Jones v. Jones

• Citation: 281 S.C. 96,314 S.E.2d 33
• Decision Date: 31 January 1984
• Docket Number: No. 0120,0120
• Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina
• Parties: Donald Ray JONES, Appellant, v. Lily Carolyn JONES, Respondent. . Heard

Page 33

314 S.E.2d 33

281 S.C. 96

Donald Ray JONES, Appellant, v. Lily Carolyn JONES, Respondent.

No. 0120.

Court of Appeals of South Carolina.

Heard Jan. 31, 1984.

Decided March 5, 1984.

Kermit S. King and Charles W. Gambrell, Jr., Columbia; and William F. Robertson, III, Greenville, for appellant.

J.D. Todd, Jr., Greenville, for respondent.

CURETON, Judge:

In this divorce action, the husband appeals from the order of the trial judge and asserts: (1) the equitable distribution award to the wife was excessive, (2) the alimony award was excessive, (3) the trial court should not have awarded the wife the exclusive use of the marital home, while requiring him to pay the taxes, insurance and maintenance costs thereon, and (4) the trial judge failed to consider the tax consequences to him in making the several awards to the wife.

The parties were married approximately twenty-nine years and have four children, two of whom are now emancipated. The trial judge awarded the wife custody of the minor children, $400 monthly alimony, $200 monthly child support, exclusive use of the marital home until the youngest child reaches eighteen, and a one-half interest in all of the real estate owned by the parties consisting of a home worth approximately $80,000 and four lots worth $6,000 each. Additionally, the husband was ordered to maintain hospitalization and major medical insurance coverage on the minor children and to pay the taxes, insurance and maintenance costs on the marital home until the youngest child reaches age eighteen. The husband was permitted to retain the $15,000 in cash he withdrew from the bank at the time of the parties' separation.

With respect to the award to the wife of a one-half interest in the real estate, the husband contends the award is excessive because the record does not demonstrate that the wife's contributions to the acquisition of the property warranted such an award. We disagree.

In making an equitable division of marital property, the family court may employ any reasonable means, Taylor v. Taylor, 267 S.C. 530, 229 S.E.2d 852 (1976), and its decision in this regard will not be disturbed by this Court unless found to be an abuse of discretion. Simmons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 267 S.E.2d 427 (1980). We cannot develop a precise mathematical formula to govern our family court judges in making such awards, Baker v. Baker, supra; we must rely, therefore, on our family court judges whose mature judgments we accord great deference. However, the amount of the wife's award should bear a reasonable relationship to her contributions to the acquisition of the property, Baker v. Baker, 276 S.C. 427, 279 S.E.2d 601 (1981), or the financial and material success of the family, Moyle v. Moyle, 262 S.C. 308, 204 S.E.2d 46 (1974).

Here, while the wife's monetary contributions to the acquisition of the marital properties were small when compared to the husband's, the record reveals she was a good wife who raised the parties' children, performed usual wifely duties and worked outside the home for at least twenty years out of the twenty-nine-year marriage. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the amount of the award.

We next consider the husband's argument that the alimony award was excessive. When making an alimony award, the court must consider a number of factors, Lide v. Lide, 277 S.C. 155, 283 S.E.2d 832 (1981), and its discretion will not be disturbed unless abuse is shown, Smith v. Smith, 264 S.C. 624, 216 S.E.2d 541 (1975). In the case sub judice, the wife's income was approximately $7200 a year while the husband's expected income exceeded $35,000 a year. Although at the time of the divorce hearing, the husband had not received a paycheck for two of his last four pay periods, he testified he expected that situation to be only temporary. The trial court also found that his employment status was only temporary. In view of the fact that the husband could petition for relief if his employment situation proved otherwise, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial judge's treatment of the husband's employment status.

The husband next argues that the trial court erred in awarding the wife the use of the marital home until the youngest child reaches age eighteen. The announced basis for this award was that since the home was suitable for the wife and minor children, "it would be unfair to order the [wife] and the two children out of this home ...." Although not set out in the divorce decree, we think it apparent that the trial judge intended the use of the home to constitute an incident of support and not a property division. ¹

In the case of Smith v. Smith, 312 S.E.2d 560 (S.C.App.1984), we said that where a spouse is awarded custody of minor children, that fact may constitute sufficient reason for granting the custodial spouse exclusive...