Jordan v. State

• Decision Date: 05 June 1907
• Citation: 103 S.W. 633
• Parties: JORDAN v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

103 S.W. 633

JORDAN v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

June 5, 1907.

Appeal from Palo Pinto County Court; E. B. Ritchie, Judge.

Ed Jordan was convicted of crime, and appeals. Reversed, and prosecution dismissed.

W. H. Bullock and John W. Wray, for appellant. F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, P. J.

Acts 29th Leg. p. 372, c. 152, § 1, read as follows: "That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, association of persons, corporation, or agent of either, to issue any ticket, check or writing obligatory to any servant or employé for labor performed, redeemable or payable in goods or merchandise." Section 2 of this act provides the punishment. Appellant was convicted of violating the section quoted, under the following statement of facts: He was the agent of the Strawn Coal Mining Company, located in Palo Pinto county, and for it and in its behalf sold to D. M. Clark a piece of metal having inscribed on one side the following, "Good for $1.00 in merchandise," and on the reverse side, "Strawn Coal Mining Co., Strawn, Texas." That this piece of metal was redeemable in merchandise at the general store of said company by the person to whom it was originally sold, or to any holder into whose hands it might subsequently come. That its redemption power for the purpose of obtaining merchandise was equal to the purchasing power of $1 of current money of the United States; that is, the holder presenting this piece of metal to the company's general merchandise store could acquire for it in redemption merchandise of equal value as though he presented $1 of current money. The company redeemed the metal with merchandise at current prices, and those prevailing in the vicinity, and charged no more for such redemptions than it did to persons purchasing and paying in current money. That at the time of the sale of said piece of metal it was charged to the account of the purchaser on the store books of the company, and at the next succeeding pay day was deducted from his pay. That the company had no contract with its men or with the purchaser of the redemption piece to pay him or its men for their labor in such redemption pieces. That frequently it sold these redemption pieces before the respective employés had performed any labor, and before anything was due them, but more frequently after some labor had been performed. That the sale and purchase of the redemption pieces is a matter of convenience both to the employés of the company and to the company itself in the transaction of its business. The purchase of the redemption piece on the part of the person purchasing was entirely optional. The company sells such redemption pieces only to such employés as apply for them. No coercion of any kind was used by the company or any of its agents to induce or require the purchaser to buy; nor does it or any of its agents ever use any coercion of any character or kind to induce its employés to purchase redemption pieces. The company pays its employés on the first and third Saturdays of each month, at which time its employés are paid for labor in current money in full up to within 15 days of each pay day. These redemption pieces are only sold by the company to its employés, and in this instance was sold between pay days after some labor had been performed. That the company redeemed these redemption pieces, and the one sold to the party herein described, by giving merchandise for the same of the current market and ordinary value of $1. That the redemption piece is simply a form of credit extended by the company to the purchaser, and any employé so purchasing from the company can obtain credit at the company's store between pay days, provided only the employé desired and applied for the purchase of the redemption piece.

Several reasons are urged why the pleading does not show any offense, and that the law under which the pleading is drawn is unconstitutional, in that it violates article 1, § 19, of the state Constitution, besides two clauses of the federal Constitution, and that it interferes with the right of free contract between the citizens of this state in relation to their private matters. We are of opinion that these contentions are correct. The statute, as framed, is certainly violative of the right of the laborer to make contracts with his employer or to sell his labor for any consideration satisfactory to himself, or for the payment of his labor in any commodity suitable to himself. If this law can stand at all, it must be under the broad provisions of what is commonly understood and denominated police regulation, or police power of the state. This is not very clear, and perhaps the question may be involved in mists as to what police power means, or where its boundaries may terminate. It has been said that police power is limited to enactments having reference to the comfort, safety, or the welfare of society, and usually it applies to the exigencies involving the public health, safety, or morals; but, as broad as it may be, and as comprehensive as some legislation has sought to make it, still it is subsidiary and subordinate to the Constitution. When the purpose of police regulation is to subserve the public in some of these respects, the legislative enactment should ordinarily be sustained, and legislative control is supreme, provided always it keeps within the limitations of the constitutional provisions. An inspection of the law under which this conviction occurred will show that it is indeed comprehensive and deprives every citizen, firm, association of persons, corporation, or agent of either, from issuing any ticket, check, or writing obligatory to any servant or employé for labor performed, redeemable, or payable in goods or merchandise. Under this law, no citizen of the state, having another in his employment, could give an order or a check or any character of writing to another to pay off the holder of the check or writing in any character of goods or merchandise. Under this law, the farmer could not pay off his employé or hired hand at the end of the day, week, or month by giving him an order or a check or any paper in writing calling for payment in goods or merchandise. In other words, this law would prevent the employer and employé from entering into any contract by which the labor, performed or to be performed by the employé could be discharged or paid off in merchandise at the hands of another. That this is violative of every fundamental principle of the right of contract will hardly need more than the mere statement of the proposition. Police power or police regulation cannot be upheld to the extent that it will prevent the citizenship of this country making such contracts as they see proper, so long at least as the law ignores coercion, or some of those matters that might enter into and prevent a free and untrammeled contract. If the contracting parties prefer to pay off and receive in pay for labor any goods or merchandise, or any commodity that is suitable to the contracting parties, it would be beyond the police power to prevent such contract. We are dealing only with the law as enacted; nor are we alluding to or undertaking to discuss any law that was not intended for the benefit of the weaker and against the strong, or any legislation to prevent coercion on the part of either of the contracting parties. Those questions are not involved in this law, for by its very terms it was enacted to prevent any contract from being entered into between the parties where the pay was to be in goods or merchandise. This law is not a sanitary measure, nor is it enacted to protect infants and insane people; but it is only intended to prevent the laborer from selling his labor or time, either or both, to his employer for goods or merchandise. So far as this statute is concerned, he may sell his time or labor for any other consideration than goods or merchandise.

As we understand the question, labor is property, and the laborer has the same right to sell his labor and make contracts with reference thereto as he would any other property he had. The Legislature has no authority to prevent the citizenship of this country from making their own contracts, nor to interfere with the freedom of contract between workman and employer. As was said in the case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937: "The right to purchase or sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless there are circumstances which exclude the right. There are, however, certain powers existing in the sovereignty of each state in the Union somewhat vaguely termed police powers, the exact description and limitation of which have not been attempted by the courts. These relate to the safety, health, morals, and general welfare of the public. When the state has passed an act which limits the right to labor, or the right of contract in regard to their means of livelihood between persons who are sui juris, both employer and employé, it becomes of great importance to determine which shall prevail, the right of the individual to labor, or the right of the state to prevent the individual from laboring or from entering into any contract to labor." It is further said in that case: "If the statute be valid, and if, therefore, a proper case is made out in which to deny the right of an individual, sui juris, as employer or employé, to make contracts for the labor of the latter under the protection of the provision of the federal Constitution, there would seem to be no length to which legislation of this character might not go." And it is further stated: "This interference on the part of the Legislatures of the several states with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people seems to be on the increase." Again, in the case of Coal Co. v. Harrier, 69 N. E. 927, 207 Ill. 624, 99 Am. St. Rep. 240, it is said: "It is not within the power of the Legislature to provide that one who is...