Juarez v. Taso El Paso Chapter

• Decision Date: 25 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 08-04-00283-CV.,08-04-00283-CV.
• Citation: 172 S.W.3d 274
• Parties: Ricardo JUAREZ, Appellant, v. TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF SPORTING OFFICIALS EL PASO CHAPTER, Ruben Espinoza, Sheldon Wheeler, Dan McGlasson, Chris Gilmore, Robert Hemphill, and Edgar Dominguez, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

172 S.W.3d 274

Ricardo JUAREZ, Appellant, v. TEXAS ASSOCIATION OF SPORTING OFFICIALS EL PASO CHAPTER, Ruben Espinoza, Sheldon Wheeler, Dan McGlasson, Chris Gilmore, Robert Hemphill, and Edgar Dominguez, Appellees.

No. 08-04-00283-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, El Paso.

August 25, 2005.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Mark T. Davis, El Paso, for Appellant.

Victor M. Firth, El Paso, for Appellees.

Before BARAJAS, C.J., McCLURE, and CHEW, JJ.

OPINION

RICHARD BARAJAS, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from the trial court's entry of an Order of Dismissal based on a Rule 11 settlement agreement entered into by the parties. Appellant appeals contending that the order should not have been entered without an evidentiary hearing on any motion or pleading pending before the court. Appellees assert that the decision of the trial court was correctly issued in light of the valid Rule 11 agreement existing among the parties and alternatively that the case should be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Because we agree that we do not have subject matter jurisdiction over this matter, we vacate the trial court's dismissal order and dismiss the case for want of jurisdiction.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The substantive facts in this case are not disputed. Appellant Ricardo Juarez was the executive secretary of the El Paso Chapter of the Texas Association of Sporting Officials, ("TASO"). TASO is a statewide organization which provides sporting officials to Texas public schools to officiate various athletic activities through its local chapters. The El Paso chapter is governed by a board of directors and officers. The organization provides officials to serve as referees at public school games, pursuant to an internal constitution and bylaws that govern the qualifications, training, and assignment of its members to officiate games.

The underlying dispute among the parties arose over the allegations of wrongdoing on the part of Appellant in connection with the assignment of Appellant to officiate at a certain game as well as certain other complaints related to Appellant's conduct as a member of the organization. Pursuant to the bylaws and internal operating procedures of the organization, the matter was set for a hearing on January 6, 2003 and a hearing was held. Mr. Juarez and his attorney appeared and participated in the proceedings. On January 8, 2003, the board of directors issued a Notice of Board Findings pursuant to the bylaws of the organization and found a violation of the rules had occurred, suspending Appellant for a one-year period. The board also requested the Appellant comply with certain other requests, not relevant here. The notice also informed Appellant of his right to appeal the "Chapter-level decision" pursuant to the bylaws of the organization.

Appellant filed suit against TASO and the individual members of the local board of directors on February 21, 2003 alleging that the organization had violated his due process rights and that the individuals had breached their fiduciary responsibilities to Appellant and asserting a cause of action based upon a breach of contract theory. TASO filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction on the grounds that the internal disputes of a private association are not subject to judicial review and that Appellant had failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him. At a status conference held July 2, 2003, the attorneys for both sides read a settlement agreement into the record. The agreement provided that the parties agreed to submit the matter to binding arbitration and provided for dismissal of the matter with prejudice.

For reasons not clear from the record, the parties did not timely submit a written, agreed order, disposing of the case, though the agreement was dictated to the court on the record in compliance with Rule 11 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, the record does not reflect whether the parties participated in the arbitration contemplated by the Rule 11 agreement. Included in the record is an Order of Dismissal signed by the Honorable Gonzalo Garcia, judge presiding, stating an effective date of dismissal of the 2nd of July, 2003, but filed on the 9th of June, 2004. This Court, on its own motion, ordered clarification of the record and was informed that the trial court signed the Order of Dismissal on June 1, 2004. This appeal follows.

II. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Subject matter jurisdiction is essential for a court to have authority to decide a case. Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.1993). Subject matter jurisdiction is never presumed, and it cannot be waived. Id. at 443-44. Because subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, our review is de novo. See Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998).

Subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Grounds v. Tolar Indep. Sch. Dist., 707 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex.1986); see Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 445; Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Funds Recovery, Inc., 887 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1994, writ denied). We must inquire into our own jurisdiction, even if it is necessary to do so sua sponte. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 887 S.W.2d at 468; White v. Schiwetz, 793 S.W.2d 278, 281 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1990, no writ). Appellate court jurisdiction of the merits of a case extends no further than that of the court from which the appeal is taken. Pearson v. State, 159 Tex. 66, 315 S.W.2d 935, 938 (1958); Ward v. Malone, 115 S.W.3d 267, 269 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied); Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 887 S.W.2d at 468.

If the trial court lacked jurisdiction, then an appellate court only has jurisdiction to set the judgment aside and dismiss the cause. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 887 S.W.2d at 468; see State ex rel. Kelly v. Baker, 580 S.W.2d 611, 612-13 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1979, no writ); see also Fulton v. Finch, 162 Tex. 351, 346 S.W.2d 823, 827 (1961).

A. Standard of Review

Our standard for reviewing subject matter jurisdiction requires the pleader to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 887 S.W.2d at 469; Texas Ass'n of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446. When reviewing subject matter jurisdiction, we must construe the petition in favor of the pleader, and if necessary, review the entire record to determine if any evidence supports jurisdiction. Dallas County Appraisal Dist., 887 S.W.2d at 469; Tellez v. City of Socorro, 164 S.W.3d 823, 828 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, pet. filed).

"Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or estoppel at any stage of a proceeding." Tourneau Houston, Inc. v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 24 S.W.3d 907, 910 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (citing Fed. Underwriters Exch. v. Pugh, 141 Tex. 539, 174 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1943)). Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is fundamental error that may be recognized by the appellate court, sua sponte, or raised by a party, by appellate challenge, for the first time on appeal. See id.; Britton v. Tex. Dep't of Criminal Justice, 95 S.W.3d 676, 681 n. 6 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2002, no pet.) ("In an appeal properly before it, an appellate court may always address fundamental error, even without an appellate challenge."). "A judgment is void only when it is apparent that the court rendering judgment `had no jurisdiction of the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.' Errors other than lack of jurisdiction render the judgment merely voidable...." Cook v. Cameron, 733 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex.1987) (quoting Browning v. Placke, 698 S.W.2d 362, 363 (Tex.1985)).

The question of subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question which we review de novo. City of Midland v. Sullivan, 33 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.). Our task is to examine the pleadings, to take as true the facts pleaded, and to determine whether those facts support jurisdiction in the trial court. Texas Association of Business, 852 S.W.2d at 446. We construe the pleadings in favor of the pleader. Id. If necessary, we may review the entire record to determine if there is jurisdiction. Id. If the petition does not allege jurisdictional facts, the plaintiff's suit is subject to dismissal only when it is impossible to amend the pleadings to confer jurisdiction. Id.

B. Facts Before Us

We have carefully reviewed the record provided on appeal and must draw the conclusion that the matter in controversy before us is precisely the type of internal dispute among members of an association wherein the courts of this state have declined to interfere. The constitution and bylaws of TASO govern membership in the organization and provide for a procedure whereby complaints against a member are addressed. Appellant, as a member of the organization, was notified of the complaints filed against him and began the process provided for in the rules. For reasons not reflected in the record, Appellant did not complete the appellate process provided for by the bylaws. Instead, he determined that he should seek judicial review of the decisions made by the association with regard to his membership therein. Regardless of the manner in which Appellant has attempted to couch his lawsuit, the courts of this state recognize the right of a private association to govern its own affairs. Appellant's complaints clearly seek judicial intervention because he is unhappy with the outcome of the initial review of the charges and complaints filed against him. We think it is the right of a private, non-profit organization to manage, within legal limits, its own affairs without interference from the courts. See Hoey v. San Antonio Real Estate Board, 297 S.W.2d 214 (Tex.Civ. App.-San Antonio 1956, no...