Jones v. Patterson

• Citation: 195 S.W. 1004,271 Mo. 1
• Parties: WILLIAM ZOLLIE JONES v. CLIFFORD PATTERSON, Appellant
• Decision Date: 29 May 1917
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

195 S.W. 1004

271 Mo. 1

WILLIAM ZOLLIE JONES v. CLIFFORD PATTERSON, Appellant

Supreme Court of Missouri, Second Division

May 29, 1917

Appeal from Platte Circuit Court. -- Hon. Alonzo D. Burnes, Judge.

Affirmed.

Norton B. Anderson and Minor Moore for appellant; Geo. W. Day of counsel.

(1) Charitable trusts are recognized, enforced and protected by the courts of chancery of this State as a part of the general jurisdiction, not based upon -- nor does it need the support of -- the Statute 43d Elizabeth; nor is it dependent upon any prerogative power, but is inherent in a court of chancery. Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Academy v Clemens, 50 Mo. 167; Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45; Powell v. Hatch, 100 Mo. 592; Woman's Ch Assn. v. Kansas City, 147 Mo. 103; Goode v McPherson, 51 Mo. 126; Schmidt v. Hess, 60 Mo. 591; Mo. Hist. Society v. Academy of Science, 94 Mo. 459; Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo. 561; Lackland v. Walker, 151 Mo. 242. (2) Where the general objects of the bequest are pointed out, or if the testator has fixed the means of doing so by the appointment of trustees with the power in them, then the gift must be treated as sufficiently definite for judicial cognizance and will be carried into effect. Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 52. (3) A charity is a gift for a public use, as a gift in and of the poor, to learning, to religion, to a humane object. Kam v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362. In general, a gift of property to be lawfully applied for an indefinite number of persons, by bringing them under the influence of religion, is prima-facie charitable in the legal sense. Turner v. Ogden, 1 Cox, 316. (4) No object is more clearly charitable in the sense of the law than the advancement of religion and education. 6 Cyc. 913; Fairbanks v. Lamson, 99 Mass. 533. (5) A liberal construction will be given by the court to bequests for the support of Christianity; and objections drawn from technical theology will have little weight when urged in avoidance of such bequests. Trustees v. Phillips Academy, 12 Mass. 545. (6) The provisions of the will in the case at bar being sufficiently clear according to the accepted meaning of the words used, how is such a charitable use as is therein created regarded by the law of this State? Has not such a charitable use always received favorable consideration from our courts? Chambers v. St. Louis, 29 Mo. 543; Academy v. Clemens, 50 Mo. 167; Schmidt v. Hess, 60 Mo. 541; Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45; Mo. Hist. Soc. v. Academy, 94 Mo. 459; Powell v. Hatch, 100 Mo. 592; Barkley v. Donnelly, 112 Mo. 561; Sappington Will Case, 123 Mo. 32; Shaw Will Case, 157 Mo. 210; Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 426; Strother v. Barrow, 246 Mo. 250.

Francis M. Wilson and Roy D. Williams for respondent.

The language "for missionary purposes in whatever he [the appellant] thinks best, so it is done in the name of my dear Savior, and for the salvation of souls," is too indefinite in its purposes and objects to be enforceable as a legal and valid trust. Dulany v. Middleton, 72 Md. 67; Reeves v. Reeves, 5 Lea, 650; Carpenter v. Miller, 320 Va. 174; Bridges v. Pleasants, 4 Ired. Eq. 26, 44 Am. Dec. 94; White v. Fisk, 22 Conn. 31; Owen v. Missionary Society, 14 N.Y. 38, 67 Am. Dec. 160; Fifield v. Van Wyck, 64 Am. St. 756; In re Schmucker's Estate v. Reel, 61 Mo. 596; Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 450; 2 Perry on Trusts, sec. 719; Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 50; Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 428; Board of Trustees v. May, 201 Mo. 360; Moran v. Moran, 73 N.W. 620; Lepage v. McNamara, 5 Iowa 124; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198, 9 Am. Rep. 691; Coleman v. Oleary, 70 S.W. 1068; Spalding v. Industrial School, 54 S.W. 200; McHugh v. McCole, 72 N. W. (Wis.) 631; In re Seymour's Will, 124 N.Y.S. 637; Stoepel v. Satterthwaite, 127 N.W. 673; In re Robinson's Will, 96 N.E. 925; In re Compton's Will, 131 N.Y.S. 183; Arnett v. Trust Co., 73 N.E. 930.

OPINION

WALKER, P. J.

This is an action to quiet title under section 2535, Revised Statutes 1909. The property in controversy consists of 160 acres of land in Platte County.

A trial before the circuit court of that county resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff, from which the defendant has appealed.

The plaintiff is the sole heir at law of Fannie R. Lytle, who died testate in Los Angeles, California, in June, 1911, seized in fee of the land in question. The defendant is the nephew and co-executor with the husband of testatrix. The terms of the will of Mrs. Lytle, so far as concerns the matter at issue, are as follows:

"I, Fannie R. Lytle, hereby make my last will and testament. I give all my property which I now possess (both real and personal) in the State of California, Los Angeles County, and also the rent of my farm consisting of one hundred and sixty acres of land in Platte County, Missouri, to my husband during his lifetime; he is to use the income off of this property for his own use and benefit, and at his death, I want it placed in the hands of Clifford Patterson (my nephew) to be used for missionary purposes in whatever field he thinks best to use it, so it is done in the name of my dear Savior and for the salvation of souls."

The defendant claims title to the land under the will in trust for the purpose therein set forth. The plaintiff, on the contrary, contends on account of the indefinite nature of the language employed that no valid trust was created and as a consequence that he is entitled to the land by descent as the heir of his mother. The determination of the title to this land, so far as the parties hereto are concerned, is of course subject to the life estate of testatrix's husband, concerning the validity of which devise no question is raised.

The validity of that portion of the will declaratory of the desire of the testatrix as to the disposition of her land in Missouri at the death of her husband is therefore the matter in issue.

On account of the frequency of the creation of charitable trusts there is no dearth of legal literature here and elsewhere on this subject. The philanthropic spirit manifested in this disposition of property prompts the courts to sustain same wherever the devise or bequest is of such a nature as to conform to well established precedents liberally construed. [Hadley v. Forsee, 203 Mo. 418, 101 S.W. 59.] An essential requisite to the validity of such a trust as is here under consideration is that it be clear, definite and certain; by which is meant that the words of creation announce a definite subject and a certain object and that the terms of the trust be sufficiently declared. [Jones v. Jones, 223 Mo. 424, 123 S.W. 29.] These measures of sufficiency appearing in the terms of the instrument, courts will not concern themselves with the wisdom or propriety of the trust or the character of the beneficiary.

The words "missionary purposes" employed by the testatrix in the creation of this trust constitute the subject of same, the object, as the context discloses, being the propagation of religion, limited in this instance to the Christian religion by a familiar reference to its founder, and the generally accepted doctrine as to his mission. But by missionary purposes nothing more is meant than the propagation of religion. Hence the subject and the object of the trust are synonymous and the definition of one necessarily includes that of the other. This fact, however, need not militate against the validity of the trust if the creator's purpose may, from the language employed, be definitely determined, or in other words, if the trust has been sufficiently declared. By this sufficiency of declaration is meant the use of such words as will enable a court of equity to enforce the performance of the duty imposed on the trustee.

The reason for this limitation was clearly expressed by the English High Court of Chancery in the beginning of the last century in the case of Morice v. Bishop of Durham, 9 Vesey, Jr., 405, where the Master of the Rolls, speaking for the court, said: " There can be no trust over the exercise of which the court will not assume control, for an uncontrollable power of disposition would be ownership and not trust."

The fact that the interest may be generally expressed will not necessarily cause the trust to fail on account of the uncertainty of the object (Sappington v. Sappington School Fund Trustees, 123 Mo. 32, 27 S.W. 356; First Baptist Church v. Robberson, 71 Mo. 326), if the particular mode of application may be rendered susceptible of direction by a court of equity. [Morice v. Durham, supra; Brennan v. Winkler, 37 S.C. 457, 16 S.E. 190; Webster v. Morris, 66 Wis. 366, 57 Am. Rep. 278, 28 N.W. 353.] Notwithstanding the permissibility of a general declaration, if the charity does not by its own terms fix itself on a well defined object or is not susceptible of such interpretation by the courts but is general and indefinite, it must fail. [Hadley v. Forsee, supra; Howe v. Wilson, 91 Mo. 45, 60 Am. Rep. 226, 3 S.W. 390; Fairfield v. Lawson, 50 Conn. 501, 47 Am. Rep. 669; Hunt v. Fowler, 121 Ill. 269; Gumble v. Pfluger, 62 How. Pr. 118.]

If a trust was created, therefore, in the instant case, the language of the testatrix will, under the rule above announced, enable it to be so determined. Without repeating her language, it may be said that the purpose sought to be effected was the propagation of the Christian religion, the resultant effect, as declared by the testatrix, being the salvation of souls. Certainly no more comprehensive words could have been used. It is true when we speak of the Christian religion we mean usually that particular form of belief to which we have given our allegiance, just as when we say, "All the people have gone to the seashore," or, "Everybody obeys the law" we mean and are so understood, indifferent as we...