Joyce v. London & Lancashire Indem. Co. of America

• Citation: 44 N.E.2d 776,312 Mass. 354
• Parties: JOYCE v. LONDON & LANCASHIRE INDEMNITY CO. OF AMERICA.
• Decision Date: 29 October 1942
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts

312 Mass. 354

44 N.E.2d 776

JOYCE

v.LONDON & LANCASHIRE INDEMNITY CO. OF AMERICA.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Worcester.

Oct. 29, 1942.

Suit in equity by Patrick E. Joyce against the London & Lancashire Indemnity Company of America to reach and apply the obligation of defendant to a judgment debtor under a motor vehicle liability policy. From a final decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.Appeal from Superior Court, Worcester County; Dillon, Judge.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, DOLAN, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

M. C. Jaquith, of Clinton, for plaintiff.

D. H. Fulton, of Boston, for defendant.

COX, Justice.

This is a bill in equity to reach and apply the obligation of an insurance company to a judgment debtor under a motor vehicle liability policy. G.L. (Ter.Ed.) c. 175, § 113; c. 214, § 3(10). The evidence is reported. The plaintiff appealed from the final decree dismissing the bill.

It was admitted by the pleadings that on October 13, 1936, the plaintiff sustained personal injuries as the result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle owned by one Robinson of Clinton in this Commonwealth, that the plaintiff recovered judgment therefor which had not been satisfied within thirty days thereafter, and that the defendant had a ‘contract of insurance’ with said Robinson. The first count of the plaintiff's declaration in the original action alleges that he was a ‘guest’ of Robinson on the day of his injury and was riding in Robinson's automobile on a public way in this Commonwealth; that the automobile was being operated by Robinson's agent and servant; that the plaintiff protested against a change of the course of the automobile and informed Robinson that he would no longer ride and that he wanted to get out; that he demanded of Robinson that the automobile be stopped and arose from his seat for the purpose of alighting; that thereby he ceased to stand in the relation of a guest of Robinson; and that Robinson disregarded his demands and caused the automobile to be driven negligently, with the result that the plaintiff was injured. The second and third counts allege that the plaintiff was riding in Robinson's automobile upon his ‘invitation.’ It is alleged in the second count that Robinson's agent and servant was grossly negligent, and in the third count that he operated the automobile in a wanton and reckless manner.

The policy of insurance was not in evidence at the trial of the case at bar, and its contents did not appear. The plaintiff made an offer of proof, which was rejected subject to his exceptions, of the ‘finding’ of the trial judge in the District Court where the original action was tried. One of the findings of that judge was that the plaintiff ‘was no longer a guest in * * * [Robinson's] automobile.’ At the trial in the Superior Court it was agreed that the plaintiff was ‘inside the motor vehicle’ at all times during which Robinson was alleged to have been negligent.

Although it does not distinctly appear, it seems to have been assumed rightly that Robinson, as owner of the automobile in question, had registered it in compliance with the law, from which it follows that a motor vehicle liability policy of insurance had been issued. See MacBey v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 292 Mass. 105, 107, 108, 197 N.E. 516, 106 A.L.R. 1248; G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 1A, inserted by St.1934, c. 264, § 2; Section 2; and Section 34A, as amended by St.1935, c. 459, § 2. It must be presumed that the policy of insurance conformed to the mandates of said Section 34A. MacBey v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 292 mass. 105, 107, 197 N.E. 516, 106 A.L.R. 1248. No further presumptions, however, can be indulged as to the contents of this policy. Inasmuch as the registration of the automobile must have been for the year 1936, the policy was not required to provide indemnity against liability to pay damages to a ‘guest occupant,’ who is defined as ‘any person, other than an employee of the owner or registrant of a motor vehicle or of a person responsible for its operation with the owner's or registrant's express or implied consent, being in or upon, entering or leaving the same, except a passenger for hire in the case of a motor vehicle registered as a taxicab or otherwise for carrying passengers for hire.’ G.L.(Ter.Ed.) c. 90, § 34A, as amended by St.1935, c. 459, §§ 1 and 2.

The plaintiff admittedly was ‘inside’ the automobile, and this fact brings him within the definition of a ‘guest occupant.’ Westgate v. Century Indemnity Co., 309 Mass. 412, 35 N.E.2d 218. We are of opinion that at all times he was a ‘guest occupant’ within the statutory definition of those words, despite the allegations in the first count of his declaration that he had ‘ceased to stand in the relation of a guest of the defendant,’ and despite any findings thereunder. There is no ambiguity in the language of the statutory definition of those words, and there is no room for the suggestion that there could be any change in the status of the occupant...