Junek v. St. Mary's Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

• Decision Date: 25 June 2019
• Docket Number: No. 74, Sept. Term, 2018,74, Sept. Term, 2018
• Parties: John JUNEK v. ST. MARY'S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

464 Md. 350

211 A.3d 403

John JUNEK

v.ST. MARY'S COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

No. 74, Sept. Term, 2018

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 25, 2019

Argued by William M. Ferris (Krause & Ferris, Annapolis, MD), on brief, for Petitioner.

Argued by Sandra Barnes, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen. of Maryland, Baltimore, MD), on brief, for Respondent.

Argued before: Barbera, C.J., McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Glenn T. Harrell, Jr. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned) JJ.

Hotten, J. Petitioner, John Junek,¹ seeks reversal of an Administrative Law Judge's finding that Mr. Junek was responsible for indicated child neglect under Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 5-701(s). Mr. Junek poses the following question for our review: "Is intent or scienter an element of child neglect under Md. Code. Ann., Family Law ("Fam. Law") § 5-701(s) ?" For the reasons outlined below, we answer Mr. Junek's question in the negative, and affirm the Administrative Law Judge's finding of indicated child neglect.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Factual Background

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. On September 3, 2014, Mr. Junek was responsible for taking his older son to preschool and younger son to daycare before going to work.² Mr. Junek first dropped his older son off at preschool. However, instead of dropping off his younger son at daycare, Mr. Junek drove directly to his workplace at the Naval Air Station Patuxent River. Mr. Junek arrived at work just before 9:00 a.m., parked his car, overlooked his 17-month-old son in the backseat of the car, and went into work. At about 3:20 p.m. that afternoon, Mr. Junek received a phone call from his wife who had arrived at the daycare center to pick up their younger son. Ms. Junek was unable to find her younger son's car seat that Mr. Junek was supposed to leave at the daycare that morning, and called Mr. Junek to inquire as to its whereabouts. It was then, for the first time that day, that Mr. Junek realized he had forgotten to drop his younger son off at daycare, and left the toddler in the backseat of the vehicle.

Mr. Junek went immediately to his car, where he found his younger son strapped into his car seat, "unconscious, unresponsive, and not breathing." Mr. Junek, with the help of a nurse who was passing by the car at the time, performed cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the child and called emergency services. Attempts to revive the child failed, and he was pronounced dead at the scene. The outside temperature that day had reached a high of 85 degrees.

The Investigation and Administrative Hearing

Respondent, the St. Mary's County Department of Social Services ("the Department") initiated an investigation into the above events. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Department notified Mr. Junek that it had rendered a finding of "indicated child neglect[ ]" against him. Mr. Junek challenged the Department's finding and requested a hearing before the Office of Administrative Hearings. An Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing on June 23, 2016 regarding Mr. Junek's appeal of the neglect finding.³ After the hearing, the ALJ concluded that the Department "ha[d] established by a preponderance of the evidence that the finding of indicated child neglect [was] supported by credible evidence and [was] consistent with the law." In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ commented that "there is no intent requirement under section 5-701(s) [,]" and that no such requirement appears in the Code of Maryland Regulations (COMAR) 07.02.07.12 (Child Neglect Disposition). Mr. Junek filed a Petition for Judicial Review in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County. A hearing was conducted by Judge David Densford, who subsequently affirmed the ALJ's decision and accompanying legal conclusions.

The Court of Special Appeals

Mr. Junek filed a timely notice of appeal to the Court of Special Appeals, presenting the single issue of whether " ‘neglect’ under § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland require[s] proof of an element of scienter?" J.J. v. St. Mary's Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , No. 2038, 2018 WL 6839467, slip op. at *1 (Dec. 31, 2018) (emphasis in original). Applying its recent holding in I.B. v. Frederick Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. , 239 Md. App. 556, 197 A.3d 598 (2018), the Court of Special Appeals concluded "that a finding of indicated neglect under the statutory provisions of Section 5-701 et seq. , of the Family Law Article, does not require intent[.]" Id. at *4. The Court compared the definition of "abuse" and the definition of "neglect" in the Family Law Article, explaining that "[t]he General Assembly, in 2017, amended the definition of abuse to include intent as an element by excluding ‘the physical injury of a child by accidental means[ ]’ " from the definition of abuse, while not making any such amendment to the definition of neglect. Id. (citing 2017 Maryland Laws, Chapter 652).

Mr. Junek filed a timely petition for certiorari before this Court, requesting that we consider whether the definition of child neglect under § 5-701(s) of the Family Law Article requires proof of the element of intent. We granted certiorari accordingly to address this issue. Junek v. St. Mary's Cty. Dep't Soc. Servs. , 463 Md. 146, 204 A.3d 189 (2019).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"We review an administrative agency's decision under the same statutory standards as the [c]ircuit [c]ourt. Therefore, we reevaluate the decision of the agency, not the decision of the lower court." Gigeous v. E. Corr. Inst ., 363 Md. 481, 495-96, 769 A.2d 912, 921 (2001). "[O]rdinarily the Court reviewing a final decision of an administrative agency shall determine (1) the legality of the decision and (2) whether there was substantial evidence from the record as a whole to support the decision." Baltimore Lutheran High Sch. v. Employment Sec. Admin. , 302 Md. 649, 662, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985). Purely legal questions are reviewed de novo with considerable "weight [afforded] to an agency's experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers[.]"

Schwartz v. Md. Dep't of Nat. Res. , 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005). Matters of statutory interpretation and application are questions of law, reviewed de novo . Schisler v. State , 394 Md. 519, 535, 907 A.2d 175, 184 (2006).

DISCUSSION

Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 5-701(s) defines "[n]eglect" as:

the leaving of a child unattended or other failure to give proper care and attention to a child by any parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for supervision of the child under circumstances that indicate:

(1) that the child's health or welfare is harmed or placed at substantial risk of harm; or

(2) mental injury to the child or a substantial risk of mental injury.

COMAR 07.02.07.12A(1) permits "a finding of indicated child neglect when there is credible evidence, which has not been satisfactorily refuted," of:

(a) A failure to provide proper care and attention;

(b) A child victim;

(c) A parent or caregiver of the alleged victim responsible for the alleged neglect; and

(d) Circumstances including the nature, extent, or cause of the alleged neglect indicating that the alleged victim's health or welfare was harmed or was at substantial risk of harm.

The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature. Armstead v. State , 342 Md. 38, 56, 673 A.2d 221, 229 (1996). In reading the language of the statute, a court should use "common sense to avoid illogical or unreasonable constructions[.]" Id. We will interpret a statute so as "to give every word effect, avoiding constructions that render any portion of the language superfluous or redundant."

Blondell v. Balt. City Police Dep't , 341 Md. 680, 691, 672 A.2d 639, 644 (1996). To that end, we first examine the plain meaning of the statutory language. MVA v. Shepard , 399 Md. 241, 254, 923 A.2d 100, 107-08 (2007). "If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written." Jones v. State , 336 Md. 255, 261, 647 A.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1994). If the meaning of the language is unclear or ambiguous, however, we will "consider ‘not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives and purpose of the enactment,’ in our attempt to discern the construction that will best further the legislative objectives or goals." Whack v. State , 338 Md. 665, 672, 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995) (quoting Gargliano v. State , 334 Md. 428, 436, 639 A.2d 675, 678 (1994) ).

It is clear that the plain language of § 5-701(s) and the COMAR provision does not identify an element of scienter or intent as a requirement for a finding of child neglect. However, Mr. Junek urges this Court to consider other portions of the COMAR, the Family Law Article, the Criminal Law Article, and prior Maryland case law to support his position that an implicit intent requirement should be read into the definition of "neglect" in § 5-701(s).

Maryland Code, Family Law Article § 5-701(b)(1) defines "[a]buse" as:

(i) the physical or mental injury of a child under circumstances that indicate that the child's health or welfare is harmed or at substantial risk of being harmed by:

1. a parent;

2. a household member or family member;

3. a person who has permanent or temporary care or custody of the child;

4. a person who has responsibility for supervision of the child; or

5. a person who, because of the person's position or occupation, exercises authority over the child; or (ii) sexual abuse of a child, whether physical injuries are sustained or not.

Importantly, sub-section (b)(2) continues on to exclude "physical injury of a child by accidental means[ ]" from the definition. Additionally, COMAR 07.02.07.11A permits a finding of indicated child...