MacBey v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.

• Decision Date: 17 September 1935
• Parties: MacBEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO. et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

292 Mass. 105

197 N.E. 516

MacBEY v. HARTFORD ACCIDENT & INDEMNITY CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

September 17, 1935

Suit in equity by Gladys E. MacBey against the Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company and others. From a final decree for the plaintiff entered in the superior court, the named defendant appeals.

Decree reversed, and decree entered dismissing the bill.

Rule that ambiguities in insurance policy must be resolved against insurer is inapplicable to provisions prescribed by statute.

Appeal from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Greenhalge, judge.

J. J Mulcahy and M. K. Campbell, both of Boston, for appellant.

A. L Doggett, of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG Chief Justice.

The plaintiff seeks by this suit in equity to reach and apply the proceeds of a motor vehicle liability insurance policy as defined by G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 34A, to the satisfaction of a judgment obtained by her against the defendant Smith. G L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 175, §§ 112, 113; c. 214, § 3(10). The material facts are not in dispute and are these: The plaintiff was the owner of the motor vehicle covered by the policy of insurance. It was registered in her name and was being operated on a highway in this Commonwealth with the consent of the plaintiff, as owner, by the defendant Smith who, without the knowledge of the plaintiff, was operating without a license. The plaintiff, who was riding in the motor vehicle, brought an action of tort against Smith alleging that she received personal injuries by reason of his gross negligence in operating the motor vehicle. Smith failed to appear and answer in that action and was defaulted but there was no evidence of fraud or collusion between the plaintiff and Smith. The defendant insurer was duly notified of that action and did not appear and defend it. Damages were assessed in the sum of $6,500 for personal injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Judgment was entered accordingly for the plaintiff and execution issued which has not been satisfied in whole or in part. A decree was entered in favor of the plaintiff. The appeal of the defendant insurer brings the case here.

At the trial of the present suit the defendant offered evidence concerning the circumstances of the accident tending to show that there was no gross negligence on the part of the defendant Smith. This evidence was rightly excluded. That question was foreclosed by the judgment in that action. Miller v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (Mass.) 197 N.E. 75, and cases collected.

The circumstance that Smith had no license to operate is no bar to the present suit. Blair v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 288 Mass. 285, 192 N.E. 467, and cases collected; Lorando v. Gethro, 228 Mass. 181, 117 N.E. 185, 1 A.L.R. 1374; Warecki v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 270 Mass. 233, 237, 170 N.E. 49.

The main question is whether the named assured in a compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance policy may have recourse to the policy for satisfaction of a judgment recovered by such assured for personal injuries sustained while riding in the motor vehicle through the gross negligence of one operating the motor vehicle with the express consent of the assured. The policy of insurance was not introduced in evidence. It must be presumed that it conformed to the mandates of G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 90, § 34A, O'Roak v Lloyds Casualty Co., 285 Mass. 532, 535, 189 N.E. 571. The relevant portion of that section requires that the policy provide ‘ indemnity for or protection to the insured and any person responsible for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle with his express or implied consent against loss by reason of the liability to pay damages to others for bodily injuries.’

The rule for the interpretation of a statute is that the intent of the legislative body enacting it must be gathered from its several parts and all its words construed according to the common and approved usage of the language, considered in connection with the cause of its enactment, the pre-existing law, the mischief to be remedied and the object to be accomplished, to the end that it be given effect in harmony with the general welfare. Duggan v. Bay State Street R Co., 230 Mass. 370, 374, 119 N.E. 757, L.R.A. 1918E, 680; Armburg v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 276 Mass. 418, 426, 177 N.E. 665, 80 A.L.R. 1408; Dexter v. Dexter, 283 Mass. 327, 330, 186 N.E. 782. In the present statute, the word ‘ others' describing persons to whom damages are to be paid, following the words ‘ insured’ and ‘ any person’ joined as describing those to be protected by the policy, plainly shows that inclusion of the named assured within the class of...