Kemp v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 21-5726 |
| Parties | Dexter Earl KEMP, Petitioner v. UNITED STATES |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Andrew L. Adler, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
Benjamin W. Snyder, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Lisa S. Blatt, Sarah M. Harris, Aaron Z. Roper, Mary E. Goetz, Mihir Khetarpal, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, Michael Caruso, Federal Public Defender, Andrew L. Adler, Counsel of Record, Asst. Federal Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, for Petitioner.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Kenneth A. Polite, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, Eric J. Feigin, Deputy Solicitor General, Benjamin W. Snyder, Assistant to the Solicitor General, Daniel J. Kane, Attorney, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Respondent.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment based on, among other things, a "mistake." The question presented is whether the term "mistake" includes a judge's error of law. We conclude, based on the text, structure, and history of Rule 60(b), that a judge's errors of law are indeed "mistake[s]" under Rule 60(b)(1).
In 2011, a federal jury convicted Dexter Kemp of various drug and gun crimes, and he was sentenced to 420 months in prison. Kemp, along with seven codefendants, appealed. The Eleventh Circuit consolidated their appeals and, in November 2013, affirmed their convictions and sentences. United States v. Gray , 544 Fed.Appx. 870. Kemp did not seek rehearing of the Eleventh Circuit's judgment or petition this Court for certiorari. Two of Kemp's codefendants did seek rehearing, which the Eleventh Circuit denied in May 2014.
In April 2015, Kemp moved the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The Government objected that Kemp's § 2255 motion was untimely. As relevant here, such motions must be filed within one year of "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final." § 2255(f)(1). For someone who, like Kemp, does not petition this Court for certiorari, a judgment becomes final when the time to seek certiorari expires—ordinarily, 90 days after judgment. See Clay v. United States , 537 U.S. 522, 525, 123 S.Ct. 1072, 155 L.Ed.2d 88 (2003) ; this Court's Rule 13.1. In this case, the District Court concluded that Kemp's judgment became final in February 2014 (90 days after the Eleventh Circuit's judgment affirming his conviction and sentence), making his April 2015 motion over two months late. The District Court dismissed Kemp's motion in September 2016, and Kemp did not appeal.
In June 2018—almost two years later—Kemp attempted to reopen his § 2255 proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which authorizes a court to reopen a final judgment under certain enumerated circumstances. Rule 60(b)(1) permits a district court to reopen a judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," so long as the motion is filed "within a reasonable time," and, at most, one year after the entry of the order under review. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1), (c)(1). Meanwhile, Rule 60(b)(6) permits reopening for "any other reason that justifies relief," so long as the motion is filed "within a reasonable time." Rule 60(c)(1).
Kemp invoked Rule 60(b)(6), but his motion arguably sought reopening based on a kind of "mistake" covered by Rule 60(b)(1). Specifically, Kemp argued that reopening was warranted because this Court's Rule 13.3 prescribes that the 90-day clock to seek certiorari does not begin to run until all parties' petitions for rehearing are denied, and the Eleventh Circuit denied his codefendants' rehearing petitions in May 2014. Thus, according to Kemp, the 1-year period to file his § 2255 motion began in August 2014, making his April 2015 motion timely.
The District Court rejected this timeliness argument and, in the alternative, held that Kemp's Rule 60(b) motion was itself untimely. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 857 Fed.Appx. 573 (2021) (per curiam ). While it agreed with Kemp that his original § 2255 motion "appear[ed] to have been timely," the Eleventh Circuit nonetheless concluded that he had filed his Rule 60(b) motion too late. Id., at 575–576. The Eleventh Circuit held that Kemp's reopening motion alleged "precisely the sort of judicial mistak[e] in applying the relevant law that Rule 60(b)(1) encompasses," and thus was subject to Rule 60(b)(1) ’s 1-year limitations period. Id., at 576.
Kemp petitioned this Court for review, and we granted certiorari to resolve the Courts of Appeals' longstanding disagreement whether "mistake" in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's errors of law.1 595 U.S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 752, 211 L.Ed.2d 471 (2022).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) permits "a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances." Gonzalez v. Crosby , 545 U.S. 524, 528, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 162 L.Ed.2d 480 (2005). Under Rule 60(b)(1), a party may seek relief based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Rules 60(b)(2) through (b)(5) supply other grounds for reopening a judgment. Finally, Rule 60(b)(6) provides a catchall for "any other reason that justifies relief." This last option is available only when Rules 60(b)(1) through (b)(5) are inapplicable. See Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp. , 486 U.S. 847, 863, n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). Even then, " ‘extraordinary circumstances’ " must justify reopening. Ibid.
Rule 60(c) imposes deadlines on Rule 60(b) motions. All must be filed "within a reasonable time." Rule 60(c)(1). But for some, including motions under Rule 60(b)(1), that "reasonable time" may not exceed one year. Rule 60(c)(1). Motions under Rule 60(b)(6) are not subject to this additional 1-year constraint. Rule 60(c)(1).
Here, the parties dispute the extent to which a judge's legal errors qualify as "mistake[s]" under Rule 60(b)(1). The Government contends that Rule 60(b)(1) applies any time a party alleges that a judge has made an "obvious" legal error—e.g., the "failure to apply unambiguous law to record facts." Brief for United States 11. Kemp's motion, the Government says, alleged an obvious legal error, so the Eleventh Circuit was correct to apply Rule 60(b)(1). According to Kemp, however, Rule 60(b)(1) applies only to factual errors made by someone other than the judge. Brief for Petitioner 3. So, in Kemp's view, his motion challenging the District Court's timeliness ruling was cognizable under Rule 60(b)(6), and the 1-year limit did not apply.
We ultimately disagree with Kemp and agree with the Government to a point. As a matter of text, structure, and history, the Government is correct that a "mistake" under Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's errors of law. But we see no reason to limit Rule 60(b)(1) to "obvious" legal mistakes, as the Government proposes. We first explain why Rule 60(b)(1) covers all mistakes of law made by a judge, and then address why the Government's and Kemp's contrary interpretations of "mistake" do not persuade us.
The ordinary meaning of the term "mistake" in Rule 60(b)(1) includes a judge's legal errors. When the Rule was adopted in 1938 and revised in 1946, the word "mistake" applied to any "misconception," "misunderstanding," or "fault in opinion or judgment." Webster's New International Dictionary 1383 (1914) (Webster's); see also Funk & Wagnalls New Standard Dictionary of the English Language 1588 (1944) (Funk & Wagnalls) (defining "mistake" as an "error in action, judgment, or perceptions," including, e.g., "a mistake in calculation"). In ordinary usage, then, a "mistake" was not limited only to factual "misconception[s]" or "misunderstanding[s]," or to mistakes by non-judicial actors. Webster's 1383. Likewise, in its legal usage, "mistake" included errors "of law or fact." Black's Law Dictionary 1195 (3d ed. 1933) (Black's). Thus, regardless whether "mistake" in Rule 60(b)(1) carries its ordinary meaning or legal meaning, it includes a judge's mistakes of law.
Had the drafters of Rule 60(b)(1) intended a narrower meaning, they "easily could have drafted language to that effect." Mississippi ex rel. Hood v. AU Optronics Corp. , 571 U.S. 161, 169, 134 S.Ct. 736, 187 L.Ed.2d 654 (2014). The difference between "mistake of fact" and "mistake of law" was well known at the time. Both lay and legal dictionaries identified them as distinct categories. See Funk & Wagnalls 1588; Black's 1195. Thus, Rule 60(b)(1) ’s drafters had at their disposal readily available language that could have connoted a narrower understanding of "mistake." Yet they chose to include "mistake" unqualified.
Similarly, Rule 60(b)(1) ’s drafters could just as easily have excluded mistakes by judges from the Rule's ambit. In fact, the Rule used to read that way. When adopted in 1938, Rule 60(b) initially referred to "his"—i.e., a party's—"mistake," so judicial errors were not covered. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b) (1938). In 1946, however, the Rule's amenders deleted the word "his," thereby removing any limitation on whose mistakes could qualify. See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 60(b)(1) (1946). Thus, as currently written, "mistake" in Rule 60(b)(1) includes legal errors made by judges.2
Both the Government's and Kemp's interpretations of Rule 60(b) depart from aspects of our reading. Their reasons for doing so are unavailing.
The Government contends that the term "mistake" encompasses only so-called "obvious" legal errors. Brief for United States 11. Several Courts of Appeals agree that Rule 60(b)(1) may be used to correct only " ‘obvious errors’ of law, such as overlooking controlling statutes or case law." In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp. S. A. , 728 F.2d 699, 703 (C.A.5 1984). The Government argues that this limitation "has historical roots" because courts of equity traditionally "could grant...
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