Jones v. United States, : 4:06-cr-029
| Decision Date | 02 February 2012 |
| Docket Number | No: 4:09-cv-007,No: 4:06-cr-029,: 4:06-cr-029,: 4:09-cv-007 |
| Parties | ADRIAN JONES, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Tennessee |
(MATTICE/CARTER)
This is a motion to vacate, set aside or correct sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by petitioner Adrian Jones ("petitioner"). The government has filed its response to the motion, and petitioner has filed his reply to the response. Petitioner also filed a motion to amend the § 2255 motion, to which the government has also responded. For the following reasons, the motion to amend will be DENIED as untimely, the § 2255 motion to vacate will be DENIED, and this action will be DISMISSED. All other pending motions will be DENIED as MOOT.
This court must vacate and set aside petitioner's conviction upon a finding that "there has been such a denial or infringement of the constitutional rights of the prisoner as to renderthe judgment vulnerable to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255. To prevail under § 2255, petitioner "must show a 'fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice,' or, an error so egregious that it amounts to a violation of due process." United States v. Ferguson, 918 F.2d 627, 630 (6th Cir. 1990) (quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1968)).
Under Rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings In The United States District Courts, the court is to determine after a review of the answer and the records of the case whether an evidentiary hearing is required. If the motion to vacate, the answer and the records of the case show conclusively that petitioner is not entitled to relief under § 2255, there is no need for an evidentiary hearing. Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 92 (6th Cir. 1986).
Petitioner and his co-defendant were indicted on two counts in a three-count indictment of conspiring to use and carry a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (count one) and aiding and abetting each other in brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (count two); petitioner's co-defendant was also indicted on charges of possessing with intent to distribute cocaine hydrochloride (count three). [Criminal Action No. 4:06-cr-29, Court File No. 1, Indictment]. Pursuant to a plea agreement filed on August 21, 2007, petitioner pleaded guilty to count one and the remainingcount against him was dismissed on motion of the government. [Id., Court File No. 108,1 Plea Agreement (Under Seal)]. The parties agreed to the following factual basis for the guilty plea:
[Id., Court File No. 50, Factual Basis, pp. 1-2, ¶¶ a-f].
By judgment entered March 24, 2008, petitioner was sentenced as a career offender to a term of imprisonment of 262 months. [Id., Court File No. 77, Judgment]. The Judgment was amended on January 4, 2010, on motion of the government pursuant to Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedures, to impose a reduced sentence of 188 months in prison. [Id., Court File No. 106, Amended Judgment].
In support of his § 2255 motion, petitioner alleges several instances of ineffective assistance of counsel. He also alleges that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; that the prosecution withheld exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, and that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction. Petitioner also moves to amend the § 2255 motion to allege nine additional instances of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Petitioner alleges that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter into a plea agreement. According to petitioner, his attorney did not explain all of petitioner's rights so that he could make an intelligent and informed decision as to whether to waive hisconstitutional right to a jury trial. Petitioner also claims that counsel misled him into believing that in exchange for the guilty plea, the government would recommend a downward departure.
In 1969, the United States Supreme Court held that, prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea, there must be "an affirmative showing that it [is] intelligent and voluntary." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969). A guilty plea cannot be knowing and voluntary unless entered with the defendant's full understanding of the charges against him and the possible consequences of his plea. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970).
Petitioner's plea agreement set forth the facts underlying his guilty plea, which were for the most part the same facts set forth in the Factual Basis. [Id., Court File No. 108, Plea Agreement, pp. 2-4, ¶ 5(a)-(e) (Under Seal)]. The Plea Agreement also specified that petitioner was facing a sentence of not less than seven years up to a maximum of life in prison. [Id. at 1, ¶ 1(a)]. The parties agreed that the court could impose any lawful term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. [Id. at 1-2, ¶ 3(a)]. Petitioner acknowledged the elements of the crime that the government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and stated that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty. [Id. at 2, ¶ 4]. He further acknowledged the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. [Id. at 4, ¶ 6]. He also acknowledged that no promises had been made by the government as to what his sentence would be; that his sentence would not be determined until after the U.S. Probation Office prepared a pre-sentence report; and that his sentence would be based upon the entire scopeof his criminal conduct, his criminal history, the Sentencing Guidelines, and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553. [Id. at 6, ¶ 12]. Petitioner agreed that he would not file a direct appeal and he waived the right to file a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for any reason other than claims of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. [Id. at 7-8, ¶ 14 (a)-(b)].
In accepting petitioner's guilty plea, the court fully complied with the plea colloquy procedure as mandated by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. [Id., Court File No. 85, Transcript of Change of Plea]. The court first determined that petitioner was 33 years old and had completed the tenth grade in school. [Id. at 4]. The court next determined that petitioner was competent to enter a guilty plea. [Id.]. The court then advised petitioner of the rights he was giving up by pleading guilty. [Id. at 4-5]. Petitioner was specifically asked whether anyone had threatened him or forced him to plead guilty; he answered "No, sir" to the question. [Id. at 5]. He also answered "No, sir" to the question of whether any officer or agent of the government had suggested he would receive a lighter sentence by pleading guilty. [Id. at 9].
The court advised petitioner of the elements of the crime to which he was pleading guilty and which the government would be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. [Id. at 10-11]. At the court's request, the government stated on the record the minimum and maximum penalties that petitioner was facing [id. at 11] and the factual basis for the plea. [Id. at 14-16]. Upon questioning by the court, petitioner agreed with the government'ssummary of the facts and stated that he was pleading guilty because he was in fact guilty. [Id. at 16].
The court also determined that petitioner understood his sentence would be determined by the court after referring to the applicable sentencing guidelines and other relevant information. [Id. at 13-14]. The court then accepted the guilty plea.
[I]t's the finding of the Court in the case of United States of America versus Adrian Jones that the defendant is fully competent and capable of entering an informed plea. And that his plea of guilty to Count 2 of the indictment is a knowing and voluntary plea supported by an independent basis in fact containing each of the essential elements of...
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