Keiper v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.
Citation | 429 S.E.2d 66,189 W.Va. 179 |
Decision Date | 25 March 1993 |
Docket Number | No. 21239,21239 |
Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
Parties | Eric J. KEIPER, Plaintiff Below, Appellant, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY and State Farm Insurance Companies, Defendants Below, Appellees. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. ." Syllabus Point 2, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W.Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989).
2. Although the stacking of uninsured motorist coverage can be based on the public policy mandate of W.Va.Code 33-6-31 [1988], there exists no statutory or other public policy requirement that would provide a basis for invalidating or modifying the anti-stacking language for medical benefits contained in an insurance policy.
3. "Insurers may incorporate such terms, conditions and exclusions in an automobile insurance policy as may be consistent with the premium charged, so long as any such exclusions do not conflict with the spirit and intent of the uninsured and underinsured motorists statutes." Syllabus Point 3, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W.Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989).
Robert D. Aitcheson, Charles Town, for appellant.
Curtis G. Power, III, Steptoe & Johnson, Martinsburg, for appellees.
Eric J. Keiper, a guest passenger in a car owned by Ernie M. Jones, appeals from a declaratory judgment holding that as non-household member, Mr. Keiper is not entitled to stack medical payments coverage and benefits under Mr. Jones' three separate insurance policies issued by State Farm Mutual Insurance Company. Because the language of the policies unambiguously precludes the stacking of medical payments, we affirmed the decision of the circuit court.
On 26 April 1989, Mr. Keiper, a guest passenger in a 1984 Buick owned by Mr. Jones and driven by his son, David R. Jones, was injured when the car left the road and struck a utility pole. Only the 1984 Buick was involved. As a result of the accident Mr. Keiper's medical expenses were in excess of $20,000. 1 Mr. Jones' insurance provided medical coverage of $10,000 per person on the Buick. Mr. Jones also had separate policies on the family's other two vehicles, which, except for a $25,000 limit, provided identical medical coverage. All of Mr. Jones' policies were issued by State Farm.
State Farm paid $10,000, the limit under the Buick's medical coverage, and refused to pay any medical expenses based on Mr. Jones' other two policies. Asserting that he is entitled to recover under Mr. Jones' other policies, Mr. Keiper filed an action for declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment to State Farm, holding "[t]hat the Plaintiff, Eric J. Keiper cannot stack the medical payments coverage under the three Jones policies, because he is not a named insured on those policies." Mr. Keiper appeals to this Court arguing that Mr. Jones' insurance policies do not prohibit the stacking of the medical coverage.
The question of whether medical coverage in insurance policies can be stacked by a guest passenger has not previously been considered by this Court. However, in a series of opinions this Court has outlined when anti-stacking provisions for uninsured or underinsured motorist benefits are void under the uninsured motorist statute, W.Va.Code § 33-6-31 [1988]. See Syllabus Points 3 and 4, Bell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 157 W.Va. 623, 207 S.E.2d 147 (1974) ( ); State Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Youler, 183 W.Va. 556, 564, 396 S.E.2d 737, 745 (1990) ( ); Russell v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 188 W.Va. 81, 422 S.E.2d 803 (1992) ( ); Starr v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 188 W.Va. 313, 423 S.E.2d 922 (1992) ( ).
This Court also addressed the question of stacking of liability coverage in Shamblin v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 175 W.Va. 337, 332 S.E.2d 639 (1985) ( ). We also note that the question of stacking of medical coverage in West Virginia has been discussed several times by the Federal District Court with different results. See Moomaw v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 379 F.Supp. 697 (S.D.W.Va.1974) ( ). See also Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 2:87-0942 (S.D.W.Va. Feb. 16, 1989) ( ). See also, Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Arbogast, 662 F.Supp. 164, 165 (N.D.W.Va.1987) ( ).
State Farm argues that the cases permitting stacking of coverage are distinguishable from the present case because public policy, as shown in the uninsured and underinsured motorist statute ( W.Va.Code 33-6-31 [1988] ), supports stacking. 2 State Farm maintains that the present case, similar to Shamblin, must be determined by the language of the insurance policy, which clearly prohibits the stacking of medical coverage and benefits. Although Mr. Keiper agrees that the policy language is controlling, Mr. Keiper maintains that the policy contains no anti-stacking language that would preclude his recovery under the other policies issued to Mr. Jones.
It is well-settled law in West Virginia that "[w]here provisions in an insurance policy are plain and unambiguous and where such provisions are not contrary to a statute, regulation, or public policy, the provisions will be applied and not construed." Syllabus Point 2, Shamblin, supra; Syllabus Point 2, Deel v. Sweeney, 181 W.Va. 460, 383 S.E.2d 92 (1989); Syllabus, Farmers' & Merchants' Bank v. Balboa Ins. Co., 171 W.Va. 390, 299 S.E.2d 1 (1982); Prete v. Merchants Property Ins. Co. of Indiana, 159 W.Va. 508, 511, 223 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1976); Tynes v. Supreme Life Ins. Co. of America, 158 W.Va. 188, 209 S.E.2d 567 (1974); Atkins v. Stonewall Cas. Co., 155 W.Va. 81, 88, 181 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1971). See Syllabus Point 1, Russell, supra ( ).
The relevant portion of Mr. Jones' insurance policy states:
We will pay medical expenses for bodily injury sustained by:
1. a. the first person named in the declarations;
b. his or her spouse; and
c. their relatives.
These persons have to sustain the bodily injury:
a. while they operate or occupy a vehicle covered under the liability section; or
b. through being struck as a pedestrian by a motor vehicle or trailer.
A pedestrian means a person not an occupant of a motor vehicle or trailer.
2. any other person while occupying:
a. a vehicle covered under the liability coverage, except a non-owned car. Such vehicle has to be used by a person who is insured under the liability coverage.... [Emphasis in original.]
The coverage provisions of the policy indicate that State Farm will pay up to the stated limit--$10,000 for the 1984 Buick--to certain enumerated parties while they operate or occupy the vehicle covered under the liability section, which defines the vehicle as the car that the policy covers, namely the 1984 Buick. Because each of Mr. Jones' policies contains identical provisions linking medical coverage to the covered vehicle, Mr. Keiper, a guest passenger, is entitled to benefits solely by virtue of his occupancy of the covered vehicle.
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