Kauffman Racing Equip., L.L.C. v. Roberts, 2008 Ohio 1922 (Ohio App. 4/18/2008)

• Decision Date: 18 April 2008
• Docket Number: No. 07-CA-14.,07-CA-14.
• Parties: Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott Roberts, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

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2008 Ohio 1922

Kauffman Racing Equipment, L.L.C., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Scott Roberts, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 07-CA-14.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Knox County.

Date of Judgment Entry: April 18, 2008.

Appeal from the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 07OT01-004.

Reversed and Remanded.

Brett Jaffe, 844 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43206-2543, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

William J. Kepko, 1 East Vine Street, Mount Vernon, Ohio 43050, for Defendant-Appellee

Before: Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J., Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J., Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.

OPINION

HOFFMAN, P.J.

{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant Kauffman Racing Equipment, LLC ("Kauffman Racing") appeals the June 1, 2007 Judgment Entry entered by the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, which granted defendant-appellee Scott Roberts' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} Kauffman Racing is an Ohio Limited Liability Company engaged in the business of selling engine blocks and related high performance racing equipment. It maintains its sole business office and operations in Glenmont, Knox County, Ohio. Kauffman Racing specializes in the sale of after-market engine blocks for Pontiac competition automobiles. The company averages approximately $750,000 in annual gross sales.

{¶3} On February 6, 2006, Kauffman Racing sold an MR-1 engine block and related equipment to a buyer, using the name "Central Virginia Machine", for the purchase price of $2,873.75. Kauffman Racing subsequently learned Roberts was the actual purchaser of the MR-1 engine block at issue herein. Roberts selected the engine block after viewing Kauffman Racing's Internet site. Approximately eight months after the purchase, in October, 2006, Roberts telephoned Kauffman Racing, complaining the engine block was defective. Roberts had not expressed to Kauffman Racing any dissatisfaction with the item prior to this time.

{¶4} Although the engine blocks and racing products marketed by Kauffman Racing are sold "as is" due to the extreme demands placed on the equipment, Kauffman Racing chose to make an effort to verify Roberts' claim of manufacturing defects in the

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engine block. Kauffman Racing proposed the engine block be shipped to Ohio, for inspection, and if the part was found defective as a result of Kauffman Racing's doing, the company would buy back the engine block at the original purchase price. Roberts accepted the terms and conditions of this arrangement. Kauffman Racing arranged for the engine block to be picked up in Virginia, and returned to its Ohio plant.

{¶5} Upon inspection, Kauffman Racing found the engine block had been substantially modified from the original specifications in which it had been shipped to Central Virginia Machine, in February, 2006. Kauffman Racing contacted Roberts, inquiring as to whom had undertaken the modifications of the engine block. Roberts admitted Central Virginia Machine had worked on the part. Kauffman Racing advised Roberts it would not buy back the engine block as the defects of which he complained were the result of modifications made subsequent to the sale and delivery of the part, and not by the manufacturer of the block itself. Kauffman Racing shipped the engine block to Roberts in Virginia. Thereafter, from October 18, 2006, through November, 2006, Roberts posted a number of statements on the bulletin board pages of Internet sites dedicated to automobile racing equipment, performance, and related subjects.

{¶6} As a result of these postings, Kauffman Racing filed a Complaint in the Knox County Court of Common Pleas, alleging Roberts had injured the company's reputation and business by posting false and malicious statements on the Internet. Kauffman Racing sought monetary damages from Roberts for defamation and intentional interference with contracts and business relationships. Kauffman Racing perfected service of process on Roberts pursuant to Civ. R. 4.3. In response, Roberts filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Via Judgment Entry filed June

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1, 2007, the trial court granted Roberts' motion to dismiss, and dismissed Kauffman Racing's Complaint.

{¶7} It is from this judgment entry Kauffman Racing appeals, raising the following assignment of error:

{¶8} "I. THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTED DEFENDANT-APPELLEE'S MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER HIS PERSON."

{¶9} We review a trial court's judgment granting a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction de novo. Joffe v. Cable Tech, Inc., 163 Ohio App.3d 479, 2005-Ohio-4930, 839 N.E.2d 67, at ¶ 10. To defeat a non-resident defendant's motion to dismiss premised upon jurisdictional grounds, a plaintiff must make a prima facie demonstration the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. See Yauger v. Hamilton Sorter Co. (Oct. 18, 1993), Butler App. No. CA93-02-030; Giachetti v. Holmes (1984), 14 Ohio App.3d 306, 307. A prima facie showing is made where the plaintiff produces sufficient evidence to allow reasonable minds to conclude that the trial court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Id. at 307. In making this determination, a trial court must "view allegations in the pleadings and the documentary evidence in a light most favorable" to the plaintiff and resolve "all reasonable competing inferences" in favor of the plaintiff. Goldstein v. Christiansen, 70 Ohio St.3d 232, 236, 1994-Ohio-229; Giachetti at 307.

{¶10} In deciding whether Ohio has jurisdiction over non-resident defendants, a court must engage in a two-step analysis. U.S. Sprint Communications Co. Ltd. Partnership v. Mr. K's Foods, Inc. (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 624 N.E.2d 1048;

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Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. v. Mitchell's Formal Wear, Inc. (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 73, 75, 559 N.E.2d 477. The court must first determine whether Ohio's long-arm statute, R.C. 2307.382, and the applicable Rule of Civil Procedure, Civ.R. 4.3(A), confer jurisdiction. U.S. Sprint Communications at 184, 624 N.E.2d 1048; Kentucky Oaks Mall Co. at 75, 559 N.E.2d 477. Second, the court must determine whether granting jurisdiction would deprive the non-resident of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id.

{¶11} The Ohio long-arm statute, section 2307.382 of the Ohio Revised Code, provides, in pertinent part:

{¶12} "(A) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising from the person's:

{¶13} "* * *

{¶14} "(6) Causing tortious injury in this state to any person by an act outside this state committed with the purpose of injuring persons, when he might reasonably have expected that some person would be injured thereby in this state;"

{¶15} Under the first prong of the U.S. Sprint test, we must decide whether Kauffman Racing has presented a prima facie case establishing the trial court has limited personal jurisdiction over Roberts under R.C. 2307.382. The evidence before the trial court shows, from a computer outside of Ohio, Roberts posted messages about Kauffman Racing on a number of websites.

{¶16} On October 18, 2006, Roberts posted the following message on the forum page of the Performance Years website:

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{¶17} "Bought a MR-1 Block from Kauffman in march [sic] of this year * * * Now, I have and have had since the day the block was delivered, a USELESS BLOCK. I didn't say worthless! I plan to get a lot of mileage out of it[.] And when i'm [sic] done Steve Kauffman will be able to attest to its worth."

{¶18} Later the same day, Roberts added:

{¶19} "I did send it back. They still have it. Steve Kauffman admitted on the phone that he got similar numbers on the sonic test as i [sic] did but he won't take it back because I did some work to it and have had it to [sic] long. I guess it doesn't matter that the day I got it all of the defects exsisted [sic] and nothing I have done caused them. But don't worry about that. What I loose [sic] in dollars I will make up in entertainment at their expence [sic]."

{¶20} The following day, October 19, 2006, Roberts wrote:

{¶21} "You don't seem to understand. As far as Steve kauffman [sic] is concerned the issue is resolved. * * * Again, this is not to get a resolution. I have a much bigger and dastardly plan than that and this is the perfect place to start. * * *(LOL)¹ * * * Here is another good board to visit! * * * Just trying to help other potential victims." (Emoticons omitted).

{¶22} On the EBay Automotive site, more of the same is found. We find Roberts' act of posting messages on various Internet sites was "committed with the purpose of injuring" Kauffman Racing, and such purpose is clearly seen in the content of Roberts' postings. As such, we find Ohio's long-arm statute and Civ. R. 4.3(A) confer jurisdiction on the trial court.

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{¶23} Although we find the trial court has limited personal jurisdiction over Roberts under Ohio's long-arm statute and Civ. R. 4.3(A), our inquiry is not finished. We also must consider whether the jurisdiction granted under the long-arm statute is consistent with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945), 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (Quotation omitted).

{¶24} The Due Process Clause protects an individual from being subject to the binding judgments of a forum in which he has not established any meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985), 471 U.S. 462, 471-472, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528, quoting Internatl. Shoe Co., supra. Due process is satisfied if a forum has either specific or general jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984), 466 U.S. 408, 414-415, 104 S.Ct. 1868, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, fns. 8 and 9. Specific jurisdiction turns...