Keith T., In re
| Decision Date | 05 June 1984 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | In re KEITH T., a minor. The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. KEITH T., Defendant and Appellant. A022961. |
Robert Cramer, Cramer & Doyle, Oakland, for defendant and appellant.
John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen. of State of Cal., Martin S. Kaye, Deputy Atty. Gen., Aileen Bunney, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, for plaintiff and respondent.
A petition was filed in juvenile court alleging that the minor, Keith T., then 16 years old, came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 in that he committed an assault with intent to commit rape (Pen.Code, § 220). Subsequently an amended petition was filed which added a charge of sexual battery (Pen.Code, § 243.4).
After a contested jurisdictional hearing the court sustained the petition as to the sexual battery only. The offense was declared to be a misdemeanor. The other charge was dismissed. The minor was adjudged to be a ward of the court and was placed on probation.
On February 22, 1983, appellant approached Susan S., a 18-year-old playground supervisor, at Harding School in Richmond. Appellant asked her about the day care program. Ms. S. moved away from the two children with whom she was sitting on a bench and responded to appellant's question. Appellant told her his name and asked for her name. Ms. S. stated that she was "working right now and ... best get back to the children." Appellant asked how he could "get to know [her] better." Ms. S. responded that she had a boyfriend and had "to get back to work now." Appellant then grabbed and held her by the shoulders, stating "don't go." He then put his arm on her waist and grabbed her vigorously by the crotch for approximately three seconds. Ms. S. at this point demanded that appellant release her or she would slap him. Appellant responded "Why would you want to slap me?" Ms. S. then broke free from his grip and left the area.
Appellant contends that the evidence presented at his jurisdictional hearing does not establish a violation of Penal Code section 243.4, sexual battery. We agree. The threshold issue to be determined is whether to commit a sexual battery as defined in section 243.4, it is necessary to prove that the perpetrator contacted the skin of an "intimate part of another person." We believe that such evidence is necessary and is totally lacking in the record before us.
Penal Code section 243.4 provides: (Emphasis added.)
Physical means "pertaining to the body ...." (Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary.) Contact means "a mutual touching of two bodies or persons ...." (Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary.) The application of these definitions to the statutory definition of "touches" in section 243.4 leads to a reasonable, plain reading that actual direct contact with the skin of the intimate part of another person is essential to the commission of a sexual battery. It is difficult to conceive of plainer language. Where the "statutory language is 'clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction and courts should not indulge in it' ". (Tiernan v. Trustees of Cal. State University & Colleges (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 218, 188 Cal.Rptr. 115, 655 P.2d 317, citing Solberg v. Superior Court (1977) 19 Cal.3d 182, 198, 137 Cal.Rptr. 460, 561 P.2d 1148.)
Moreover, in our view, the legislative intent supports this interpretation of section 243.4. The initial draft, introduced in the Assembly on February 22, 1982, did not define "touches" (Assem.Bill No. 2721 (1982 Reg.Sess.) § 1). The bill only defined "intimate part." On April 15, 1982, the Assembly amended the bill by defining "touches." After this amendment, the definition remained unchanged as codified in section 243.4. If the term "touches" had not been specifically defined in section 243.4, it would then have had a general meaning. Under a general meaning, a person who touched the intimate part of another through clothing would violate this section. However, if this was the Legislature's intent it would not have specifically defined the term "touches." By defining the term to "mean physical contact with the skin of another person" it is obvious that the Legislature intended to give the term "touches" a restrictive rather than a general meaning. If this was not the legislative intent, the inclusion of the definition of "touches" would be meaningless and mere surplusage. As stated in Watkins v. Real Estate Commissioner (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 397, 400, 6 Cal.Rptr. 191, "A cardinal rule of construction is that every word in the statute is presumably intended to have some meaning and that a construction making some words surplusage is to be avoided." (See also People v. Gilbert (1969) 1 Cal.3d 475, 480, 82 Cal.Rptr. 724, 462 P.2d 580, and People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104.) Moreover, " '[i]f possible, significance should be given to every word, phrase, sentence and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.' " (People v. Black, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 5, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104, citing Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672.) 1
Respondent contends that if our interpretation is correct then victims would have to be partially or completely naked in order to have a violation of section 243.4. Apparently this is exactly what the Legislature intended. This is in fact illustrated by a report prepared by the Senate Judiciary Committee which analyzed this section. To illustrate under what circumstances section 243.4 would apply, the report stated: (Sen.Com. on Jud.Rep. on AB 2721, p. 6)
Accordingly, regardless of whether we may feel that section 243.4 is too restrictive in its...
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