Jones v. Grinnell Corp.
| Decision Date | 13 August 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-285-A,74-285-A |
| Citation | 117 R.I. 44,362 A.2d 139 |
| Parties | Charles L. JONES v. GRINNELL CORP. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This is an employee's appeal from the denial by the Workmen's Compensation Commission of a petition for disfigurement benefits. The record indicates that on December 23, 1969, Jones suffered severe work-related third-degree burns to his right forearm. He was admitted to Rhode Island Hospital where an attempt was made to save the arm. Within a week of the mishap Grinnell executed a preliminary agreement in which it agreed to pay Jones a weekly sum of $70 so long as he remained incapacitated, dependency benefits for his six children, and the medical expense payments called for by the Workmen's Compensation Act. A few days later, January 2, 1970, Jones's right arm was amputated just above the elbow.
After the amputation, Jones was given physical therapy treatment and fitted with a prosthesis. His rehabilitation program ran into difficulty because he continued to experience pain in the stump area. On January 11, 1971, he returned to the hospital for the excision of a neuroma, a condition which his surgeon defined as a 'growth of nerve tissue * * * embedded in (the) scar tissue at the amputation site.' In October of 1971 Grinnell executed a second agreement in which it agreed to pay Jones specific compensation for the severance of his right arm. This agreement called for the weekly payment of $45, which was to be paid to Jones for a period of 312 weeks.
Jones's attempts to master his prosthetic device were impeded by continual pain in the stump area, and in November 1973 he paid a fourth visit to the operating table to have another neuroma excised. In January 1974 Jones was still complaining of pain in the stump, but there were no objective signs of a recurring neuroma.
Jones filed this disfigurement petition on February 1, 1974. A hearing was held before a trial commissioner, who denied the petition. An appeal followed to the full commission, where a decree was entered affirming the trial commissioner's findings of fact and law. The commission's denial is based upon its finding that Jones's petition was barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
The statute of limitations governing workmen's compensation proceedings is set forth in G.L.1956 (1968 Reenactment) § 28-35-57. In essence, the relevant portions of this statute provide that a compensation claim will be barred unless an agreement to pay compensation or a petition seeking compensation 1 is filed with the appropriate authority within 2 years after an occurrence or manifestation of the incapacity; and where there is an undisclosed physical or mental impairment, the time of the filing of the claim will not begin to run until the time the claimant either knew or should have known of the existence of the impairment and its causal relationship to his employment or when he becomes disabled, whichever event comes later.
Before proceeding with the merits of this controversy, a brief preliminary reference to certain legal principles is warranted. In Andreozzi v. D'Antuono, 113 R.I. 155, 159, 319 A.2d 16, 18 (1974), we pointed out that the word 'compensation,' when employed in our Workmen's Compensation Act, encompasses a wide variety of benefits. It includes payments for the loss of earning capacity, a limb, hearing, or sight; support of dependents; disfigurement; and the payment of medical and funeral expenses. Again, in Fontaine v. Gorfine, 105 R.I. 174, 181-82, 250 A.2d 361, 364-65 (1969), we alluded to the fact that the word 'injury' does not have the same meaning whenever it appears in the Act. Sometimes, we said, it means an incapacity for work, but when used in relation to the payment of specific compensation, it refers to a type of condition which may not necessarily result in the loss of earning capacity but which will establish the worker's right to receive a weekly benefit payment for any of the specific losses enumerated in § 28-33-19. Such payments, we have said, are to be considered as 'damages' for the injury or loss sustained rather than 'compensation.' Coletta v. State, 106 R.I. 764, 771, 263 A.2d 681, 685 (1970); Sherry v. Crescent Co., 101 R.I. 703, 706, 226 A.2d 819, 821 (1967); Steele v. Darlington Fabrics Corp., 78 R.I. 272, 275, 81 A.2d 424, 426 (1951).
In 1963 the General Assembly amended the specific compensation benefits of the Act so as to provide a weekly benefit to a worker whose injury has resulted in permanent disfigurement. Section 28-33-19(n)(2) specified that a permanent disfigurement about the face, head, neck, hand, or arm entitled the injured employee to a weekly benefit payable for a maximum period of 300 weeks. The amount of the benefit depended upon the employee's average weekly wage, but in no way could the payment be more than $30 or less than $16. 2 The number of weeks the payment would be made was left to the sound discretion of the commission with the maximum number of weeks being 300. The statute called for a compensation award that is 'proper and equitable.' In 1966 we established the rule that the time for filing a claim for specific compensation benefits, where there has been a protracted effort to restore the use of a bodily function, runs from the date when sound medical opinion determines that an end result has been reached in the treatment phase and nothing further can be done to help the employee because the then existing condition has become permanent. Tirocchi v. United States Rubber Co., 101 R.I. 429, 434, 224 A.2d 387, 391 (1966).
This court defined 'disfigurement' as '* * * 'that which impairs or injures the beauty, symmetry or appearance of a person or thing; that which renders unslightly, mis-shapen or imperfect or deforms in some manner. " St. Laurent v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 113 R.I. 10, 13, 316 A.2d 504, 506 (1974). After defining 'disfigurement,' we emphasized that the Legislature, in providing compensation for disfigurement, never intended to penalize the employer but that the commission, after determining the existence and extent of the disfigurement on the basis of all relevant material evidence submitted by the parties, could make an award that is proper and equitable in the given circumstances. Id. at 13-14, 316 A.2d at 506.
Turning to the present controversy, two witnesses appeared before the trial...
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