People v. Spring

• Decision Date: 02 December 1985
• Docket Number: 83SC155,Nos. 83SC145,s. 83SC145
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. John Leroy SPRING, Respondent. John Leroy SPRING, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Page 865

713 P.2d 865

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. John Leroy SPRING, Respondent.

John Leroy SPRING, Petitioner, v. The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Respondent.

Nos. 83SC145, 83SC155.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

Dec. 2, 1985.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearings

Jan. 13, 1986.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Margaret L. O'Leary, Seth J. Benezra, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for John Leroy Spring.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., Maureen Phelan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for the People.

LOHR, Justice.

In People v. Spring, 671 P.2d 965 (Colo.App.1983), the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the conviction of defendant John Leroy Spring for first degree murder because it concluded that the trial court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress certain statements made by him while in custody during questioning by police officers. We granted the People's petition for certiorari to review this holding. We also granted that part of the defendant's petition for certiorari in which he contends that the trial court committed reversible error by improperly limiting his right to present evidence in his own behalf through defense witnesses, an issue not reached by the court of appeals. ¹

We agree with the court of appeals that the district court erred in denying the defendant's motion to suppress two of the three statements in question, and that a new trial is required as a result, although we do not agree fully with the reasoning of the court of appeals. We also affirm the court of appeals' holding that it was not established whether the third statement was the product of an illegally obtained statement and, therefore, that further proceedings are necessary to resolve the issue of attenuation if the People seek to introduce that statement into evidence at a retrial of Spring. Because certain errors alleged by Spring in his petition for certiorari are likely to arise again upon retrial, we address them in this opinion and conclude that the trial court was unduly restrictive in refusing to admit certain testimony offered by the defendant.

I.

Defendant John Leroy Spring was charged in Moffat County District Court with the first degree murder of Donald Walker. ² Evidence presented at trial established that Walker was shot to death during a nightime elk hunt in early February of 1979 while in the company of Spring and another man, Donald Wagner. The three men had driven to a hunting site near Craig, Colorado. Walker was asked by one of the other men to walk ahead and search a ravine next to the road for elk. Wagner then asked Spring to shine a flashlight in the direction of Walker, whereupon Wagner fired a rifle shot that hit Walker in the head and dropped him to the ground. Wagner then approached the victim and fired a second shot, which resulted in Walker's death. Spring's defense at trial was that he had no knowledge that Wagner was going to shoot and kill Walker and that he assisted Wagner in burying Walker's body in the snow and in further concealing the murder because he was afraid of Wagner. Spring was convicted by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, and he appealed.

The court of appeals reversed the conviction, holding that statements made to officers by Spring on March 30, 1979, and July 13, 1979, while he was in custody, were taken in violation of his constitutional rights and that the People had failed to establish that a third statement, made by Spring on May 26, 1979, was not a fruit of the March 30 statement. Specifically, the court of appeals held that because Spring was not informed prior to the March 30 and July 13 interviews that the officers were going to question him about Walker's death, Spring's waivers of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel were not intelligent and knowing. With regard to the July 13 statement, the court of appeals also held that the officers improperly continued to question Spring about Walker's death after Spring told them that he did not want to talk about the subject. For these reasons, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court committed reversible error when it refused to grant Spring's motion to suppress the three statements. People v. Spring, 671 P.2d at 966-67. We granted the People's petition for certiorari to review these suppression holdings.

The defendant also filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the trial court committed a variety of errors during his trial in addition to the failure to suppress the challenged statements. We decided to review Spring's assertion that the trial court improperly limited his right to present evidence on his own behalf through defense witnesses. We begin with an examination of the suppression issues.

II.

Spring made three statements to law enforcement officers while in custody, each one after an advisement of rights and without an attorney present. Two of those statements were admitted into evidence at trial. The statements, and the circumstances surrounding their making, will be described in part B below. A review of the general principles governing the admissibility of statements made by a person in custody will be useful before considering the statements at issue.

A.

The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates that the defendant was warned adequately of his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to counsel and thereafter voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived those rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45, 467-76, 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 1624-1628, 1630, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966); People v. Lee, 630 P.2d 583, 588 (Colo.1981). The reason for the warning requirement is that, without such a safeguard, the compelling pressures inherent in police custody "work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak [where] he would not otherwise do so freely." People v. Lee, 630 P.2d at 588, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 467, 86 S.Ct. at 1624. A consideration separate from the requirement of an advisement of rights and a valid waiver of those rights is that a statement obtained from a defendant is admissible only if made voluntarily. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); People v. Thorpe, 641 P.2d 935, 941 (Colo.1982). A defendant's due process rights are violated if his conviction is founded, in whole or in part, upon an involuntary statement. People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722, 728 (Colo.1985). Thus, when reviewing a motion to suppress a statement, and after determining that the statement was preceded by a proper Miranda advisement, a court is required to address both the effectiveness of the waiver of Miranda rights and the voluntariness of the statement itself. People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d 770, 775-76 (Colo.1983); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d 505, 508 (Colo.1983). ³

First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to have counsel present. People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d at 775; People v. Fish, 660 P.2d at 508. "A waiver is valid if it is a knowing and intelligent relinquishment of a known right under the totality of the circumstances which in turn is determined by 'the particular facts and circumstances surrounding [that] case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.' " People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d at 775, quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed.2d 1461 (1938). The burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant waived his constitutional rights. People v. Fish, 660 P.2d at 508. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628 (a "heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived" his rights). A valid waiver will not be presumed simply because a statement has been obtained from the defendant. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475, 86 S.Ct. at 1628; People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d at 776. "Moreover, any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 476, 86 S.Ct. at 1629.

If the court determines that the defendant validly waived his constitutional rights, the court must then decide whether the defendant's statement was voluntarily made. People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d at 776; People v. Fish, 660 P.2d at 508. The burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, considering the totality of the circumstances, that the statement was voluntary. People v. Cummings, 706 P.2d 766, 769 (Colo.1985); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d at 508. Statements may not be admitted if they were obtained through promises, threats, violence, or any other improper influence. People v. Cummings, 706 P.2d at 769.

Findings of fact made by a trial court as part of its determination concerning the validity of a waiver of rights and the voluntariness of a statement will be upheld on appeal if supported by adequate evidence in the record. People v. Cummings, 706 P.2d at 769; People v. Pierson, 670 P.2d at 776; People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Colo.1983); People v. Fish, 660 P.2d at 509, 510. However, the appellate court may not ignore uncontradicted and credible evidence in the record that is contrary to the trial court's decision. People v. Freeman, 668 P.2d at 1378.

With these general principles in mind, we turn next to a description and analysis of the circumstances surrounding the making of the statements by Spring.

B.

Prior to trial, Spring filed a motion to suppress the relevant statements. After a hearing on March 17, 1980, the trial...