Jones v. Clarksville Isd
| Decision Date | 25 April 2001 |
| Docket Number | 6,060000110CV |
| Parties | DHARLENE JONES, Appellant v. CLARKSVILLE INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, ET AL., AppelleesIn The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 6th Judicial District Court Red River County, Texas Trial Court No. 53-CV-2-99
Before Cornelius, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ.
Dharlene Jones, a former high school principal for seven years with Clarksville Independent School District, sued the district and some of its employees and officials, in their public and private capacities, in connection with her "reassignment" or "demotion" and a number of other actions that surrounded that act. She appeals from the trial court's granting of the school district's plea to the jurisdiction.
The underlying facts as alleged by Jones show that she was accused by a new school superintendent and the school board president of stealing money from a cash fund kept by the school (the Coke fund), with an underlying theme of internal disagreements between herself and school officials and employees. In her pleadings, Jones states that she was told she could resign and the allegations would be kept confidential or she could refuse and the school administration would "go public." Jones declined the invitation to resign. She states that the underlying disagreement which has caused the continued attempts to remove her from the school is about the priority to be given by the district to athletic programs as opposed to academic programs. She has also alleged facts that show a substantial effort by the members of the school board to remove her by portraying her as a thief; that show the named defendants and others made numerous public accusations about her character and her probable long-term thievery from the district; and that show that, at the behest of those individuals, any members of the faculty who questioned the validity of the charges against her were punished.
Jones was prosecuted on allegations of misdemeanor theft. She was acquitted by a jury.
Procedurally, Jones originally filed suit against the school and its employees and officials in both their personal and official capacities. After the district filed a plea to the jurisdiction, she amended her petition to omit claims against district employees and officials in their official capacities, with the exceptions of Alan Hale and Victor Bishop, the president and a member of the board of trustees, respectively.
Her second amended petition and request for declaratory relief states that she seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief from the school district and that the remaining individuals are being sued individually because of their actions taken outside the scope of their offices.
She alleges that the defendants conspired to commit intentional wrongful acts to violate her rights as secured by the Texas Constitution and under the common law of the State of Texas. She expressly states that she brings no federal claim.
Jones alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress (against individuals in private capacities only), defamation, tortious interference by the individuals with her contract (her business relationship with the district), violations of equal protection, deprivation of liberty and property interests (her position with the district), and the right to be free from retaliation for exercising fundamental rights. She also alleges malicious prosecution against the individuals involved.
Jones seeks damages from the individual defendants for financial, physical, and emotional injuries, and seeks punitive damages. She further seeks an injunction directing the district to reinstate her to her former position as principal and attorney's fees for that portion of the case brought pursuant to the Declaratory Judgments Act.
The trial court granted the district's plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed the claims against the district defendants.
The lawsuit was dismissed on a plea to the jurisdiction. The plea was based on the concept that Jones was first required to present all the issues and causes of action to the commissioner of education and exhaust any administrative remedies before bringing the suit to court.
Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 7.057 (Vernon 1996) provides:
(a) Except as provided by Subsection (e),1 a person may appeal in writing to the commissioner if the person is aggrieved by:
(1) the school laws of this state; or
(2) actions or decisions of any school district board of trustees that violate:
(A) the school laws of this state; or
(B) a provision of a written employment contract between the school district and a school district employee, if a violation causes or would cause monetary harm to the employee.
. . . .
(f) In this section:
. . . .
(2) "School laws of this state" means Title 1 and this title and rules adopted under those titles.
As noted and as argued by counsel for Jones, this statute contains the word "may," which would typically mean that taking such an appeal is not mandatory. However, despite the seemingly clear language of the statute, it has historically been explained as actually meaning that an aggrieved person may appeal, and if an appeal is taken, it must be to the commissioner if the matter is one within the scope of the agency's review powers. Although the use of the word "may" in the context of this statute may invite confusion, that language has survived several amendments and reenactments without alteration, and without any change in analysis by the courts.2
Subject to certain exceptions,3
Texas law requires a party whose claim concerns the administration of school laws and involves disputed fact issues to exhaust the statutorily provided administrative remedies with the commissioner of education before turning to the courts for relief. Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1992); Gibson v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 971 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998), vacated on other grounds, 22 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2000) (); Janik v. Lamar Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied).
A plea to the jurisdiction is an appropriate vehicle for raising a challenge to the plaintiff's suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1986); Godley Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Woods, 21 S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.) (containing an excellent and thorough review of the history of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies in connection with statutory school law in Texas). Contracts between teachers and school districts are regulated by the Education Code. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.002, 21.101-.102, 21.104-.106, 21.151-.160, 21.201-.213 (Vernon 1996), § 21.103 (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Appellees contend the trial court had no jurisdiction because Jones failed to exhaust her administrative remedies under the Education Code. The merit of the underlying claims is not before this Court-only the nature of those claims. The only issue for our consideration is whether the trial court correctly granted the plea to the jurisdiction and dismissed Jones' lawsuit. We have reviewed the record and conclude that all allegations brought in the suit are before this Court on appeal. The granting of the plea to the jurisdiction was not preceded by a severance, and it effectively dismissed the entirety of Jones' suit.
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to decide a case. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). A plea to the jurisdiction urges that the court lacks the power to determine the subject matter of the suit. Woods, 21 S.W.3d at 660; City of Cleburne v. Trussell, 10 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.). To avoid such a plea, the plaintiff must plead facts which affirmatively show that the trial court has jurisdiction. Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Cornyn v. County of Hill, 10 S.W.3d 424, 426 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.). Absent an allegation that the plaintiff's jurisdictional pleadings are fraudulent, the court should take the allegations of fact stated in the petition as true and must construe them liberally in favor of the plaintiff when ruling on the plea. See Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996); Texas Dep't of Mental Health & Mental Retardation v. Pearce, 16 S.W.3d 456, 460 (Tex. App.-Waco 2000, no pet.). If the facts alleged fail to establish the trial court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to amend the petition. Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446.4
In a recently decided case, the Texas Supreme Court used its conflicts jurisdiction to review the case and held that in resolving a plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court is not required to restrict itself solely to the pleadings, but may consider evidence-indeed, it must do so when necessary to resolve jurisdictional issues. Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 34 S.W.3d 547, 554 (Tex. 2000). It must, however, restrict itself solely to the evidence necessary to decide the jurisdictional issue. Id.
In this case, which was tried before the decision in Bland, no evidence was received on this issue. Thus, the court's decision rests solely on its application of the law to Jones' allegations. Jones alleged, after stating that the Board had refused to meet with her in a reinstatement proceeding, that "[n]o administrative appeal has been available and the Board has not acted, . . . ." and also alleged that "[she] has satisfied all prerequisites prior to bringing this action, . . . ."
Appellees did not provide evidence, but argue on appeal (as they did before the trial court) that Jones failed to meet her burden because she did not allege specific facts that would show an...
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