Jones v. Croft
| Decision Date | 13 November 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:12-cv-0545 |
| Parties | Jason Jones, Plaintiff, v. Chief Inspector Gary R. Croft, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Plaintiff, Jason Jones, an inmate who was housed at Ross Correctional Institution at the time relevant to this action, filed this action against defendants Chief Inspector Gary R. Croft and Institutional Inspector Whitten pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983. According to the complaint, both of these defendants conspired and demonstrated deliberate indifference when informed of the imminent danger of murder or brutal attack faced by Mr. Jones. Defendants have filed a motion for summary judgment, which is now fully briefed. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that the motion (#20) be granted.
This is one of three cases filed by Mr. Jones asserting claims of deliberate indifference to his safety arising from an alleged conspiracy between various prison officials and prison inmates. The allegations in this action involve Defendants' actions and inactions relating to a Notification of Grievance that Mr. Jones filed on June 13, 2011 claiming that he was in substantial risk of serious physical harm (Compl. at ¶2). Mr. Jones accuses Defendant Croft of violating his need for safety by failing to take action to ensure Mr. Jones's safety, delaying the response to the Notification of Grievance, and ultimately denying the grievance. Mr. Jones accuses Defendant Whitten of refusingto make blank grievance forms available to Mr. Jones and failing to ensure Mr. Jones' safety after being made aware of the substantial risk of serious physical harm to Mr. Jones.
Summary judgment is not a substitute for a trial when facts material to the Court's ultimate resolution of the case are in dispute. It may be rendered only when appropriate evidentiary materials, as described in Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), demonstrate the absence of a material factual dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Systems, Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962). The moving party bears the burden of demonstrating that no material facts are in dispute, and the evidence submitted must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Additionally, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences from that evidence in favor of the nonmoving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962).
The nonmoving party does have the burden, however, after completion of sufficient discovery, to submit evidence in support of any material element of a claim or defense on which that party would bear the burden of proof at trial, even if the moving party has not submitted evidence to negate the existence of that material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986). Of course, since "a party seeking summary judgment ... bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of [the record] which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact," Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, the responding party is only required to respond to those issues clearly identified by the moving party as being subject to the motion. It is with these standards in mind that the instant motion must be decided.
The facts which the Court must take as true for purposes of a summary ruling are those which have been properly supported. As Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) states, proper support for facts at this stage of the case can come from "depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials...." One common feature of all these types of information is that they be properly authenticated or sworn to. As the Court of Appeals has said, "it would [be] improper for the district court to consider documents that were not admissible in evidence" when ruling on a summary judgment motion. Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 561 (6th Cir. 2009).
Mr. Jones has brought claims relating to his conditions of confinement alleging that Defendants violated his constitutional rights. While Mr. Jones stated in his complaint that this action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986, and 1987, both parties have referred exclusively to section 1983 in their briefing. There is no need to analyze claims pursuant to section 1987, because that section does not provide a private right of action. Trapp v. Kimpel, 3:13-CV-18, 2013 WL 4510570, *3 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2013) (). Accordingly, this Court will address sections 1983, 1985(3) and 1986, but will begin its analysis with section 1983, which provides in relevant part: "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
"To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law." Salehpour v. University of Tennessee, 159 F.3d 199, 206 (6th Cir. 1998) (internal quotations and citations omitted). A plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 may bring a claim against a public official in the official's individual or official capacity. Individual-capacity claims "seek to impose individual liability upon a government officer for actions taken under color of state law ." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L.Ed.2d 301 (1991). In contrast, an official-capacity claim is "another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent." Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n. 55, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). Mr. Jones did not specify in the complaint which type of claim he was bringing, and Defendants made arguments addressing both official-capacity and individual-capacity claims. The parties' arguments regarding each type of claim will be addressed below.
Regarding the types of damages at issue, Mr. Jones's prayer for relief requested monetary damages or, alternately, release from his sentence and conviction. However, "[h]abeas is the exclusive remedy . . . for the prisoner who seeks 'immediate or speedier release' from confinement." Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2011). Accordingly, release from sentence and conviction is not a proper remedy for Mr. Jones's claims, and only his request for damages is before the Court.
"[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office." Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 572 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). "Indeed, when officials sued in this capacity in federal court die or leave office, their successors automatically assume their roles in the litigation." Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S.Ct. 358, 116 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1991) (citing inter alia Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 25(d)(1); Fed. R.App. Pro. 43(c)(1)). As a result, an official capacity suit is, for most purposes, "'no different from a suit against the State.'" McCoy v. Michigan, 369 F. App'x 646, 654 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989)).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution "bars suits brought in federal court against a state and its agencies unless the state has waived its sovereign immunity or consented to be sued in federal court." Grinter, 532 F.3d at 572 (). This immunity extends to claims against individuals sued in their official capacity to the extent that those claims seek monetary damages. Barker v. Goodrich, 649 F.3d 428, 433 (6th Cir. 2011), reh'g denied (Sept. 12, 2011); see also McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 662 (6th Cir. 2012). Ohio has not waived its sovereign immunity or consented to being sued in federal court. See Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999); see also Barker, 649 F.3d at 432 () (citations omitted). Furthermore, section 1983 has not abrogated that immunity, see Campbell v. Hamilton Cnty., 23 F. App'x 318, 327 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979)), and Mr. Jones has not argued that 1985(3) or 1986 abrogated that immunity, nor does the language of those sections indicate an intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 1986. Accordingly, because the claimsat issue here are claims for monetary damages, to the extent Defendants are sued in their official capacities, the claims against them are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
Mr. Jones responds to that argument by making a variety of arguments. His first argument discusses "discretion" authority, and while the question of whether government officials are performing discretionary functions is relevant to whether qualified immunity protects defendants sued in their individual capacity, it is not relevant to the question of whether Eleventh Amendment immunity protects defendants sued in their official ca...
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