Juvenile v. Com.

• Decision Date: 12 May 1976
• Parties: A JUVENILE v. COMMONWEALTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

Page 677

347 N.E.2d 677

370 Mass. 272

A JUVENILE

v. COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Argued Feb. 5, 1976.

Decided May 12, 1976.

Jean-Claude D. Sakellarios, Boston, for plaintiff.

Gerard F. Gillis, Asst. Dist. Atty., for the Com.

Before HENNESSEY, C.J., and REARDON, QUIRICO, BRAUCHER and WILKINS, JJ.

HENNESSEY, Chief Justice.

The plaintiff commenced this action in the Supreme Judicial Court for the County of Suffolk pursuant to G.L. c. 211, § 3, by filing a petition for relief in the nature of certiorari, and a motion for a stay of the proceedings in the court below. A statement of agreed facts was filed by the parties, and a single justice of this court reported the matter without decision for a determination by the full court.

This case raises substantial questions concerning the procedures and criteria by which a District Court judge, sitting in juvenile session, may dismiss a juvenile complaint and order the issuance of an adult complaint. The plaintiff claims that a nonadjudicatory transfer hearing which is held prior to a hearing on the merits of the juvenile complaint conflicts with statutory requirements; that the transfer hearing which was conducted in the District Court violated his constitutional rights; and that the decision to dismiss the juvenile complaint was not required by the 'public interest' (see G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1964, c. 308, § 2) in view of the evidence presented at the hearing.

Although we conclude that no error has been demonstrated in this case when viewed in light of the law existing at the time of the proceeding below (July 24 and 25, 1975), we find that, on the facts of this particular case, the interests of justice would best be served by our remanding the case for a new hearing which will include a consideration both of transfer and probable cause. ¹ This result, although not constitutionally or statutorily mandated, is, in the circumstances, consistent with 'the proper administration of criminal justice' (see Commonwealth v. Martin, 355 Mass. 296, 301, 244 N.E.2d 303 (1969)), for, while we recognize that the judge conscientiously applied the then controlling law, we believe that his task was complicated by the fact that the statutes, rules of court, and case law (see Recent Legal Developments, § I, infra) relating to transfer hearings were in a constant state of flux. Since no probable cause hearing on the adult complaint has yet been held, it is appropriate at this time for the transfer decision to be redetermined in accordance with newly enacted legislation (G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1975, c. 840, § 1, effective December 24, 1975) and the suggestions set forth in this decision (see Guidelines for Transfer Hearings, § III, infra).

The facts, as agreed to by the parties, are as follows. The plaintiff, who was born on February 2, 1960, was arraigned in the Municipal Court of the South Boston District on the charge of being a delinquent child by reason of homicide. The complaint alleged that on July 4, 1975, the plaintiff caused the death of Thomas Madjerec by striking him over the head with a baseball bat. At the arraignment on the juvenile complaint, the plaintiff was found to be indigent and counsel was assigned to represent him.

On July 24 and 25, 1975, a hearing was held in the juvenile session at which the presiding judge informed the parties at the outset that he intended to conduct a preliminary nonadjudicatory transfer hearing, the purpose of which was to determine whether the plaintiff should be tried as an adult and not to hear evidence relating to the merits of the case. Despite objection by counsel for the plaintiff, the assistant district attorney gave a statement, at the judge's request, outlining the Commonwealth's evidence and giving an account of the alleged homicide. The judge announced that this introductory statement would not be considered as evidence but was in the nature of an opening argument. The assistant district attorney proceeded to describe the events surrounding the victim's death which occurred in South Boston on the evening of July 4, 1975, during a fight in which the plaintiff was one of many participants. According to the assistant district attorney's statement, the victim had interceded in order to break up the fight, and, in the process, had pushed the plaintiff. In response, the plaintiff called for his friend to get him a bat and, as the victim was walking away from the scene of the fight, the plaintiff hit him several times over the head with the baseball bat. The victim died two days later.

Following this opening statement, the plaintiff presented evidence relative to the issue whether he should be treated as a juvenile. Testimony was given by the boy's mother, his school guidance counselor, a doctor who specializes in psychiatry, and employees of the Department of Youth Services, the Probation Department, and the Department of Correction concerning the plaintiff's background and psychological condition and the availability of programs and facilities for youthful offenders in the Commonwealth.

At the conclusion of the hearing on July 25, 1975, the presiding judge entered findings and an order dismissing the juvenile complaint so that the plaintiff could be tried for the offense of murder instead of being dealt with as a child. Immediately following, the plaintiff was arraigned on an adult complaint charging him with murder. The probable cause hearing on the adult complaint, continued to July 31, 1975, has since been continued from time to time at the plaintiff's request, and, as a consequence, no probable cause hearing has yet been held.

I. Recent Legal Developments.

Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision on May 27, 1975, in Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), the practice in this Commonwealth under G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1964, c. 308, § 2, ² and rule 85A of the rules of the District Courts (1965), as amended, ³ had been to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the juvenile complaint prior to a transfer hearing. At the transfer hearing, if the judge decided to decline jurisdiction, the juvenile complaint was dismissed pursuant to G.L. c. 119, § 61, and an adult complaint was issued forthwith under G.L. c. 119, § 75. See generally A Juvenile, petitioner, 364 Mass. 531, 306 N.E.2d 822 (1974).

In May, 1975, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Breed relating to juvenile proceedings in California. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of robbery in a Superior Court trial following an adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court at which it was determined that he had violated a criminal statute but that he was unfit for treatment as a juvenile. The Court held 'that the prosecution of respondent in Superior Court, after an adjudicatory proceeding in Juvenile Court, violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.' 421 U.S. at 541, 95 S.Ct. at 1791. As pointed out by the Supreme Court, the basic effect of its holding was 'to require, in most cases, that the transfer decision be made prior to an adjudicatory hearing. ⁴ Id. at 536, 95 S.Ct. at 1789. See Stokes v. Commonwealth, --- Mass. ---, 336 N.E.2d 735 (1975). ^a

Shortly after the decision in Breed, and before the proceedings in this case, the Chief Justice of the Massachusetts District Courts issued a memorandum directive which altered Rule 85A of the Rules of the District Courts, see note 3 supra. Under the amended Rule 85A, in accordance with Breed, the District Court judge was required to hold a transfer hearing prior to an adjudicatory hearing. In effect, the transfer hearing was a preliminary proceedings which was to be followed by either a probable cause hearing on the adult complaint or a Juvenile Court trial on the delinquency complaint, depending on the result of the transfer hearing. ⁵

Subsequently, G.L. c. 119, § 61, was amended by St.1975, c. 840, § 1 (effective December 24, 1975), so as to require a judge to make a determination, during the transfer hearing, as to whether probable cause exists. General Laws c. 119, § 61, as amended, further provides that a judge, before dismissing a juvenile complaint, must enter a 'written finding based upon clear and convincing evidence that the child presents a significant danger to the public as demonstrated by the nature of the offense charged and the child's past record of delinquent behavior, if any, and is not amenable to rehabilitation . . ..' ⁶

II. The Proceedings Below in this Case.

Although we are granting the relief sought in this case, we consider it useful to discuss the alleged errors as argued by the plaintiff. This discussion may be helpful in determining the rights of other juveniles who were involved in similar nonadjudicatory transfer proceedings that occurred in the intervening period between Breed and the amendment to G.L. c. 119, § 61, by St.1975, c. 840, § 1. ⁷

On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the District Court judge, sitting in juvenile session, had no statutory authority under the then controlling statute (G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1964, c. 308, § 2, see note 2 supra) to conduct a transfer hearing prior to a hearing on the merits of the juvenile complaint. We do not agree.

Although it may have been the practice in this Commonwealth to conduct an adjudicatory hearing in Juvenile Court prior to a transfer hearing, see Commonwealth v. A Juvenile, 363 Mass. 640, 296 N.E.2d 194 (1973), we do not believe that this practice was statutorily mandated. In view of the principle that a statute must be construed so as to avoid constitutional doubts, see Worcester County Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner of Banks, 340 Mass. 695, 701, 166 N.E.2d 551 (1960), we believe that G.L. c. 119, § 61, as appearing in St.1964, c. 308, § 2, may be read as permitting a nonadjudicatory transfer hearing prior to...