Jones v. Dillard's, Inc.

• Decision Date: 30 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 02-14145.,02-14145.
• Citation: Jones v. Dillard's, Inc., 331 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2003)
• Parties: Pamela Sue JONES, Plaintiff, v. DILLARD'S, INC., Defendant. Sarah Crocker, Lana House, James Thompson, Deborah T. Gibbons, Plaintiffs, Gerda Byrd, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Dillard's, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

331 F.3d 1259

Pamela Sue JONES, Plaintiff, v.DILLARD'S, INC., Defendant.

Sarah Crocker, Lana House, James Thompson, Deborah T. Gibbons, Plaintiffs,Gerda Byrd, Plaintiff-Appellant, v.Dillard's, Inc., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 02-14145.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

May 30, 2003.

Charles Hardin, Tuscaloosa, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Brian Roberts Bostick, Timothy Alan Palmer, John Richard Carrigan, Ogletree Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.

Before DUBINA and FAY, Circuit Judges, and DOWD,^*District Judge.

DOWD, District Judge:

The above-captioned appeal from the Northern District of Alabama involves the discrimination claims asserted by Plaintiff-AppellantGerda Byrd.Byrd was one of six plaintiffs who alleged that Defendant-AppelleeDillard's, Inc., took some adverse action against them in their jobs because of their age.Byrd's claims are grounded in the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and Alabama statutory fraud.The district court granted Dillard's motion for summary judgment as to all defendants on all claims.Byrd was the only plaintiff to appeal; thus, only her claims are at issue.

I.BACKGROUND

Plaintiff-AppellantGerda Byrd began working for Gayfer's Department Store in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in 1975.In August 1998, Dillard's, Inc.("Dillard's" or the "Company"), purchased the Tuscaloosa store, but continued to employ its existing workforce.For the five years preceding the buyout, Byrd held the position of office and credit manager.Dillard's offered no such position within its organizational structure, but placed her in an assistant area sales manager ("AASM") position in order to keep her at the same rate of pay.Shortly thereafter, however, Byrd learned from Richard Lucas, also an AASM, that the store was eliminating AASM positions and that the store had no intention of ever employing AASMs again.

In May 1999, as part of its restructuring, Dillard's offered Byrd an opportunity to sell cosmetics on the sales floor.She declined, however, because she saw lagging store sales as a bad sign for commissions in that department.Moreover, Byrd feared that she would eventually be terminated for failing to reach sales-per-hour ("SPH") goals.Rather than risk termination, Byrd considered her other options.As a manager with her position being eliminated, she was entitled to fill another managerial position in the store or take severance pay.She opted for the latter.Dillard's approved her severance request in May 1999, and she left in the same month.In all, Byrd received forty-seven weeks of severance pay.

On June 8, 1999, Byrd spoke to Andy Poole, operations manager at Dillard's, who told her that the company instructed him to hire two new AASMs.(Byrd Dep. Tr.at 55, Ex. 2at 5(D.Ct.Doc. No. 15).)Byrd recorded her reaction to this news in some typewritten notes:

This happens after I was told [that] the store could not afford any AASM[ ]s ... because they were not making their figures.Seems to me [that] I was lied to!!!As soon as I find out there are two new AASM[s] in place[,] I will file a lawsuit against Dillard[']s.This lawsuit will be for [a]ge discrimination and [w]age discrimination.Seems to me [that]they wanted to get rid of me ... by demoting me to the floor, and[,] after several paycuts [] because I could not meet my SPH[,] fire me.

(Byrd Dep. Tr.at 45, Ex. 2at 5.)

In September 1999, Tiffany Winters applied for an AASM position at the Tuscaloosa store, and was hired a month later.Byrd testified that she heard Poole say that Winters was "young and pretty," and that he"had to hire her."(Byrd Dep. Tr.at 67, 70.)

At the time Byrd left the company, she was only aware of poor sales as the Company's reason for eliminating the AASM position.She admitted having no evidence that the store manager knew at the time that the position would be reinstated later that year.Byrd testified that, despite the lack of evidence, she felt certain someone in the company knew her former position was not really eliminated because Winters was hired in that position so soon after she left.

II.PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Byrd filed her administrative charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission("EEOC") on February 24, 2000.In December 2000, Byrd and the other plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal court, alleging claims under the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act("ADEA"), the Alabama Age Discrimination in Employment Act("AADEA"), and an Alabama fraud statute.

Dillard's filed a motion for summary judgment as to the claims of Byrd and the other plaintiffs.The Company argued that Byrd's claim was time-barred because Byrd failed to file her EEOC charge within 180 days of any alleged act of discrimination.Dillard's argued that her state discrimination claim was also time-barred because the AADEA simply adopted the ADEA's limitations period.Alternatively, it argued that Byrd had no direct or circumstantial evidence of age discrimination, which required judgment in its favor on the merits.With respect to Byrd's fraud claim, Dillard's argued in its motion that no evidence showed it made a false representation to her, but that only another store employee indicated that the AASM position was being permanently eliminated.Further, she did not actually rely on any such statements, that any reliance was unreasonable, that she had no evidence of an intent to deceive, and that she did not suffer cognizable damages.

The district court granted the Company's motion for summary judgment as to all of Byrd's claims.It found that Byrd had reason to believe she had suffered age discrimination before the 180 days preceding her EEOC charge.Specifically, the district court found that her pre-resignation discussions with co-workers and her June 8, 1999, discovery of the reinstatement of the AASM position were sufficient to start the running of the statute of limitations.In addition, the court found that the AADEA's statute of limitations was, at most, 180 days because the language of the statute mirrored that of the ADEA.Thus, the court held that Byrd's AADEA claim was also time-barred.Finally, the district court found that there was no evidence the Company's allegedly false statement caused her any injury.Instead, the court found that Byrd resigned because she was being transferred to cosmetics and did not want to work in that department, not because of the elimination of the AASM position.

The court also denied Byrd's motion to alter or amend its judgment.(Order datedJune 25, 2002, at 3(D.Ct.Doc. No. 31).)

III.ANALYSIS

The Court reviews de novo a lower court's decision to grant summary judgment.Pennington v. City of Huntsville,261 F.3d 1262, 1265(11th Cir.2001);Patrick v. Floyd Med. Ctr.,201 F.3d 1313, 1315(11th Cir.2000).A district court's entry of summary judgment should be affirmed if, after construing the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-movant, the reviewing court finds that no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c);William Penn Life Ins. Co. of New York v. Sands,912 F.2d 1359, 1361(11th Cir.1990).

We now turn to examine the district court's rulings on each of Byrd's claims under this legal standard.As discussed herein, we reverse on the ADEA claim, certify a question to the Alabama Supreme Court on the AADEA claim, and affirm on the fraud claim.

A.The ADEA Claim

The period in which a person must file a complaint with the EEOC depends on whether a state is a "deferral state" under the ADEA.Deferral states are those that have a state agency equivalent to the EEOC.See29 U.S.C. §§ 626(d),633 (1999);see alsoAmerican Airlines, Inc. v. Cardoza-Rodriguez,133 F.3d 111(1st Cir.1998);Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools Div.,927 F.2d 876, 878(5th Cir.1991).In these states, a person must file an age discrimination claim with the EEOC within 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred.29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2).In states without a state equivalent to the EEOC, the ADEA requires a charge to be filed within 180 days.29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(1).Alabama has a state discrimination statute, the AADEA, but does not have an EEOC equivalent.Thus, the Court examines the timeliness of Byrd's ADEA claim in the context of the 180-day rule.The parties do not dispute that the applicable charging period is 180 days.

What the parties dispute, however, is when that period starts to run.The proper focus for when a statute of limitations begins to run is the time of the discriminatory act.Chardon v. Fernandez,454 U.S. 6, 8, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6(1981);Nance v. Maxwell Fed. Credit Union,186 F.3d 1338, 1341(11th Cir.1999).Three possible dates can be construed as the unlawful practice that triggered the limitations period: (1) April or May 1999, when Byrd was told that her position was being eliminated; (2)June 12, 1999, when she took notes about her discovery of two new AASMs to be hired and her plans to sue for age discrimination; or (3)November 1, 1999, when she learned that a 28-year-old woman had been hired to fill her former AASM position.

Byrd argues in support of the third date.She says that, at the time her position was eliminated, she was only aware of purported financial reasons for the elimination of her job.Byrd asserts that she could not file a complaint until she became aware of the Company's discriminatory intent.On this date, she learned from Poole that Winters had been hired in her place.Thus, Byrd contends, the limitations period did not begin to run until November 1, 1999, bringing her EEOC charge filed on February 24, 2000, within the limitations period.

Alternatively, Byrd argues that, even if the Company's discriminatory act...