Jones v. State
| Decision Date | 26 July 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. S–10–0239.,S–10–0239. |
| Citation | 256 P.3d 527,2011 WY 114 |
| Parties | Ronald Kirby JONES, Appellant (Defendant),v.The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Representing Appellant: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Appellate Counsel; Eric M. Alden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel. Argument by Mr. Alden.Representing Appellee: Bruce A. Salzburg, Attorney General; Terry L. Armitage, Deputy Attorney General; D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Senior Assistant Attorney General. Argument by Mr. Rehurek.Before KITE, C.J., and GOLDEN, HILL, VOIGT, and BURKE, JJ.BURKE, Justice.
[¶ 1] Appellant, Ronald Kirby Jones, appeals his conviction of felony larceny in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–402(a). He challenges the district court's subject matter jurisdiction and contends that the district court erred in instructing the jury as to the elements of larceny. He also asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. We conclude that the jury instructions were inadequate, and, as a result, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
[¶ 2] Appellant raises four issues, which we discuss in the following order:
1. Did the district court obtain subject matter jurisdiction over the State's larceny charge under W.S. § 6–3–402(a) when the affidavit of probable cause alleged facts indicating a violation of W.S. § 6–3–402(b), which defines the crime of larceny by bailee?
2. Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury?
3. Did the prosecution provide sufficient evidence to support the elements of caption and asportation?
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow the defense to examine the prosecution's expert witness regarding his prior felony convictions?
[¶ 3] Appellant rented a mechanic's shop jointly with an acquaintance in Gillette, Wyoming. Appellant and his cotenant both worked on cars at the shop, and each had a separate area outside the shop where they stored vehicles. Sometime in the summer of 2006, Appellant's cotenant allowed Corey, the owner of a 1968 Dodge Charger, to store his car in the cotenant's area of the shop grounds. Approximately a year later, the cotenant moved from Gillette and no longer rented the shop with Appellant. Corey testified that in early 2008, after the cotenant had moved away, Appellant told him that he could continue to store his car at the shop. Corey testified that he talked to Appellant again sometime in late 2008 or early 2009, and Appellant again told him that he could continue to store his car there. Corey did not pay Appellant to store his car at the shop.
[¶ 4] From 2006 to May, 2009, Corey went to the shop approximately six times to check on his car and to store replacement parts inside the car. In addition, Corey periodically drove by the shop to make sure the car was still there. In June, 2009, Corey drove by the shop and noticed that his car was missing from the spot where it had been parked for the last several years. He testified that when he checked with Appellant, Appellant told him that he thought Corey had taken the car away. According to Appellant, however, he first met Corey when he came to inquire about his missing car. Appellant further testified that he had never spoken to Corey about storing his car at the shop. On June 19, 2009, after checking with several of his friends to see if they had heard anything about his car, Corey reported to the Sheriff's office that the car had been stolen.
[¶ 5] A little over a month later, the vehicle was located when Mark, a resident of Gillette who restored old cars as a hobby, called the Sheriff's office to request a vehicle identification number check on a car in his possession that he thought might be stolen. Mark had obtained the vehicle from Appellant. He testified that in May, 2009, after learning that the vehicle was sitting at Appellant's shop, he spoke with Appellant about buying the car. Appellant told Mark that the car had been abandoned. He informed Mark that he did not own the car and did not have title. Mark offered to buy the car anyway, and the parties agreed to a purchase price of $2,000.00. Mark returned to the shop a week later and paid Appellant $1,000.00 in cash. No bill of sale, receipt, or other paperwork was exchanged. The following week, Mark, his nephew, and his nephew's roommate went to the shop and loaded the car onto a trailer. Appellant arrived at the shop as they were loading the car and was paid the remaining $1,000.00. Mark subsequently towed the car to his house, and his nephew began stripping the car a few days later.
[¶ 6] Appellant was charged with felony larceny under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–402(a). After a two-day jury trial, he was found guilty. He was sentenced to a prison term of two to five years, which was suspended in favor of five years of supervised probation. This appeal followed.
[¶ 7] In his first argument, Appellant contends the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the offense as charged. Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo. Hoffman v. Darnell, 2011 WY 65, ¶ 7, 252 P.3d 936, 938 (Wyo.2011). Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. Fuller v. State, 568 P.2d 900, 902–03 (Wyo.1977). District courts in Wyoming have jurisdiction over all criminal cases except those for which other provision is made. Id. at 902, citing Article 5, § 10, Wyoming Constitution. A determination as to whether subject matter jurisdiction over the offense exists is made by looking at the face of the charging document. Messer v. State, 2004 WY 98, ¶ 15, 96 P.3d 12, 17 (Wyo.2004). An information is sufficient if it is “in the words of the statute.” See, e.g., Spagner v. State, 2009 WY 12, ¶ 11, 200 P.3d 793, 799 (Wyo.2009). As we stated in Spagner, “[a]n information is required to set forth only ‘ultimate facts,’ as opposed to ‘matters of evidence,’ the latter phrase meaning ‘particulars as to manner or means, place or circumstance.’ ” Id., quoting Crouse v. State, 384 P.2d 321, 325 (Wyo.1963).
[¶ 8] Appellant claims that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the facts alleged in the affidavit of probable cause did not support a violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–402(a), as alleged in the State's Felony Information. According to Appellant, the facts alleged in the affidavit of probable cause did not establish that Appellant “took” or “carried” the property of another as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–402(a).1 Appellant contends that, as a result, the district court failed to acquire subject matter jurisdiction over the offense.
[¶ 9] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–402 (LexisNexis 2009) states, in relevant part, as follows:
§ 6–3–402. Larceny; livestock rustling; theft of fuel; penalties.
(a) A person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny.
The Felony Information filed by the State alleged that Appellant “did steal, take and carry away property of another with the intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor of that property,” which is consistent with the language of Section 402(a). Applying the rule that subject matter jurisdiction is determined from the face of the charging documents, the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over the offense because the charging documents set forth the elements of the alleged crime. See Messer, ¶ 16, 96 P.3d at 17.Jury Instructions
[¶ 10] In Appellant's second issue, he contends the district court did not properly instruct the jury as to the elements of larceny. As set forth above, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6–3–402(a) provides that “[a] person who steals, takes and carries, leads or drives away property of another with intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor is guilty of larceny.” The district court gave the following elements instruction:
The necessary elements of the crime of Larceny, as charged in this case, are:
1. Between May 1, 2009 and June 18, 2009;
2. In Campbell County, Wyoming;
3. The Defendant, Ronald Kirby Jones;
4. Did steal;
5. Property of another;
6. Of a value of $1,000.00 or more;
7. With intent to deprive the owner or lawful possessor of said property.
(Emphasis added.) On appeal, Appellant argues that the jury instructions were inadequate because they omitted any reference to “taking” and “carrying” the property of another. At trial, however, Appellant did not object to the instruction. As a result, we review for plain error. Granzer v. State, 2008 WY 118, ¶ 19, 193 P.3d 266, 272 (Wyo.2008).
[¶ 11] Jury instructions are “designed to inform the jury about the applicable law so that the jury may apply that law to its own findings with respect to the material facts.” Reilly v. State, 2002 WY 156, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d 1259, 1265 (Wyo.2002), quoting Brown v. State, 817 P.2d 429, 439 (Wyo.1991). “Given this purpose, the test whether the jury has been instructed on the necessary elements of the crime charged is whether the instruction ‘leaves no doubt as to under what circumstances the crime can be found to have been committed.’ ” Reilly, ¶ 16, 55 P.3d at 1265, quoting Miller v. State, 904 P.2d 344, 348 (Wyo.1995). We have previously recognized that “taking” and “carrying” are elements of larceny. Mendicoa v. State, 771 P.2d 1240 (Wyo.1989). The State concedes that “taking” and “carrying” are elements of larceny, and that these elements were omitted from the jury instructions. When an element of a crime is omitted from the jury instructions, we must determine whether the error was prejudicial. Granzer, ¶ 19, 193 P.3d at 272.
[¶ 12] In Granzer, we addressed the issue of whether the failure to instruct the jury on an element of a crime requires reversal of an appellant's...
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