Jones v. Astrue
| Decision Date | 29 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. CBD-09-2314 |
| Parties | BONITA M. JONES, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner, Social Security Administration Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Bonita M. Jones, ("Plaintiff") brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") under Title II of the Social Security Act ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433, and Supplemental Social Security Income ("SSI") payments under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1382 et seq. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Plaintiffs Motion) and Commissioner's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Commissioner's Motion"). The Court has reviewed said motions and the applicable law. No hearing is deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md.). For the reasons presented below, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion and GRANTS Commissioner's Motion.
Plaintiff filed for DIB and SSI on September 18, 2006. (R. 91, 96). In both applications the alleged onset date was August 9, 2006. (R. 91, 96). The claims were denied on December 8, 2006 and again on April 5, 2007 upon reconsideration. (R. 11). On May 29, 2008, a video hearing was held before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"), at which Plaintiff was represented by counsel. (R. 22-57). On July 8, 2008, the ALJ determined in a written decision that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Act. (R. 9). Plaintiff subsequently requested review of the ALJ's decision by the Appeals Council, which was denied on August 26, 2009, making the ALJ's decision final and appealable. (R. 1-5).
At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 46 years old. (R. 27). Plaintiff has three adult children. (R. 13). Plaintiff has a high school education. (R. 13). Plaintiff is approximately 5'7" and weighs approximately 353 pounds. (R. 14). Plaintiff has a history of chronic mental illness, which includes one suicide attempt in the late-1990's for which she received psychiatric hospitalization. (R. 14). Plaintiff has been in regular psychiatric treatment since 2003. (R. 14). Plaintiffs sources of income are Social Services and Food Stamps. (R. 28).
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiffs claim using the five-step sequential process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920 (2009). At the first step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity ("SGA") since August 9, 2006-the alleged onset date. (R. 13). At the second step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: Schizophrenia, Depression, and Obesity. (R. 13). At the third step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (the "Listings"). (R. 14). At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Plaintiffs residual functional capacity ("RFC"). Accordingly, Plaintiff has the physical residual functional capacity ("PRFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) (2009).
(R. 14). Due to her obesity, Plaintiff cannot crouch and she can only occasionally balance and/or climb stairs. (R. 14). Plaintiff must avoid heights and hazardous machinery. (R. 14). The ALJ also determined that Plaintiff has the mental residual functional capacity ("MRFC") to perform an unskilled level of work with limited public contact. (R. 17). In addition, at the fourth step, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work ("PRW"). (R. 20). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff's PRW was unskilled and thus transferability was not an issue. (R. 20). At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, considering Plaintiff's age, education, work experience, and RFC. (R. 20). Based on the limitations that the ALJ found, the ALJ asked the vocational expert ("VE") if jobs existed in the national economy for an individual with the Plaintiffs age, education, work experience, and RFC. (R. 21). The VE testified that given all of the factors, the individual would be able to perform the requirements of representative light unskilled occupations such as a Sorter/Inspector and as an Office Helper, non-typing but the number of jobs available for the latter position reflects a downward adjustment 20% to account for the claimant's limitation in public contact. (R. 21).
The role of this Court is to determine whether substantial evidence supports the Commissioner's decision and whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hayes v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987). Substantial evidence is a reasonableness standard of review and in this context substantial evidence does not refer to a considerable amount of evidence. France v. Apfel, 87 F. Supp. 2d 484, 489 (D. Md. 2000) (citing Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). Instead, substantial evidence means evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. France at 489 (citing Richardson v. Pearles, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971)). It is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance, of the evidence presented. Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984). "If there is evidence to justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is substantial evidence." Johnson v. Califano, 434 F. Supp. 302, 307 (D. Md. 1977). Ordinarily, if there is substantial evidence to support the decision of the Commissioner, then that decision must be upheld. Smith v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986). This Court cannot try the case de novo or resolve evidentiary conflicts, but rather must affirm a decision supported by substantial evidence. Id.
The Court must also determine whether the Commissioner followed correct procedures. "A factual finding by the ALJ is not binding if it was reached by means of an improper standard or misapplication of the law." Coffman, 829 F.2d at 517. After review, the Court has the power to affirm, modify, or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, with or without remanding the case for rehearing. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Virek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1158 (4th Cir. 1971).
Finally, it must be noted that hearings on applications for Social Security disability entitlement are not adversary proceedings. Easley v. Finch, 431 F.2d 1351 (4th Cir. 1970). Moreover, the Social Security Act is a remedial statute and it is to be broadly construed and liberally applied in favor of beneficiaries. Dorsey v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 246 (4th Cir. 1987). A claimant is entitled to a full and fair hearing and failure to have such a hearing may constitute sufficient cause to remand the case. Sims v. Harris, 631 F.2d 26 (4th Cir. 1980).
Plaintiff raises four arguments. First Plaintiff claims that the ALJ is not empowered to selectively discredit a consultative examiner's ("CE") medical source statement in order to support a claim to deny benefits. Second, the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff did not meet or equal a listing is not supported by substantial evidence. Third, the ALJ's hypothetical question to the VE does not remotely describe Plaintiff's mental impairment. Finally, Plaintiff argues that Jones was deprived a full and fair hearing by the ALJ.
Plaintiff objects to the ALJ's rejection of only a single portion of the 2008 report prepared by Donald Nachand, Ph.D., the psychological CE. Plaintiff claims that "[t]his piecemeal exclusion of Dr. Nachand's medical opinion is as harsh as it is illogical." (R. 8). While it may be harsh, it is not illogical, and more importantly it is not improper. E.g. Vo v. Astrue, 518 F. Supp. 2d 715, 730 (D.S.C. 2007) (). It is clear there is a duty to explain the weight the ALJ gives to Dr. Nachand's opinion and the ALJ cannot simply ignore it. However, it is equally clear that the ALJ is not bound by such opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(f), 416.927(f); See SSR 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180 *2 (July 2, 1996) ().
Here, the ALJ's decision states the reasoning behind the findings of which Plaintiff complains:
Consistent with the non-examining State agency opinions, Dr. Nachand wrote that [Plaintiff's] capacities for sustained concentration and persistence were moderately impaired (Exhibits 10F, 2F, and 3F). The undersigned accords these said opinions, Exhibits 2F, 3F, and 10F, significant weight in determining [Plaintiffs] mental residual functional capacity. Dr. Nachand went on to write that the [Plaintiff] shows "marked" impairment in social interaction and adaptation (Exhibit 10F). Because neither the other opinion evidence, nor anyobjective evidence, comports with this conclusion, and because Dr. Nachand gave no supporting explanation for this finding, the undersigned rejects this portion of his opinion.
(R. 18).
Though the Court may have decided differently, this is both a reasonable explanation and not inconsistent with the other evidence in the record. SSR 96-6P, 1996 WL 374180 * 2 (July 2, 1996) (...
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