Kent State Univ. v. Hannam

Decision Date22 July 2019
Docket NumberCASE NO. 2018-P-0109
Citation2019 Ohio 2971
PartiesKENT STATE UNIVERSITY, Appellee, v. WILLIAM B. HANNAM, et al., Appellant.
CourtOhio Court of Appeals
OPINION

Judgment: Affirmed.

John N. Childs and Bryan E. Meek, Brennan, Manna & Diamond, LLC, 75 East Market Street, Akron, OH 44308 (For Appellee).

Michelle Wrona Fox, Community Legal Aid Services, 11 Central Square, 7th Floor, Youngstown, OH 44503 (For Appellant).

CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, J.

{¶1} Appellant, William B. Hannam, appeals the November 30, 2018 judgment of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas reversing the Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision to award appellant unemployment benefits for a certain period in August 2017. For the reasons discussed herein, the decision of the Portage County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

{¶2} The facts are undisputed. Mr. Hannam was employed by the Kent State University as a part-time adjunct professor in the Music Department for the Spring 2017 semester, which ended on May 15, 2017. On June 13, 2017, Mr. Hannam received a letter from the University offering "reasonable assurance," pursuant to the University's employment practices, that Mr. Hannam would be needed for the following "fall and/or spring semester(s)" (the "Reasonable Assurance Letter" or the "Letter"). The Letter did not specify which classes Mr. Hannam would teach but Mr. Hannam testified that he knew in the spring of 2017 that he was listed as a professor on the fall class schedule. The Letter stated that his continued employment was subject to the University's "employment practices." Both the University and Mr. Hannam understood this to mean that Mr. Hannam's employment was contingent on sufficient student enrollment, with priority to full-time faculty pursuant to the faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement, and budget approval. Ultimately, the University confirmed Mr. Hannam's classes had sufficient enrollment for the fall semester on August 11, 2017, and on August 28, 2017, Mr. Hannam began teaching.

{¶3} Shortly after receiving the Reasonable Assurance Letter, Mr. Hannam applied to the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (ODJFS) for unemployment benefits. On July 7, 2017, ODJFS determined that Mr. Hannam was totally unemployed due to lack of work and allowed his application for benefits. The University timely appealed and, upon reconsideration, ODJFS modified the decision to allow benefits from May 15, 2017 through June 17, 2017, but determined that starting the week of June 18, 2017, Mr. Hannam had reasonable assurance of employment for the next academic year and therefore was not eligible for benefits from June 18, 2017 through August 26, 2017. That decision also ordered Mr. Hannam to repay $690.00 that ODJFSdetermined to be overpaid benefits. Mr. Hannam timely appealed and ODJFS transferred jurisdiction to the Review Commission pursuant to R.C. 4141.281(B).

{¶4} In August 2017, a Review Commission Hearing Officer conducted an evidentiary hearing, and, in the September 8, 2017 decision, the Hearing Officer determined Mr. Hannam did not have reasonable assurances until the week ending August 19, 2017, i.e., the week the University confirmed adequate enrollment in Mr. Hannam's classes, and that Mr. Hannam, accordingly, was entitled to benefits from June 18, 2017 through August 12, 2017. The University requested further review, and on November 15, 2017, the Review Commission ultimately affirmed their decision.

{¶5} The University then appealed to the Portage County Court of Common Pleas, which reversed the Review Commission's grant of unemployment benefits, finding Mr. Hannam had reasonable assurances as of the June 13, 2017 Reasonable Assurances Letter. The instant appeal followed.

{¶6} Mr. Hannam assigns two errors for our review, which we address together:

{¶7} [1] The trial court erred by reversing the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision when it found Mr. Hannam was ineligible for benefits since he had reasonable assurance of employment because the Review Commission decision was not unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶8} [2] The trial court erred by reversing the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision to grant Mr. Hannam unemployment compensation benefits because Mr. Hannam did not have reasonable assurances of employment as defined by Unemployment Insurance Program Letter 5-17.

{¶9} In reviewing the decision of the trial court in this matter, we apply a manifest weight of the evidence standard of review. According to R.C. 4141.282(H), "[i]f the [reviewing] court finds that the decision of the commission was unlawful,unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, it shall reverse, vacate, or modify the decision, or remand the matter to the commission. Otherwise, the court shall affirm the decision of the commission." Though R.C. 4141.282 specifically addresses appeals to the court of common pleas, and not to appellate courts, the Supreme Court of Ohio has held that, in appeals from the unemployment compensation review commission, the same standard of review applies to both the court of common pleas and the appellate court. Tzangas, Plakas & Mannos v. Ohio Bur. of Emp. Serv., 73 Ohio St.3d 694 (1995), paragraph one of the syllabus. "When we review the trial court's decision, we apply the same standard. In such cases, this Court is 'required to focus on the decision of Review Commission, rather than that of the common pleas court[.]'" Univ. of Akron v. Ohio Dept. of Job & Family Servs., 9th Dist. Summit No. 24566, 2009-Ohio-3172, ¶9, quoting Markovich v. Employers Unity, Inc., 9th Dist. Summit No. 21826, 2004-Ohio-4193.

{¶10} Furthermore, "[t]he court's role is to determine whether the decision of the Review Commission is supported by evidence in the certified record. * * * If the reviewing court finds that such support is found, then the court cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Review Commission. * * * 'The fact that reasonable minds might reach different conclusions is not a basis for the reversal of the [Review Commission's] decision.'" (citations omitted.) Univ. of Akron, supra, at ¶11, quoting Irvine v. Unemp. Comp. Bd. of Review, 19 Ohio St.3d 15, 18 (1985).

{¶11} The Ohio Revised Code sets out the eligibility requirements to receive unemployment compensation benefits between academic terms. Specifically, R.C. 4141.29(I)(1) pertains to university employees and provides, in pertinent part:

{¶12} (a) Benefits based on service in an instructional, research, or principal administrative capacity in an institution of higher education, as defined in division (Y) of section 4141.01 of the Revised Code; or for an educational institution as defined in division (CC) of section 4141.01 of the Revised Code, shall not be paid to any individual for any week of unemployment that begins during the period between two successive academic years or terms, or during a similar period between two regular but not successive terms or during a period of paid sabbatical leave provided for in the individual's contract, if the individual performs such services in the first of those academic years or terms and has a contract or a reasonable assurance that the individual will perform services in any such capacity for any such institution in the second of those academic years or terms.

{¶13} With the facts not in dispute, the case sub judice turns on what it means to have "reasonable assurance" of continued employment as it pertains to R.C. 4141.29(I)(1). Effective in November 1983, however, the Ohio Revised Code was amended to eliminate the definition of "reasonable assurance" for this section, and there has been little precedent since established by this court or the Supreme Court of Ohio on the meaning, interpretation, or definition of "reasonable assurances" as applied to this Code Section. In University of Toledo v. Heiny, 30 Ohio St.3d 143, 146 (1987), the Supreme Court of Ohio held that reasonable assurance, as applied to a similar Code section, is sufficient if the employer informs the employee that employment is available. And, as applied to R.C. 4141.29(I)(1), in Knight v. Administrator, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services, 28 Ohio St.3d 8, 10-11 (1986), the Supreme Court of Ohio found that an offer of employment for the following academic year or terms constituted reasonable assurance despite being contingent on student enrollment.

{¶14} The Reasonable Assurance Letter Mr. Hannam received reads, in pertinent part:

{¶15} I am also writing to offer reasonable assurance, consistent with the University's employment practices, that the School of Music willneed your services again during the next fall and/or spring semester(s). The salary for any such appointment will be no less than the rate per credit hour that you received this semester.
{¶16} I hope that you will be interested in maintaining your association with Kent State University. If you are available to teach in the fall and/or spring semester(s), please notify me within fifteen (15) days of your receipt of this letter.

{¶17} The University acknowledges that, though it is not the University's intention at the time of sending reasonable assurance letters, occasionally circumstances dictate that an adjunct professor who was given a reasonable assurance letter is not hired back the following semester. Though this happens less often than not, Dr. Jeff Judge, Director of the ESL Center at the University, stated in an e-mail to Mr. Hannam's colleague, an adjunct professor that received a Reasonable Assurance letter but was not hired back the following semester, that "a reasonable assurance letter does NOT guarantee work with Kent State University. It is kind of an intent to hire, if we have enough classes to offer. If our student population drops and we don't have classes to...

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