Juvenile v. Com.

• Decision Date: 25 April 1978
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 1351

374 N.E.2d 1351

375 Mass. 104

A JUVENILE v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued March 7, 1978.

Decided April 25, 1978.

Jay D. Blitzman, Boston, for plaintiff.

John B. Glynn, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Commonwealth.

Before HENNESSEY, C. J., and KAPLAN, WILKINS, LIACOS and ABRAMS, JJ.

ABRAMS, Justice.

Pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, the plaintiff juvenile seeks to enjoin the holding of a second juvenile transfer hearing on the same charges after a finding of no probable cause at the first hearing.

The pertinent facts, which are taken from a statement of agreed facts, are as follows. On November 21, 1976, three juveniles were observed in a stolen vehicle by a police officer. The officer followed the vehicle for approximately ten minutes at speeds of thirty-five to forty-five miles an hour. Suddenly, the stolen car accelerated to an estimated speed of sixty-five miles an hour prior to entering an intersection. The car ran a stop light and hit another car. One of the passengers in the other car was killed. Two of the juveniles were apprehended at the scene. The plaintiff was arrested later at his home.

On November 22, 1976, the plaintiff was charged in Boston Juvenile Court on delinquency complaints with use of a motor vehicle without authority, vehicular homicide, and operating without a license. These matters were continued for transfer hearings. These same delinquency charges were also brought against one of the other juveniles. The third juvenile was charged with use without authority. The latter two cases were continued for adjudicatory delinquency proceedings.

On February 5, 1977, the plaintiff's transfer hearing and the other juveniles' delinquency proceedings were held. The assistant district attorney moved for hearing simultaneously against the three juveniles.

The police officer who had followed the stolen car identified the three juveniles as those he had seen in the car, and recounted his observations of the chase and accident. During the officer's testimony, the assistant district attorney attempted to introduce statements made to the officer by the two juvenile codefendants concerning the identity of the operator of the car at the time of the accident. This testimony was excluded.

On March 4, 1977, the delinquency complaints against the plaintiff concerning vehicular homicide and operating without a license were dismissed for lack of probable cause. The complaint charging use without authority was continued for finding and disposition. On March 28, 1977, the plaintiff was committed to the Department of Youth Services. The two codefendants were found delinquent on the charge of use without authority.

On May 19, 1977, the plaintiff was charged with delinquency by reason of vehicular homicide and operating without a license. Transfer hearings were again requested by the Commonwealth. The additional evidence to be presented by the Commonwealth was the testimony of one of the two codefendants involved in the accident.

The plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the request for a transfer hearing. After consideration of the motion, the presiding judge indicated that he would sign a memorandum in support of a petition pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, since he had concluded that the issues raised were of first impression and of recurring importance, and that no other avenue of relief exists under present procedure.

The plaintiff then commenced the present action in the Supreme Judicial Court for Suffolk County. Relying on the judge's memorandum, a single justice reported the case to the full court.

1. Propriety of relief under G.L. c. 211, § 3. In the present case no remedy other than review under G.L. c. 211, § 3, is available to provide the plaintiff with the relief he seeks, the avoidance of a second transfer hearing. The decision to transfer is not subject to appeal; no appeal can presently be taken from the allowance of a motion to dismiss a request for a transfer hearing; and the Juvenile Court is not authorized to report cases. See G.L. c. 278, § 30A.

While we are aware that our authority under G.L. c. 211, § 3, should be exercised only in exceptional circumstances, Cappadona v. Riverside 400 Function Room, Inc., --- Mass. ---, --- - --- ^a, 360 N.E.2d 1048 (1977), the special features of the present case lead us to conclude that it is an appropriate one for review pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3. Cases involving probable cause determinations have been entertained under G.L. c. 211, § 3. Burke v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. --- ^b, 365 N.E.2d 811 (1977). Corey v. Commonwealth, 364 Mass. 137, 301 N.E.2d 450 (1973). Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 298 N.E.2d 819 (1973). Moreover, where, as here, a single justice reports the case to the full court, we have granted full review under G.L. c. 211, § 3. See Burke v. Commonwealth, supra, --- Mass. at --- - --- ^c, 365 N.E.2d 811.

2. Availability of a second transfer hearing. The purpose of a probable cause hearing for adults is "to screen . . . those cases that should not go to trial . . . ." Myers v. Commonwealth, supra, 363 Mass. at 847, 298 N.E.2d at 822. "Defendants are held for trial only if the examining magistrate finds (1) 'that a crime has been committed' and (2) 'that there is probable cause to believe the prisoner guilty.' G.L. c. 276, § 42." Id. Additional probable cause hearings may be held, especially if additional evidence is to be offered at the subsequent hearing. See Burke v. Commonwealth, supra, --- Mass. at --- - --- ^d, 365 N.E.2d 811; Maldonado, petitioner, 364 Mass. 359, 363-365, 304 N.E.2d 419 (1973). ¹

Under G.L. c. 119, § 61, as amended through St.1977, c. 829, § 11, at a transfer hearing "the court shall find whether probable cause exists to believe that the child has committed the offense or violation as charged." If the judge finds that probable cause exists, he must then determine whether the juvenile should be treated as a delinquent child or whether the case should continue under usual criminal...