizes three distinct types of police/citizen interactions: (1) consensual encounters that do not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) investigative detentions that are Fourth Amendment seizures of limited scope and duration that must be supported by a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; and (3) arrests, the most intrusive of Fourth Amendment seizures, that are reasonable only if supported by probable cause. Wade v. State , 422 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Police officers are as free as any other citizen to approach citizens to ask for information or cooperation. Id. These consensual encounters may be uncomfortable for a citizen, but they are not Fourth Amendment seizures. Id.
No bright-line rule governs when a consensual encounter becomes a detention. Id. Courts must take into account the totality of the circumstances of the interaction to decide whether a reasonable person would have felt free to ignore the police officer's request or terminate the consensual encounter. Id. Under the Fourth Amendment caselaw, courts presume that a reasonable person has considerable fortitude. Id. at 667, n.19. The law views an encounter as a consensual interaction and, as such, the citizen may terminate the encounter at any time. Id. at 667–68. If ignoring the request or terminating the encounter is an option, then no Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred. Id. at 668. But, if an officer through force or a show of authority sufficiently conveys the message that the citizen is not free to leave or to ignore the officer's request, the encounter is no longer consensual; it is a Fourth Amendment detention or arrest, subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny. Id. The question of whether the particular facts show that a consensual encounter has evolved into a detention is a legal issue that we review de novo. Id.
In considering police contacts with citizens seated in parked cars, the Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that the following approach "is useful when examining police contacts with citizens in parked cars":
The mere approach and questioning of [citizens seated in parked cars] does not constitute a seizure. The result is not otherwise when the officer utilizes some generally accepted means of gaining the attention of the vehicle occupant or encouraging him to eliminate any barrier to conversation. The officer may tap on the window and perhaps even open the door if the occupant is asleep. A request that the suspect open the door or roll down the window would seem equally permissible, but the same would not be true of an order that he do so. Likewise, the encounter becomes a seizure if the officer orders the suspect to "freeze" or to get out of the car. So too, other police action which one would not expect if the encounter was between two private citizens—boxing the car in, approaching it on all sides by many officers,...
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Johnson v. State
...the criminal, and ultimately find ourselves the displaced refugees in a raging war on crime. Johnson v. State , 602 S.W.3d 50, 68 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020) (Hassan, J., concurring) (quoting Ceniceros v. State , 551 S.W.2d 50, 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) ). The same can be said abo......