Jones v. Brightwood Independent School District, No. 1, Richland County
| Decision Date | 10 April 1933 |
| Docket Number | 6122 |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court of Richland County Hutchinson, J.
Affirmed.
Conmy Young & Conmy and Maurice S. Aker, for appellants.
Constitutional provisions only act prospectively, unless they are clearly intended to operate otherwise. Strickler v. Colorado Springs (Colo.) 26 P. 313; Kirby v. Western U Teleg. Co. 4 S.D. 105, 30 L.R.A. 612; Board of Comrs. v. Perkins (Wyo.) 38 P. 915; Meade v. Watson (Cal.) 8 P. 311; Moore v. Cunningham (Miss.) 87 So. 112.
Statutes and constitutions are not retrospective, unless the words employed show a clear intention to that effect. Loud v Winchester (Mich.) 30 S.W. 987; State ex rel. Missouri & M.R. Co. v. Macon County Ct. 41 Mo. 453; State v. Cape Girardeau, etc. R. Co. 48 Mo. 468; State v. Barbee, 3 Ind. 258; Davidson v. Koehler, 76 Ind. 398; Allbyer v. State, 10 Ohio St. 588; People ex rel. v. Job (Colo.) 4 P. 798, 1179; State ex rel. v. Green Co. 54 Mo. 540; Morgan v. State (S.D.) 78 N.W. 19; Mostas v. Diamond Coal & Coke Co. (Wyo.) 76 P. 567; Tremont Lumber Co. v. Bond, 166 La. 125, 116 So. 723.
A constitutional provision directing the establishment of school districts is not self-executing. Ex parte Wall, 48 Cal. 279, 17 Am. Rep. 425; Ulbrecht v. Keokuk (Iowa) 97 N.W. 1082; Covington v. District of Highlands (Ky.) 68 S.W. 669; Arey v. Lindsey, 48 S.E. 889; Louisville & N.R. Co. v. School Dist. (Ky.) 64 S.W. 974.
A constitutional requirement that municipal corporations shall be created by general, and not special, laws, operates prospectively, applying only to cities chartered after the Constitution was adopted, and not those already created by act of a territorial assembly. McCarthy v. Tucson, 225 P. 329; Pierce v. Kimball, 9 Me. 54, 23 Am. Dec. 537.
"Uniformity" means throughout taxing district. American Dig. Key No. Taxation, 44; Quinn v. Hester (Tenn.) 186 S.W. 459; Bonne Homme Co. Farm Bureau v. County Comrs. (S.D.) 220 N.W. 618; Nashville, C. & St. L.R. Co. v. Marshall (Tenn.) 30 S.W.2d 268.
The provisions of a city charter, it being a municipal corporation, may be repealed or altered by the legislature at will; but a general statute repealing all acts contrary to its provisions will not be held to repeal a clause in any municipal corporation upon the same subject matter. State v. Branin, 23 N.J.L. 485.
General school laws do not repeal special charter provisions. Brenen v. Civil Service Commission (Ill.) 52 N.E. 353; Roberts v. Clay City (Ky.) 42 S.W. 909.
General school laws providing rate of taxation do not repeal special laws providing for a lower rate. People v. Blomington (Ill.) 22 N.E. 833; State v. Melik, 25 N.J.L. 536.
A general law relating to bonds does not impliedly repeal a charter provision. People v. Parmenter (N.M.) 53 N.E. 40.
As regards the issuance of bonds, a city is held to its charter provisions. Smith v. Vicksburg (Miss.) 38 So. 301.
General laws relating to borrowing by municipal corporations do not apply to special charter cities unless made particularly applicable. Reed v. Cedar Rapids (Iowa) 113 N.W. 773.
Where bonds are in excess of the debt limit, the legislature has no power to directly or indirectly change the situation. Mosher v. School Dist. 44 Iowa 122.
The legislature cannot validate bonds issued in contravention of the constitution. Katzenberger v. Aberdeen, 121 U.S. 172.
Where there is no authority to issue, the legislature cannot validate. Gaddis v. Richland Co. 92 Ill. 119.
The legislature has no right to raise the constitutional debt limit. Booth v. Board of Education (Ky.) 17 S.W.2d 1013.
The legislature cannot validate that which it could not originally authorize. Public Instruction v. Union School Furniture Co. (Fla.) 129 So. 824.
The legislature may not by statute violate a constitutional provision. Mumm v. Lentz, 256 Mich. 233, 239 N.W. 298; Glidden v. Hopkins, 47 Ill. 525; School Directors v. Fogelman, 76 Ill. 189; Lewis v. Shreveport, 108 U.S. 282; Marsh v. Fulton Co. 10 Wall. 676; Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 160; Rochester v. Bank, 13 Wis. 432, 80 Am. Dec. 746.
Municipal indebtedness in excess of the constitutional limitation can not be made good by ratification, since power to authorize originally is a condition precedent to the power to ratify subsequently. Balch v. Beach, 95 N.W. 132; Am. Dig. Municipal Corporations, Key No. 933; Uncas Nat. Bank v. Superior (Wis.) 91 N.W. 1004; Shonk Land Co. v. Koachim (W. Va.) 123 S.E. 444; Riesen v. School Dist. (Wis.) 212 N.W. 783.
A school district is not within a constitutional provision relating to "cities, towns and incorporated villages." Felmet v. Commissioners, 186 N.C. 250, 119 S.E. 353.
The territory had the right to create a school district by a special act. Dietz v. Central, 1 Colo. 323; Wagner v. Harris, 1 Wyo. 104.
The assent of the people is not necessary to incorporation by special charter. 36 Century Dig. (Municipal Corporations) p. 34, § 17.
Furthermore, a special charter is not abandoned by taking steps under a general act. In order to abandon a special charter, there must be some formal action. Decorah v. Bullis, 25 Iowa 12.
A school district is to be held to its charter as regards its debt limitation, and long acquiescence does not ratify debts contrary thereto. Erwin v. St. Joseph Bd. of Pub. Schools, 12 F. 680.
Taxpayers can enjoin school district officials who enter into contracts in excess of the levies allowed by the charter. Putnam v. Grand Rapids (Mich.) 25 N.W. 330.
A tax levy beyond the charter limitations is void. Wattles v. Lapier, 40 Mich. 624.
A contract entered into in violation of a charter provision is not subject to ratification. Santa Cruz Rock Pav. Co. v. Broderick (Cal.) 45 P. 863.
Persons dealing with a city are bound by the limitations to be found in the special charter. Pasadena v. Estrin (Cal.) 298 P. 14.
The taking and retaining possession of a school house does not ratify an excessive expenditure. Torney v. Bridgeport (Conn.) 12 A. 520; Young v. Board of Education (Minn.) 55 N.W. 1112.
The fact that the schools cannot be kept open without the questioned levy is not defense. Bardsdale v. Sampson Co. 93 N.E. 472.
The fact that the school was needed is not justification for exceeding the debt limit. Scott v. Goshen (Ind.) 70 N.E. 79; Russell v. High School Bd. of Edu. 212 Ill. 327, 72 N.E. 441.
The board cannot enter into a contract in excess of the debt limit although it is necessary to do so in order to keep the school open. Wolfe v. School Dist. (Wash.) 108 P. 442, 27 L.R.A. (N.S.) 891; Shonk Land Co. v. Joachim (W. Va.) 123 S.E. 444; Buckner v. Board of Education (Ky.) 34 S.W.2d 236; Hackettstown v. Swackhamer, 37 N.J.L. 191; Law v. People, 87 Ill. 385; Merrill v. Monticello, 14 F. 628; Reed v. Cedar Rapids (Ia.) 113 N.W. 773; Rush v. Hyattsville (Md.) 81 A. 278; Byrum v. Shawnee (Okla.) 200 P. 183; Valentine v. Robertson, 300 F. 521; Barrow v. Moffett (Fla.) 116 So. 71; Grabe v. Lamso Consol. School Dist. (S.D.) 221 N.W. 697.
Obligations in excess of the debt limitations have been held void although there were funds on hand sufficient to pay the same. State ex rel. Helena Waterworks Co. v. Helena, 24 Mont. 521, 55 L.R.A. 336.
An injunction should be granted where the officers have been making illegal levies and applications of the same. Union P.R. Co. v. Dawson Co. (Neb.) 11 N.W. 307.
Injunction is the proper remedy against an illegal tax. Finney v. Lamb, 54 Ind. 1; Tygarts Val. Bank v. Philipp (W. Va.) 18 S.E. 489; Century Dig. Taxation, # 1231; Jackson v. Joint Consol. School Dist. (Kan.) 255 P. 87; Jackson v. Norris, 72 Ill. 364; The Liberty Bell, 23 F. 843; Clark v. Cline (Ga.) 51 S.E. 617.
A taxpayer can enjoin the payment of illegal warrants without making a warrant holder party to the proceeding. Kellogg v. School Dist. (Okla.) 74 P. 110.
Taxpayers can enjoin the entering into or carrying out of an illegal contract. Hanaher v. Board of Education (W. Va.) 32 L.R.A. 413; Roberts v. Fargo, 10 N.D. 230.
Taxpayers can enjoin the threatened payment of illegal warrants. Manning v. Devils Lake, 13 N.D. 47.
A purchaser of bonds is chargeable with knowledge of the assessed valuation of the district. Shelby Co. v. Provident Sav. Bank & T. Co. 54 F.2d 602.
Even a school district is not estopped against a bona fide purchaser to question the want of authority to issue bonds. Dartmouth Sav. Bank v. School Dist. 6 Dak. 332.
The levy of taxes for several years does not estop the bringing of an action to question void bonds. First Nat. Bank v. District Twp. (Iowa) 53 N.W. 301; Cowdrey v. Caneadea, 16 F. 532; Eufaula v. McNab, 67 Ala. 588, 42 Am. Rep. 118; Weismer v. Douglas, 64 N.Y. 91, 21 Am. Rep. 586.
The municipality cannot anticipate more than one year's income. San Francisco Gas Co. v. Brickwedel, 62 Cal. 641.
A contract or warrant in excess of year's revenue is void. Montague v. English (Cal.) 51 P. 327.
In determining debt limit future levies cannot be considered. Anderson v. International School Dist. 32 N.D. 412.
Obligations in excess of constitutional restrictions are absolutely void. Mosher v. Independent School Dist. 44 Iowa 122; Smith v. Broderick (Cal.) 40 P. 1033; Law v People, 87 Ill. 385; Millsaps v. Turrell, 60 F. 193; Century Dig. Municipal Corporations, # 1988; Schools and School Districts, Am. Dig. Key No. 97 (3); Thornburgh v. School Dist. (Mo.) 75 S.W. 81...
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