Kendall v. United Services Auto. Ass'n

• Citation: 23 So.3d 1119
• Decision Date: 15 May 2009
• Docket Number: 1061472.
• Parties: Rosalyn KENDALL v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

23 So.3d 1119

Rosalyn KENDALL v. UNITED SERVICES AUTOMOBILE ASSOCIATION.

1061472.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

May 15, 2009.

Richard F. Horsley and Lindsey O. Hill of King, Horsley & Lyons, LLC, Birmingham, for appellant.

W. Evans Brittain of Ball, Ball, Matthews & Novak, P.A., Montgomery, for appellee.

BOLIN, Justice.

Rosalyn Kendall appeals from a summary judgment in favor of United Services Automobile Association ("USAA") on her claim seeking underinsured-motorist ("UIM") benefits.

On December 17, 2002, Rosalyn Kendall was operating her vehicle on Highway 143 in Elmore County ("the County") when Angelia Mercer, an employee of the Elmore County District Attorney's office, failed to stop at a red light and collided with Kendall's vehicle. Mercer was acting within the line and scope of her employment with the County at the time of the accident. Kendall suffered severe and permanent injuries as the result of the accident, and she sued the County and Mercer seeking damages for her injuries.

At the time of the accident, Kendall was insured by an automobile-insurance policy issued by USAA. The USAA policy contained an uninsured/underinsured-motorist provision, which stated as follows:

"We will pay damages which a covered person is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because [bodily injury] sustained by a covered person and caused by an auto accident."

The County offered Kendall $100,000, its insurance-policy limits, to settle her claims against it and Mercer. It is undisputed that Kendall's medical expenses exceeded the County's policy limits of $100,000. On April 4, 2003, Kendall notified USAA of the County's offer to settle her claims for its policy limits of $100,000. Kendall also demanded payment from USAA of $75,000, the policy limit for UIM's coverage. On May 5, 2003, USAA gave its permission to Kendall to settle her claims with the County and waived its rights of subrogation. Subsequently, Kendall settled her claims against the County and Mercer for $100,000. On June 20, 2003, Kendall again demanded from USAA the payment of the UIM policy limits. USAA refused to pay to Kendall the policy limits of the UIM coverage of Kendall's policy with USAA because it claimed that the County's liability was limited by statute to $100,000 and Kendall had received that amount.

On September 21, 2006, Kendall sued USAA, seeking a judgment declaring her rights under the policy and an award of UIM benefits under the policy. On December 12, 2006, USAA moved for a summary judgment, arguing that § 11-93-2, Ala.Code 1975,¹ caps the County's liability at $100,000, and that, because Kendall had already settled her claims against the County and Mercer for $100,000, she is no longer "legally entitled to recover" damages against the County and, therefore, she cannot recover the UIM benefits under her policy with USAA in this case. On February 28, 2007, the trial court denied USAA's motion for a summary judgment.

On April 5, 2007, USAA moved the trial court to reconsider its denial of USAA's motion for a summary judgment on the issue whether Kendall could recover UIM benefits in this case when she had already recovered $100,000 from the County, which is the limit of the County's liability under the damages cap of § 11-93-2, Ala.Code 1975. USAA submitted in support of its motion State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Causey, 509 F.Supp.2d 1026 (M.D.Ala.2007). On May 30, 2007, the trial court set aside its order of February 28, 2007, and entered a summary judgment in favor of USAA. Kendall appeals.

Standard of Review

In reviewing the disposition of a motion for a summary judgment, we use the same standard the trial court used in determining whether the evidence before it presented a genuine issue of material fact and whether the movant was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Bussey v. John Deere Co., 531 So.2d 860, 862 (Ala.1988). When the movant makes a prima facie showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmovant to present substantial evidence creating such an issue. Bass v. SouthTrust Bank of Baldwin County, 538 So.2d 794 (Ala.1989). Evidence is "substantial" if it is of "such weight and quality that fair-minded persons in the exercise of impartial judgment can reasonably infer the existence of the fact sought to be proved." West v. Founders Life Assurance Co. of Florida, 547 So.2d 870, 871 (Ala.1989). This Court must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hanners v. Balfour Guthrie, Inc., 564 So.2d 412 (Ala.1990).

Discussion

USAA argues that Kendall cannot recover UIM benefits under her policy in this case because, it says, she had already recovered from the County the statutory maximum of $100,000 permitted by § 11-93-2; therefore, it argues, Kendall was no longer "legally entitled to recover" damages from the County. Kendall argues that her expenses for the injuries she incurred exceed the $100,000 she received in settlement of her claims against the County and Mercer and that she is entitled to UIM benefits under her policy in this case in order to be made whole and that her right to the UIM benefits cannot abrogated by the damages cap in § 11-93-2.

The uninsured-motorist statute provides, in part:

"No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered ... unless coverage is provided ... in limits for bodily injury or death ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. ..."

§ 32-7-23(a), Ala.Code 1975.

In Ex parte Carlton, 867 So.2d 332 (Ala. 2003), the plaintiff was injured in an automobile accident while acting within the line and scope of his employment with a landscaping company. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle owned by his employer and being driven by a co-employee when the co-employee negligently turned in front of an oncoming vehicle. The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from his employer for the injuries he sustained in the accident. The plaintiff also sought uninsured-motorist benefits under a policy that his mother had with State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, which named him as an insured. State Farm refused to pay the uninsured-motorist benefits. Both the plaintiff and State Farm filed separate actions, and the two cases were consolidated. State Farm contended that the plaintiff could not recover uninsured-motorist benefits in that he was not "legally entitled to recover" from the negligent driver because the exclusivity-of-remedy and the co-employee-liability provisions of the Workers' Compensation Act barred his suing the co-employee on a claim of negligence. The trial court disagreed with State Farm's position and awarded the plaintiff $50,000, which was the limit of his mother's uninsured-motorist coverage. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, and this Court granted the plaintiff's petition for a writ of certiorari. Ex parte Carlton, 867 So.2d at 333.

In affirming the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals, this Court accorded the statutory language "legally entitled to recover" a plain-meaning interpretation and overruled prior decisions that had expanded uninsured-motorist coverage beyond the plain language of the uninsured-motorist statute. This Court stated:

"Today we return to the point from which this Court never should have departed — the language of the statute. The language of the uninsured-motorist statute is plain and unambiguous:

"`No automobile liability or motor vehicle liability policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle shall be delivered ... unless coverage is provided ... for bodily injury or death ... for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom. ...'

"Ala.Code 1975, § 32-7-23. This Court has often stated:

"`"`Words used in a statute must be given their natural, plain, ordinary, and commonly understood meaning, and where plain language is used a court is bound to interpret that language to mean exactly what it says. If the language of the statute is unambiguous, then there is no room for judicial construction and the clearly expressed intent of the legislature must be given effect.'"'"

"DeKalb County LP Gas Co. v. Suburban Gas, Inc., 729 So.2d 270, 275 (Ala. 1998) (quoting Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. Nielsen, 714 So.2d 293, 296 (Ala.1998), quoting in turn IMED Corp. v. Systems Eng'g Assocs. Corp., 602 So.2d 344, 346 (Ala.1992)). No interpretation of the words of the uninsured-motorist statute is necessary. Furthermore, this Court is not at liberty to rewrite statutes or to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Patterson, 816 So.2d 1 (Ala.2001); see also Omni Ins. Co. v. Foreman, 802 So.2d 195 (Ala.2001).

"Pursuant to the Alabama Workers' Compensation Act, [the plaintiff] may not recover from his co-employee for the co-employee's negligent or wanton conduct. The workers' compensation benefits [the plaintiff] received are his only remedy against his employer. § 25-5-11, Ala.Code 1975. Therefore, [the plaintiff] is not `legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured vehicle' as the plain language of § 32-7-23(a), Ala.Code...