Godley I.S.D. v. Woods

• Decision Date: 07 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 10-99-317-CV,10-99-317-CV
• Parties: (Tex.App.-Waco 2000) GODLEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. DAN C. WOODS, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 656

21 S.W.3d 656 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000)

GODLEY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Appellant v. DAN C. WOODS, Appellee

No. 10-99-317-CV

IN THE TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

June 7, 2000

From the 18th District Court Johnson County, Texas Trial Court # 155-97

Before Chief Justice Davis, Justice Vance, and Justice Gray

O P I N I O N

BILL VANCE, Justice

Dan Woods sued Godley Independent School District (GISD), claiming a breach of his teaching employment contract. Via a plea to the jurisdiction, GISD asked the trial court to dismiss the action, alleging that Woods had not pled that he exhausted his administrative remedies. When the court refused to do so, GISD brought this interlocutory appeal. We conclude that where the petition fails to affirmatively establish the court's jurisdiction but could conceivably be amended to establish jurisdiction, a party must attack the pleadings by special exception before seeking to have the suit dismissed for want of jurisdiction. We affirm the trial court's order because GISD did not first file and obtain a ruling on special exceptions to Woods' petition.

Woods filed suit against GISD on July 22, 1997, claiming that GISD breached his teaching employment contract by failing to reimburse expenses he incurred in attending the Texas Bandmasters Association Meeting and Convention in July 1997, and by withholding wages and retirement contributions for days he was authorized to be absent from work on discretionary personal leave. Woods did not plead that he had exhausted the available administrative remedies or facts which would support a conclusion that he had done so or an exception to the exhaustion requirement. In its original answer, filed on August 7, 1997, GISD generally denied all of Woods' allegations and claimed that his suit was barred by his failure to exhaust the administrative remedies available to resolve his complaints. GISD filed a plea to the jurisdiction on June 24, 1999, asking the district court to dismiss Woods' claims because he had not alleged nor shown that he had exhausted his administrative remedies. The court conducted a hearing on GISD's plea on August 11, 1999, and denied the request on September 9, 1999. This appeal followed, with GISD again arguing that Woods' suit should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction because he has failed to claim or show that he exhausted the administrative remedies available to resolve his dispute. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8) (Vernon Supp. 2000); City of Austin v. L.S. Ranch, Ltd., 970 S.W.2d 750, 752 (Tex. App.--Austin 1998, no pet.).

A plea to the jurisdiction urges that the court lacks the power to determine the subject matter of the suit. City of Cleburne v. Trussell, 10 S.W.3d 407, 410 (Tex. App.--Waco 2000, no pet.); Bland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Blue, 989 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1999, pet. granted). The plaintiff must plead facts which affirmatively show that the trial court has jurisdiction. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993). Absent an allegation that the plaintiff's jurisdictional pleadings are fraudulent, the court must take the allegations in the petition as true and must construe them liberally in favor of the plaintiff when ruling on the plea. Id.; Continental Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tex. 1996); Texas Dep't of Mental Health and Mental Retardation v. Pearce, No. 10-99-156-CV, 16 S.W.3d 456, 459-60 (Tex. App.--Waco March 29, 2000, no pet. h.); Trussell, 10 S.W.3d at 409; Blue, 989 S.W.2d at 446, 447. If the facts alleged fail to establish the trial court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to amend the petition. Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446; Blue, 989 S.W.2d at 446. However, the court can dismiss the claim without allowing the opportunity to amend if it can determine that no claim within the court's jurisdiction can be stated consistent with the facts alleged. City of Saginaw v. Carter, 996 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1999, pet. filed); Ramirez v. Lyford Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 900 S.W.2d 902, 906 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1995, no writ). Stated another way, "the trial court must allow a plaintiff the opportunity to amend its pleadings to cure a jurisdictional defect so long as the plaintiff has not affirmatively pled itself out of court[.]" Ramirez, 900 S.W.2d at 906.

Because jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction de novo, applying the same standards that the trial court applies. City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 2; Blue, 989 S.W.2d at 446. We apply the de novo standard to both the granting of a plea to the jurisdiction and to the denial of such a plea. See City of Houston v. Morua, 982 S.W.2d 126, 127 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.).

A plea to the jurisdiction may be an appropriate vehicle for raising a failure-to-exhaust-administrative-remedies challenge to the plaintiff's suit.¹ Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. 1986). Subject to certain exceptions, Texas law requires a party whose claim concerns the administration of school laws and involves disputed fact issues to exhaust the statutorily provided administrative remedies with the Commissioner of Education before turning to the courts for relief. Texas Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tex. 1992); Gibson v. Waco Indep. Sch. Dist., 971 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex. App.--Waco 1998), rev'd on other grounds, ___ S.W.2d ___, 2000 WL 572515 (Tex. May 11, 2000); Janik v. Lamar Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 961 S.W.2d 322, 323 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1997, writ denied). Although we are unable to determine the nature of Woods' contract with GISD,² Woods has alleged that he signed a "teaching contract" with the district.³

Contracts between teachers and school districts are regulated by the terms of the Education Code. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. §§ 21.002, 21.101-.106, 21.151-.160, 21.201-.213 (Vernon 1996 & Supp. 2000). Additionally, there are fact issues at stake in the controversy because Woods claims that GISD made certain representations as to the performance of his contract and that he complied with the district's requirements to take his personal leave, assertions that GISD has controverted by its general denial.

Woods' claims as to the withholding of his wages and retirement contributions could be construed to allege that the district wrongfully suspended him without pay, a claim that specifically falls under the administrative procedures of the Education Code. Id. § 21.251(a)(3) (Vernon 1996). If his petition were construed in this way, the district court in Johnson County would have jurisdiction over an appeal from the decision of the Commissioner of Education. Id. § 21.307(a)(1) (Vernon 1996). Because such a construction would result in a possibility that Woods could establish the jurisdiction of the trial court, we must give his pleadings that construction.⁴ Texas Ass'n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. Under any construction, though, Woods' petition plainly involves the administration of school laws and disputed fact issues. Thus, he was required to exhaust the administrative remedies provided by the Education Code before he could look to the courts for relief.⁵ Tex. Educ. Code. Ann. §§ 7.057(a), 21.255, 21.258, 21.301, 21.307 (Vernon 1996); Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d at 90; Gibson, 971 S.W.2d at 200-01; Janik, 961 S.W.2d at 323. The issue becomes, then, whether the trial court should have dismissed this proceeding in the posture it now occupies and on the pleadings as they now stand.

Before the court could dismiss this suit without giving Woods an opportunity to amend his petition it must have determined that it was impossible for Woods to amend his pleadings in such a way as to confer jurisdiction on the court. City of Saginaw, 996 S.W.2d at 3; Ramirez, 900 S.W.2d at 906. However, as we have shown, Woods may be able to amend his pleadings to assert that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, if in fact he has, which would have the effect of establishing the court's jurisdiction. Thus, an amendment which would show the court's jurisdiction is not impossible in this case.

Because Woods may be able to amend his petition to establish the court's jurisdiction, he was entitled to an opportunity to do so before the plea to the jurisdiction could be granted. Id. GISD, as the opposing party, had the burden of prompting the court to alert Woods to his pleading defect. A special exception is the proper vehicle to challenge a pleading on the basis that "though there is a legal rule which might be applicable, the petition omits one or more allegations essential to bring plaintiff's claim within its scope[.]" Fernandez v. City of El Paso, 876 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1993, writ denied) (citing 2 McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 9:25 (1992)). Thus, the special exception is the method by which the opposing party triggers the court's duty to give a party the opportunity to amend to state a claim within the court's jurisdiction. "If and when those special exceptions are heard and granted, and if and when the plaintiff does not adequately amend, then the suit can be properly dismissed." Barto Watson, Inc. v. City of Houston, 998 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. denied); see also Washington v. Fort Bend Indep. Sch. Dist., 892 S.W.2d 156, 159 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).

Thus, a party who is faced with a pleading that it believes does not confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed has two choices. If, after analyzing the petition, the opposing party believes that the pleading party cannot amend the petition to show jurisdiction under any circumstances, it may file a plea to the jurisdiction. If that position is correct, the plea should be granted.⁶ If, on the other hand, the petition is susceptible to...