Jones v. People

• Decision Date: 07 December 1896
• Citation: 47 P. 275,23 Colo. 276
• Parties: JONES v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

47 P. 275

23 Colo. 276

JONES v. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Colorado

December 7, 1896

Error to district court, Arapahoe county.

James C. Jones was convicted of murder in the second degree, and brings error. Reversed.

At the April, A. D. 1891, term of the district court of Arapahoe county, plaintiff in error was indicted for the murder of one Thomas J. Strawn. The case was first tried in 1892, but the result of that trial does not definitely appear from this record. It sufficeth to know that a new trial was awarded and the defendant again put upon trial in June, 1893. The second trial resulted in a verdict of 'guilty of murder in the second degree,' upon which a sentence of imprisonment in the penitentiary for life was imposed. From this judgment a writ of error was sued out from this court. The remaining facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. The writ of error was at one time dismissed for failure of prosecution, but it was recently reinstated upon stipulation, and the cause submitted upon printed briefs.

David G. Taylor, for plaintiff in error.

Byron L. Carr, Atty. Gen., and Calvin E. Reed, Asst. Atty. Gen for the People.

HAYT, C.J. (after stating the facts).

The killing of the deceased is admitted by the defendant. It is claimed that it was done at a time when the defendant was insane, such insanity having been caused in part by a shock produced by information reaching him, going to show that his wife was unduly intimate with the deceased; that he was predisposed to insanity by heredity, and that the knowledge of his wife's infidelity, acting upon a mind weakened by this infirmity transmitted from his father, dethroned his reason, and rendered him incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong.

The first assignments of error relate to questions propounded to jurors, with reference to the effect upon them, in the discharge of their duties as jurors in the case, if such intimacy should be established by the evidence. The nature of such examination will appear from the following, taken from the transcript: 'J. H. Lyon, being duly sworn to answer questions concerning his competency to sit as a juror upon the trial of the cause, testified as follows, among other things: Direct examination by Mr. Benson: 'Q. If it should appear that the wife of defendant and the deceased were unduly intimate, would that fact influence you in rendering your verdict, or could you disregard that fact, if such fact should be proven, and, under the instructions of the court, render a fair and impartial verdict notwithstanding that fact? The Court: I want to explain to the juror, before answering these questions, that under some circumstances the law does make a difference in cases of this kind. What the law is, and what the evidence will be, neither you nor I at this time know, or are presumed to know, because we have not heard it; but we want to know, and all that we want to know now is, whether, after you have heard the evidence, you will be governed by the instructions of the court as to what the law is in applying such evidence, or whether you will have a bias or prejudice that will prevent you from properly weighing the evidence, and being governed by the law. You may answer this question with this explanation. A. It would not.' Thereupon, E. B Green, another juror, being duly sworn to answer questions concerning his competency to sit as a juror in the trial of the cause, testified, inter alia, as follows: Q. If it should appear that the wife of the defendant in this case and the deceased were unduly intimate, could you and would you, notwithstanding that fact, return a verdict based wholly and solely upon the evidence and the instructions of the court in this case? A. It would influence my mind. Q. Would it influence your mind to such an extent that you would disregard the instructions of the court? A. I would try very hard not to disregard the instructions of the court, but I doubt my ability. Q. You would doubt your ability if such fact were proven? A. Yes, sir. Q. Then you doubt your ability, if such fact were proven, to act as a fair and impartial juror in the trial of this case? A. I do. I think, that fact being proven, I doubt my ability. Q. And if such fact should be proven, you could not serve as a fair and impartial juror in the trial of this cause? A. I say I would do the best that I could, but I doubt very much if I could get that off my mind. (Challenged by the prosecution for cause. Challenge sustained, and juror excused, to which ruling of the court defendant duly excepted.)' There was no error in sustaining this challenge. In this state it is the duty of the court to declare the law in the trial of criminal, as well as civil, cases, and it is for the jury to determine the facts in accordance with the instructions of the court. The examination of jurors upon this evidence is for the purpose of obtaining a fair and impartial jury for the trial of the issues between the parties; and where a juror announces in advance that he will not be governed by the instructions of the court, or if it appears doubtful as to whether such instructions will be controlling with him, as to the law of the case, it is the duty of the court to excuse such juror. Similar questions were propounded to the juror Lyon and others, who were not challenged for cause. Such questions were proper, not alone for the purpose of informing the parties to the end that they might intelligently exercise their right to challenge for cause, but for the stronger reason that counsel were entitled to be fully informed of the state of mind of the jurors with reference to the matter, in order that the parties should be fully advised in exercising the right of peremptory challenges.

A number of assignments of error are based upon the admission and rejection of evidence. The most important of these brings up for review the ruling of the trial court upon the redirect examination by the state of Dr. Eskridge, a medical expert upon the question of sanity. The question objected to is as follows: 'Q. You have heard what Mr. Jones' acts were immediately before the shooting, and immediately after,...