State v. Woodard
| Citation | 341 S.W.3d 404 |
| Decision Date | 06 April 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. PD–0828–10.,PD–0828–10. |
| Parties | The STATE of Texasv.David Wayne WOODARD, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas. Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Greg King, Wichita Falls, for Appelant.John W. Brasher, Asst. Crim. D.A., Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.
The court of appeals correctly held that the initial interaction on the sidewalk between David Wayne Woodard and Officer John Warner, Jr., which began with Officer Warner asking Woodard if he had been involved in a reported accident, was a consensual encounter.1 Further, we conclude that the encounter, which eventually escalated into Woodard's arrest for DWI, was supported by probable cause. The court of appeals's judgment is therefore affirmed.
Woodard drove his car off the road into a ditch and then abandoned it by walking away. Woodard filed a pretrial motion to suppress, claiming that his warrantless arrest for driving while intoxicated (DWI), about a quarter of a mile from the accident, was unlawful. The trial judge held a suppression hearing. Officers Donald Morgan and Warner testified about the events leading up to Woodard's arrest.
Around 10 p.m. on May 17, 2008, the Burkburnett Police Department dispatcher received a call from an anonymous tipster reporting a single-car accident at the intersection of Oklahoma and North Berry Street. The dispatcher relayed the information to officers. Officers Morgan and Warner headed to the accident scene in separate patrol vehicles.
While Officer Warner was on his way to the reported accident scene, the dispatcher advised that the tipster reported that the driver was leaving the scene of the accident and was wearing a black T-shirt and jeans. The driver was last seen at Berry and Third Street. Officer Warner decided to head in that direction while en route to the accident scene. Officer Warner spotted Woodard walking on a sidewalk on Berry Street, about six to eight blocks from the accident. Woodard was the only person walking on Berry Street, and he matched the broad description relayed by the dispatcher. Officer Warner had a “hunch” that Woodard had been the person involved in the accident, even though Woodard did not appear to have any injuries. Nor did Officer Warner observe Woodard behaving illegally, endangering himself or others, or breaching the peace. Officer Warner immediately asked Woodard if he had been involved in an accident at Oklahoma and North Berry Street. Woodard said, “Yes” and “I'm drunk and should not have been driving.” Officer Warner detected the odor of alcohol on Woodard's body and breath. Woodard's eyes were bloodshot and glazed; he was unsteady on his feet and staggered when he walked.
During this time, Officer Morgan had arrived at the accident scene. He observed an unoccupied green automobile with front-end damage in a ditch. Officer Morgan believed that the accident may have injured the vehicle's occupants. Officer Morgan did not know who drove the vehicle, the number of occupants in the vehicle, or when the accident occurred. Because the police department's standard procedure upon finding a wrecked, unoccupied vehicle is to “try to find out who the driver [was] in case we need to get [him or her] medical attention,” Officer Morgan opened the driver's-side door and attempted to find an insurance card, driver's license, or other identifying information. Officer Morgan found an insurance card and discovered two beer cans by the driver's seat; one can was empty and the other was about a quarter full and cold to the touch. Officer Morgan did not know when the beer had been consumed. After calling a tow truck to remove the vehicle, Officer Morgan informed Officer Warner that he had found alcoholic beverages in the vehicle.
Because Officer Warner suspected that Woodard was intoxicated and that he had been driving the now-wrecked car while intoxicated, he asked Woodard to perform the standardized field sobriety tests. Based on Woodard's performance on the tests, Officer Warner concluded that Woodard was intoxicated. Officer Warner asked Woodard if he would be willing to take a breath test, and Woodard said that he would. Officer Warner then arrested Woodard. Woodard was later charged with misdemeanor DWI.
At the close of the hearing, the trial judge granted Woodard's suppression motion. The judge rejected the State's argument that the initial interaction between Officer Warner and Woodard was a consensual encounter, outside of the protections of the Fourth Amendment, and that Officer Warner subsequently lawfully detained and arrested Woodard. At the State's request, the trial judge entered written findings of fact and conclusions of law. In doing so, the judge adopted Woodard's proposed findings and conclusions in toto and added an additional conclusion of law.
Among other things, the trial judge found that Officer Warner arrested Woodard without a warrant. When Officer Warner first spotted Woodard, he did not observe Woodard committing a criminal offense, like public intoxication or breach of the peace, and Woodard was not acting in a manner that would indicate that Woodard was a danger to others or himself. Officer Warner did not observe Woodard “commit any offense within his view.” Additionally, Officer Warner had no personal knowledge that Woodard had been driving while intoxicated “before he decided to detain” him. The trial judge also found that Officer Warner “performed an investigative detention of ... Woodard ... because he had a hunch based upon very vague information provided by an anonymous tipster who lacked credibility.” Officer Warner did not arrest Woodard based on an “admissible statement which established probable cause to believe Woodard committed a felony.”
Additionally, among other things, the trial judge concluded that the uncorroborated anonymous tip was not sufficient to provide Officer Warner with reasonable suspicion to detain Woodard. The trial judge also concluded that Officer Warner did not articulate specific facts to support a reasonable suspicion that Woodard committed a criminal offense before he detained Woodard. No officer observed Woodard operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. And Officer Warner did not have probable cause to arrest Woodard for public intoxication, which requires the intoxicated person to endanger himself or herself or another. The interaction between Officer Warner and Woodard, according to the trial judge, was not a consensual encounter because a reasonable person in Woodard's situation would not have felt free to leave when Officer Warner stopped him.
The State appealed the trial judge's ruling, arguing that when Officer Warner initially approached Woodard, it was a consensual encounter and that Officer Warner was therefore permitted to ask Woodard questions without reasonable suspicion that Woodard committed a crime.2 With one Justice dissenting, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the trial judge's ruling, concluding that the judge erroneously applied the law to the facts.3 The court determined that the initial interaction was a consensual encounter; Officer Warner merely “engaged [Woodard] in conversation.” 4 The trial judge erred in finding that a reasonable person in Woodard's position would not have believed that he was free to leave because there is no evidence to support that finding.5
The record is devoid of a threatening presence of numerous officers around [Woodard], Officer Warner's display of any weapon, any physical touching of [Woodard] by Officer Warner, Officer Warner's words or tone of voice indicating that compliance with his requests might be compelled, or flashing lights or blocking [Woodard's] path. No evidence indicates that Officer Warner's mere approach interfered with [Woodard's] freedom of movement or caused inconvenience and loss of time, nor that the officer's initial questioning constituted an unconstitutional seizure.6
The interaction then escalated into a lawful investigative detention when Officer Warner administered the field sobriety tests, and this was only after Officer Warner had reasonable suspicion to believe that Woodard had been driving drunk.7 Then Officer Warner lawfully arrested Woodard based on probable cause following Woodard's performance on the tests.8 The court rejected Woodard's argument that his arrest for DWI was unlawful because Officer Warner did not actually witness Woodard driving while intoxicated as required by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Article 14.01(b).9 Article 14.01(b) provides that a peace officer may effectuate a warrantless arrest for an offense committed “in his presence or in his view.” 10 Taking into account the information known to Officer Warner before he arrested Woodard, the court held that Officer Warner had sufficient information to believe that Woodard had committed the offense of DWI.11
The dissent accused the majority of improperly substituting its judgment for that of the trial judge.12 The dissent opined that the case was controlled, in part, by Article 14.01(b), and since no officer observed Woodard commit an offense, the arrest was unlawful.13 The anonymous tip about the car in the ditch did not satisfy Article 14.01(b)'s requirement that an officer personally view the commission of a misdemeanor offense to justify a warrantless arrest.14 The dissent also faulted the majority for citing cases in which the police wrongfully arrested the person for DWI but the arrest was nevertheless held to be lawful because the facts supported an arrest for public intoxication.15 The dissent maintained that the State procedurally defaulted that argument and that the trial judge entered a contrary finding based on Officer Warner's testimony. 16 The dissent also asserted that the majority improperly shifted the burden to...
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