Kenyon v. Vogel
| Decision Date | 26 November 1924 |
| Citation | 250 Mass. 341,145 N.E. 462 |
| Parties | KENYON v. VOGEL. DIMICK v. SAME. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Norfolk County; G. A. Flynn, Judge.
Separate actions in tort by Flora L. Kenyon and Nelson A. Dimick against Louis L. Vogel to recover respectively for personal injuries and for injuries to automobile. Judgments for plaintiffs, and defendant excepts. Exceptions as to judgment of Flora L. Kenyon overruled only on condition of remittitur; exceptions as to case of Nelson A. Dimick overruled.
F. J. Squires, of Norwood, for plaintiffs.
W. P. Murray, of Boston, for defendant.
[1] These are actions of tort, in which the plaintiff in the first action recovered damages for personal injuries, and in the second action the plaintiff recovered damages for injuries to his automobile. The plaintiff Dimick on Sunday, May 18, 1920, was driving his own automobile on a public way in the town of Norwood, in which the plaintiff Kenyon was also riding at his invitation, when it came in contract with the automobile of the defendant, in which he was riding, driven by one Huskins, who was not specially licensed. G. L. c. 90, § 12. The record states that both cars were going in the same direction, and that the right-hand front portion of the defendant's car came into collision with the left-hand rear portion of the plaintiff's car, causing the injuries alleged. But no further description appears. The defendant, while admitting there was evidence warranting the jury in finding that the plaintiff's car was properly operated, and that the defendant's car was driven at excessive speed by Huskins, who was under the influence of intoxicating liquor, contends that evidence tending to show that Huskins was the defendant's servant was improperly admitted. After the accident the defendant and Huskins went to the Norwood police station where the chief of police in presence of the defendant asked Huskins for whom he worked, and Huskins replied that on that Sunday he was working for the defendant. During the colloquy the defendant not only remained silent, but when asked ‘why he did not drive his own car,’ answered ‘that he had to have Huskins because his car went too fast.’ The defendant was not under arrest for violating D. L. c. 90, § 12, 17, relating to obligations of owners of automobiles in the employmentof chauffeurs, or in the limitations of speed. And even if contradicted by the defendant this evidence was plainly admissible, for reasons stated in Warner v. Fuller, 245 Mass. 520, 139 N. E. 811, where the authorities are collected. See, also, Commonwealth v. Spiropoulos, 208 Mass. 71, 74, 94 N. E. 451;Commonwealth v. Anderson, 245 Mass. 177, 139 N. E. 436.
[2][3][4][5][6] The sixth request, ‘There can be no inference drawn by the jury against this defendant, because of the testimony that the defendant said nothing after Huskins...
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Popkin v. Goldman
...evidence was competent. Commonwealth v. Brailey, 134 Mass. 527, 530;Warner v. Fuller, 245 Mass. 520, 528, 139 N. E. 811;Kenyon v. Vogel, 250 Mass. 341, 145 N. E. 462;Commonwealth v. Helfman, 258 Mass. 410, 155 N. E. 448. This testimony if believed, considered in connection with other testim......
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...for such payment. In these circumstances the contractor was not entitled to recover the amount of the premium. See Kenyon v. Vogel, 250 Mass. 341, 344, 145 N. E. 462. The question whether the contractor is entitled to recover as an element of damages a profit on labor furnished by it in com......
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Pearl v. William Filene's Sons Co.
...or upon his credit by a hairdresser who charged him for the treatments. Driscoll v. Gaffey, 207 Mass. 102, 92 N.E. 1010;Kenyon v. Vogel, 250 Mass. 341, 145 N.E. 462. A plaintiff in an action of tort for deceit is not entitled to nominal damages merely by proving that the defendant had perpe......
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Cassidy v. Constantine
...is responsible for the reasonable support of the wife and for affording her necessary nursing and physicians's care. Kenyon v. Vogel, 250 Mass. 341, 344, 145 N. E. 462. The wife may, however, bind her separate estate for service of this nature. Charron v. Day, 228 Mass. 305, 117 N. E. 347. ......