Jones v. State

• Decision Date: 17 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 49A02–1508–CR–1148.,49A02–1508–CR–1148.
• Parties: Jennifer JONES and Jamaal Jones, Appellants–Defendants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

54 N.E.3d 1033

Jennifer JONES and Jamaal Jones, Appellants–Defendants

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 49A02–1508–CR–1148.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

May 17, 2016.

Adam Lenkowsky, Roberts & Bishop, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Eric P. Babbs, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

RILEY, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE¹

[1] Appellants–Plaintiffs, Jennifer Jones² (Jennifer) and Jamaal Jones (Jamaal) (collectively, Jones), appeal the trial court's denial of their motion to suppress the evidence discovered during a warrantless search of their residence.

[2] We affirm.

ISSUES

[3] Jones raises three issues on appeal, which we restate as:

(1) Whether the warrantless search of Jones' residence is justified based on the exigent circumstances to conduct a welfare check on three minor children left unattended in the home in the middle of the night;

(2) Whether police officers may conduct a protective sweep of the residence as part of a welfare check; and

(3) Whether the Butler University Police Department had jurisdiction pursuant to the Trustees Resolution to conduct a welfare check based on the particular facts in this case.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] This case comes before us as an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of Jones' motion to suppress. In October of 2014, Jennifer and Jamaal lived with Jennifer's three children, who were six, nine, and twelve, near the Butler University campus in Indianapolis, Indiana.

[5] On October 20, 2014, around 1:08 a.m., Officer Chris Nelson (Officer Nelson) of the Butler University Police Department (BUPD) initiated a traffic stop³ of a vehicle driven by Jennifer just south of 42nd Street and Capitol Avenue. Officer Nelson retrieved Jennifer's identifying information and vehicle registration and noticed “an extremely strong odor of marijuana emitting from the vehicle.” (Transcript p. 20). Jennifer informed Officer Nelson that “she had just gotten off work and was running to the convenient [sic] store to get milk for her kids for the morning.” (Tr. p. 22). After Officer Nelson informed Jennifer of his observation of marijuana odor, Jennifer responded that she “had no idea why it would smell like that and reiterated the fact that she had just gotten off work.” (Tr. p. 22). Officer Nelson requested Jennifer to exit and to “step to the rear of the vehicle.” (Tr. p. 22). Meanwhile, two other BUPD officers arrived. Officer Nelson conducted a probable cause search of the vehicle and located a marijuana blunt in the ashtray and “several pills that were identified as a controlled substance in a personal bag belonging” to Jennifer. (Tr. p. 23). Officer Nelson placed Jennifer under arrest.

[6] As soon as she was placed under arrest, Jennifer asked, “What about my children? They're home alone[.]” (Tr. p. 24). Officer Nelson informed her that officers would be sent to the house to check on the children and make arrangements for their safety. Officer Nelson transported Jones to the BUPD station. While in route, Officer Nelson requested dispatch to contact the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department (IMPD) to conduct a welfare check on the children. At approximately 1:45 a.m., IMPD and Sergeant Anthony Rivera (Sergeant Rivera) of the BUPD arrived at the Jones' residence. The officers were unable to make contact with the children inside the residence.

[7] At the BUPD station, Jennifer was given her cell phone and was asked to call her residence. During the subsequent thirty minutes, Jennifer tried to get in touch with her children but failed. She became concerned and she next contacted her mother-in-law. Officer Nelson decided to go to Jennifer's residence with Jennifer's house keys.

[8] Upon his arrival at the residence, Officer Nelson knocked and announced his presence. At this point, almost an hour had lapsed since Jennifer had informed the officers that her children were home alone. Officer Nelson unlocked the front door, entered the home, and again identified himself and multiple times called to the children. He received no response. As soon as Officer Nelson walked in the residence, he could smell “an extremely strong odor of raw marijuana in the air. It was pretty potent.” (Tr. p. 29). Walking toward the bedrooms to search for the children, Officer Nelson noticed a “little bit of [marijuana] remnants on the coffee table.” (Tr. p. 29). Moving past that, Officer Nelson located one of the children sleeping in one of the bedrooms. Another officer was able to locate the other two children in a second bedroom. “Officer Marshall took the third bedroom to the left which ended up being the master suite at which time right in plain view when you walk in the room, he was able to observe a glass jar containing marijuana.” (Tr. p. 29). Sergeant Rivera went “down to the basement[,]” where he found lighting systems and marijuana plants. (Tr. p. 55).

[9] After waking the children up, Officer Nelson informed them that their mother would not be returning to the residence that night and that someone needed to be contacted to stay with them. A short while later, the children's grandparents arrived. A search warrant was obtained and executed several hours after the children had been located and removed from the residence. In the course of executing the search warrant, the marijuana and lighting equipment were seized.

[10] On October 22, 2014, the State filed an Information charging Jennifer with dealing in marijuana, a Level 6 felony; possession of a narcotic, a Level 6 felony; neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony; possession of a controlled substance, a Class A misdemeanor; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. The State charged Jamaal with dealing in marijuana, a Level 6 felony; possession of a narcotic, a Level 6 felony; neglect of a dependent, a Level 6 felony; and possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor. On November 12, 2014, Jones filed a motion to suppress, which was amended on December 4, 2014. On April 23, 2015, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing on the amended motion to suppress. On July 9, 2015, the trial court issued its ruling from the bench, denying the amended motion to suppress.

[11] On August 17, 2015, the trial court certified its order for an interlocutory appeal, which this court accepted. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.⁴

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[12] Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress the evidence found as a result of a warrantless search. Our standard of review for the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is similar to other sufficiency issues. Westmoreland v. State, 965 N.E.2d 163, 165 (Ind.Ct.App.2012). We determine whether substantial evidence of probative value exists to support the denial of the motion. Id. We do not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence that is most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Id. However, the review of a denial of a motion to suppress is different from other sufficiency matters in that we must also consider uncontested evidence that is favorable to the defendant. Id. We review de novo a ruling on the constitutionality of a search or seizure but we give deference to a trial court's determination of the facts, which will not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 596 (Ind.2008).

II. Exigent Circumstances

[13] First, Jones contends that the trial court erred when it determined that the BUPD officers had properly entered the residence in the middle of the night to check on the welfare of the minor children based on the exigent circumstances exception of the Fourth Amendment.

[14] The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable search and seizure, and this protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 961 (Ind.2001). As such, warrantless searches and seizures inside the home are presumptively unreasonable. Buckley v. State, 797 N.E.2d 845, 848 (Ind.Ct.App.2003). Nonetheless, there are limited exceptions to the warrant requirements under the Fourth Amendment. Collins v. State, 822 N.E.2d 214, 218 (Ind.Ct.App.2005), trans. denied. A well-recognized exception is the existence of exigent circumstances. Id. Under this exception, police officers may enter a residence if the situation suggests a reasonable belief of risk of bodily harm or death, a person in need of assistance, a need to protect private property, or actual or imminent destruction or removal of evidence before a search warrant may be obtained. Scott v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1231, 1235–36 (Ind.Ct.App.2004). “However, a police officer's subjective belief that exigent circumstances exist is insufficient to support a warrantless search.” United States v. Richardson, 208 F.3d 626, 629 (7th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 910, 121 S.Ct. 259, 148 L.Ed.2d 188 (2000). Rather, “as is normally the case for Fourth Amendment inquiries, the test is objective: ‘the government must establish that the circumstances as they appear at the moment of entry would lead a reasonable, experienced law enforcement officer to believe that someone inside the house, apartment, or hotel room required immediate assistance.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Arch, 7 F.3d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir.1993) ). In this light, “[o]fficers do not need ironclad proof of ‘a likely serious, life-threatening’ injury to invoke the emergency aid exception.” Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49, 130 S.Ct. 546, 175 L.Ed.2d 410 (2009). “[E]xigent circumstances justify dispensing with the search warrant but do not eliminate the need for probable cause.” Harless v. State, 577 N.E.2d 245, 248 (Ind.Ct.App.1991). “[I]n an emergency, the probable cause requirement may be satisfied where the officers reasonably believe a person is in danger.” United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ...