Jones v. Conn. Med. Examining Bd.
Decision Date | 13 August 2013 |
Docket Number | No. 18843.,18843. |
Citation | 72 A.3d 1034,309 Conn. 727 |
Parties | Charles Ray JONES v. CONNECTICUT MEDICAL EXAMINING BOARD. |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Elliott B. Pollack, with whom was Megan Y. Carannante, Hartford, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Henry A. Salton, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Tanya Feliciano DeMattia, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (defendant).
ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, PALMER, ZARELLA, EVELEIGH and VERTEFEUILLE, Js.
The issue presented in this case is what standard of proof should be applied in physician disciplinary proceedings before the defendant, the Connecticut Medical Examining Board (board). The plaintiff, Charles Ray Jones, a physician, claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied in his disciplinary hearing before the board and should have concluded that the clear and convincing evidence standard of proof was applicable. The board asserts that the Appellate Court correctly determined that the preponderance of the evidence standard applied at the proceeding before it because the board is an administrative agency and, therefore, is subject to the provisions of the Uniform Administrative Procedure Act (UAPA); General Statutes § 4–166 et seq.; under which the preponderance of the evidence is the default standard of proof. We agree with the board and affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
In its opinion, the Appellate Court set forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. “The plaintiff is a physician and surgeon licensed to practice medicine in Connecticut. The [board] is a state agency within the meaning of the [UAPA].... On August 29, 2005, the [D]epartment [of Public Health] presented the [board] with a statement of charges against the plaintiff's license pursuant to General Statutes (Rev. to 2005) § 19a–17 1 and General Statutes § 20–13c.2 The two counts contained therein alleged that the plaintiff violated the applicable standard of care in various respects in his treatment of two ... children.
3
(Citation omitted; footnotes altered; internal quotation marks omitted.) Jones v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 129 Conn.App. 575, 577–80, 19 A.3d 1264 (2011).
The plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court from the trial court's judgment, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly had concluded that the applicable standard of proof in disciplinary proceedings before the board was the preponderance of the evidence, rather than clear and convincing evidence, and that a member of the hearing panel was biased against the plaintiff, depriving him of his due process right to an impartial tribunal.4Id., at 577, 19 A.3d 1264. The Appellate Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court's judgment. Id., at 586, 593, 19 A.3d 1264.
The plaintiff thereafter sought certification to appeal, which we granted, limited to the following question: “Did the Appellate Court properly conclude that the [D]epartment of [P]ublic [H]ealth was required to prove its case in proceedings before the ... board by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than by clear and convincing evidence?” Jones v. Connecticut Medical Examining Board, 302 Conn. 921, 28 A.3d 338 (2011). 5
The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly determined that the present case was controlled by this court's holding in Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, 288 Conn. 790, 821, 955 A.2d 15 (2008)( Goldstar ). Specifically, the plaintiff maintains that, although the UAPA applied in both Goldstar and the present case, the nature of the hearing and the interest at stake in the present case requires the application of a heightened standard of proof. The board, by contrast, contends that the standard of proof outlined in Goldstar is appropriate and should not be disturbed when, as in the present case, there is no indication that the legislature intended to impose a heightened standard of proof beyond that which applies generally to administrative proceedings under the UAPA. We agree with the board.
The determination of the appropriate standard of proof presents a question of law, over which our review is plenary. See Braffman v. Bank of America Corp., 297 Conn. 501, 515–16, 998 A.2d 1169 (2010) ( .
Under the UAPA, “ ‘[a]gency’ means each state board, commission, department or officer authorized by law to make regulations or to determine contested cases, but does not include either house or any committee of the General Assembly, the courts, the Council on Probate Judicial Conduct, the Governor, Lieutenant Governor or Attorney General, or town or regional boards of education, or automobile dispute settlement panels established pursuant to section 42–181....” General Statutes § 4–166(1). It is uncontested that the board is an administrative agency within the meaning of § 4–166(1); e.g., Pet v. Dept. of Health Services, 228 Conn. 651, 653 n. 3, 638 A.2d 6 (1994); and disciplinary proceedings before the board are therefore subject to the provisions of the UAPA.
The UAPA does not itself set forth a standard of proof applicable to administrative proceedings. In Goldstar, however, we considered the appropriate standard of proof under such circumstances, evaluating both federal administrative precedent; see Goldstar Medical Services, Inc. v. Dept. of Social Services, supra, 288 Conn. at 819–20, 955 A.2d 15; and the status of the preponderance of the evidence standard as “the ordinary civil standard of...
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