Jones v. People
| Decision Date | 13 January 1986 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 83SC401,83SC414,s. 83SC401 |
| Citation | 711 P.2d 1270 |
| Parties | Nicholas J. JONES, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Nicholas J. JONES, Respondent. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
David F. Vela, State Public Defender, Shelley Gilman, Special Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for Nicholas J. Jones.
Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Maureen Phelan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for the People.
Defendant, Nicholas J. Jones, was convicted of first-degree murder 1 and aggravated robbery 2 following a jury trial. In People v. Jones, 677 P.2d 383 (Colo.App.1983), the court of appeals reversed the judgments of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. We granted certiorari to review the decision of the court of appeals. 3 We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand to the court of appeals with directions to reinstate the judgments of conviction against the defendant.
On August 30, 1979, the body of Angel Santiago was found in Plateau Creek near Grand Junction, Colorado. He had been shot twice in the head. Santiago's wrists were tied behind his back, and his ankles were bound together. Santiago had left his home in Downey, California on August 23, driving a white 1973 Pontiac LeMans, en route to New York. A pathologist estimated Santiago's date of death between August 24 and August 26.
On September 7, at approximately 1:30 a.m., the defendant, accompanied by a male companion, checked into the Holiday Inn in Manchester, New Hampshire. The defendant registered under the name of Angel Santiago and used a VISA credit card bearing Santiago's name. Approximately one-half hour later, the defendant appeared in the hotel lobby and told the desk clerk that his companion had stolen his wallet, credit cards, money, and car while he was taking a shower. Officer Eugene Cook of the Manchester Police Department was on routine patrol on the morning of September 7 and happened to walk into the Holiday Inn while the defendant was talking to the clerk. The clerk referred the defendant to Officer Cook, and the defendant, still identifying himself as Angel Santiago, reported the theft to Officer Cook. The defendant said that the car was a white 1973 Pontiac with a California registration. Officer Cook obtained the license plate number of the vehicle from the hotel registration card, and relayed the information to the police station. After talking with the defendant, Officer Cook returned to the police station and filed a written report. The vehicle information was entered on the police department's computer, and the police learned that the car had previously been reported stolen and was being sought in connection with a homicide in Colorado. The police then contacted Milo Vig of the Mesa County Sheriff's Department in Colorado. Vig said that his office was investigating the homicide of Angel Santiago and that the victim's car was missing.
Edmond LaBeouf, the Deputy Chief of Police of the Manchester Police Department, was apprised of the foregoing information when he reported for duty at 7:00 a.m. on the morning of September 7. He instructed Officer Cook and another officer to go to the Holiday Inn and ask the defendant to come to the police station to provide further information regarding the stolen car. The officers were not told to arrest the defendant. The officers went to the hotel and knocked on the door of the room registered to the defendant. Receiving no answer, the officers asked a hotel employee to open the door. The door was chained from the inside, but the officers could see the defendant asleep on a bed. They called out to the defendant and, when he awoke, told him that questions had arisen about the car he had reported stolen and that the police wanted him to come to the station to provide further information. The defendant agreed to go to the station with the officers and was transported there in the officers' patrol car.
At the stationhouse, Officer Cook introduced the defendant to Deputy Chief LaBeouf and Captain Michael Welch, who took the defendant to an interview room. LaBeouf informed the defendant that the car he had reported stolen had previously been reported stolen, and that the police wanted to clear up the matter. LaBeouf said it was standard policy to advise persons of their rights prior to questioning, and he gave the defendant an oral Miranda advisement. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The defendant said he understood his rights and was willing to talk to the officers.
The officers asked the defendant to describe the route he had travelled from California to New Hampshire. The defendant responded that three weeks earlier he left Costa Mesa, California with a woman named Julie. The two drove up the West Coast through Oregon and Washington into Canada. They proceeded east across Canada to Montreal. When they reached Montreal, Julie flew back to California. In Montreal the defendant met a man named Steve whose last name was either Corbitt or Carlton. The two men drove south to New Hampshire and stopped at the Holiday Inn in Manchester. It was there that "Steve" stole the defendant's car and personal belongings.
At this point in the interview, LaBeouf told the defendant that an Angel Santiago had been shot to death in Colorado, and that the defendant had registered at the Holiday Inn using a credit card bearing the name of Santiago. LaBeouf then asked the defendant to start over again beginning with his correct name. The defendant paused for a moment, stared at the officers, and said his real name was Nicholas Jones. He stated that he was an escapee from an Alabama prison where he had been serving a sentence for auto theft.
The defendant then gave a second account of his travels. He told the officers that he hitchhiked east out of Las Vegas, Nevada, and obtained a ride from a man named George between August 16 and August 19 in Utah. Several hours after picking the defendant up, the man said that he was going to give his car to the defendant and hitchhike back to California. The man said he would report the car as stolen a few weeks later. The defendant accepted the car and drove across country, eventually stopping in Montreal, where he met "Steve."
The interview lasted from 7:35 a.m. to 9:45 a.m. On the basis of the defendant's admission that he was an escapee from prison, he was arrested and incarcerated as a fugitive from justice.
The defendant was subsequently charged in the Mesa County District Court with the first-degree murder and aggravated robbery of Angel Santiago. At trial the prosecution called James Cooper, who testified that he met the defendant in Las Vegas in August 1979. Cooper said that the defendant stayed with him for several days and then departed without saying where he was going. Cooper also testified that he owned a .22 caliber "Bicentennial Edition" Ruger handgun which he discovered missing shortly after the defendant left.
The evidence at trial also established that two days after the defendant's arrest in New Hampshire, police officers in Maine discovered Angel Santiago's car in the possession of and recently registered to Douglas Copley, who had obtained different license plates. Copley was subsequently identified as the man who checked into the Manchester Holiday Inn with the defendant. Copley led the officers to a handgun, which he had taken from the car and buried several miles from his home. At trial James Cooper identified the weapon as his .22 caliber Ruger handgun. A ballistics expert testified that two of the three shell casings found in the vicinity of Santiago's body were fired in Cooper's gun.
Other evidence against the defendant included the discovery of personal items belonging to Santiago in the defendant's room at the Manchester Holiday Inn. Objects belonging to Santiago were also found in a dumpster in Iowa. A fingerprint lifted from a cigarette carton in the dumpster was identified as the defendant's.
Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion to suppress the statements he made to the Manchester police. At the suppression hearing, the defendant argued that the Miranda advisement given to him was insufficient because the officers did not inform him that he was suspected of criminal activity. The trial court denied the motion after finding that the defendant was properly advised of his rights, and that he voluntarily agreed to talk to the police officers. 4
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. The court stated:
Here, defendant was questioned by New Hampshire police after reporting the theft of his automobile. The questions asked by the policemen concerned the registration number and vehicle identification number of the automobile. According to New Hampshire authorities, Miranda warnings were given prior to this questioning as a matter of course. After double checking the information given them by defendant in response to their questions, the investigators had reason to believe defendant had participated in a homicide which occurred in Mesa County, Colorado. Before questioning defendant regarding the Colorado homicide, however, no further advisements were given.
People v. Jones, 677 P.2d at 383. Relying on People v. Spring, 671 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983), the court held that since the defendant was not advised that he was a suspect in the Colorado homicide, the waiver of his Miranda rights was invalid.
Statements made by a defendant during custodial interrogation are admissible only if the prosecution establishes that the defendant was warned of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel prior to any questioning. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); People v. Spring, 713 P.2d 865 (Colo. 1985). The...
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