Kerr v. Hurd

Decision Date15 March 2010
Docket NumberCase No. 3:07-cv-297.
Citation694 F. Supp.2d 817
PartiesElton R. KERR, Plaintiff, v. William W. HURD, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

John Randolph Folkerth, Jr., Kenneth Joseph Heisele, Weprin Folkerth & Routh LLC, Dayton, OH, for Plaintiff.

Timothy Alan Lecklider, Rory P. Callahan, Ohio Attorney General's Office, Columbus, OH, Jonathan Hollingsworth, J. Hollingsworth, LLC, Kathy Ruark Blevins, Dayton, OH, for Defendants.

DECISION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

MICHAEL R. MERZ, United States Magistrate Judge.

This case is before the Court on Motions for Summary Judgment of Defendants Wright State Physicians (Doc. No. 83) and William W. Hurd (Doc. No. 84). Plaintiff Van Noy Culpepper, Trustee in bankruptcy for Dr. Elton R. Kerr, opposes the Motions (Doc. No. 100) and each moving Defendant has filed a reply in support (Doc. Nos. 111, 112).

The parties have unanimously consented to plenary magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the case has been referred on that basis (Doc. Nos. 5, 6). Thus the Magistrate Judge is authorized to decide these two motions.

Plaintiff asserts subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for claims arising under federal law, with supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 for state law claims. (Complaint, Doc. No. 1, ¶ 2.) Alternatively, Plaintiff asserts subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the parties are of diverse citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The Court finds that it has jurisdiction under both § 1331 and § 1332, which is uncontested.

Generally Applicable Law

Most of Dr. Kerr's claims arises under Ohio common law. Where state law creates the cause of action, state substantive law provides the rules of decision. 28 U.S.C. § 1652; Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), overruling Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1, 16 Pet. 1, 10 L.Ed. 865 (1841). In applying state law, the Sixth Circuit follows the law of the State as announced by that State's supreme court. Ray Industries, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754, 758 (6th Cir.1992); Miles v. Kohli & Kaliher Assocs., 917 F.2d 235, 241 (6th Cir.1990). On the other hand, if "a rule really regulates procedure,—the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them,"—then the federal procedural law, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will apply regardless of the basis of jurisdiction. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1940). Allocation of the burden of proof is a matter governed by state law. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. City of White House, Tennessee, 191 F.3d 675 (6th Cir. 1999).

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. On a motion for summary judgment, the movant has the burden of showing that there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the evidence, together with all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom, must be read in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157-59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970). Nevertheless, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Summary judgment procedure is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed to "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

Read together, Liberty Lobby and Celotex stand for the proposition that a party may move for summary judgment asserting that the opposing party will not be able to produce sufficient evidence at trial to withstand a directed verdict motion (now known as a motion for judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 50). Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478 (6th Cir.1989). If, after sufficient time for discovery, the opposing party is unable to demonstrate that he or she can do so under the Liberty Lobby criteria, summary judgment is appropriate. Id. The opposing party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. at 2510-11 (citations omitted). "The mere possibility of a factual dispute is not enough." Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir.1992) (quoting Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 863 (6th Cir.1986)). Therefore a court must make a preliminary assessment of the evidence, in order to decide whether the plaintiff's evidence concerns a material issue and is more than de minimis. Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 795 (6th Cir.1996). "On summary judgment," moreover, "the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655, 82 S.Ct. 993, 994, 8 L.Ed.2d 176 (1962). Thus, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

The moving party

Always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also, Boretti v. Wiscomb, 930 F.2d 1150, 1156 (6th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). The party bringing the summary judgment motion has the initial burden of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine dispute over material facts. Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551 (6th Cir.2009), citing Mt. Lebanon Personal Care Home, Inc. v. Hoover Universal, Inc., 276 F.3d 845, 848 (6th Cir.2002). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings to show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348; Martin v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n., 968 F.2d 606 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1054, 113 S.Ct. 979, 122 L.Ed.2d 133 (1993).

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment (in other words, determining whether there is a genuine issue of material fact), "a district court is not . . . obligated to wade through and search the entire record for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim." InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F.2d 108, 111 (6th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1091, 110 S.Ct. 1839, 108 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990). Thus, in determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists on a particular issue, a court is entitled to rely only upon those portions of the verified pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits submitted, specifically called to its attention by the parties.

A fact is "material" if its resolution affects the outcome of the lawsuit. Lenning v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 574, 581 (6th Cir.2001). "Materiality is determined by the substantive law claim." Boyd v. Baeppler, 215 F.3d 594, 599 (6th Cir.2000). An issue is genuine if a "reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Henson v. Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin., 14 F.3d 1143, 1148 (6th Cir.1994), quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Irrelevant or unnecessary factual disputes do not create genuine issues of material fact. St. Francis Health Care Centre v. Shalala, 205 F.3d 937, 943 (6th Cir.2000). When the "record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party," there is no genuine issue of material fact. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951 (6th Cir.2000), rev'd on other grounds, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002). Thus, a factual dispute which is merely colorable or is not significantly probative will not defeat a motion for summary judgment which is properly supported. Kraft v. United States, 991 F.2d 292, 296 (6th Cir.), cert. denied 510 U.S. 976, 114 S.Ct. 467, 126 L.Ed.2d 419 (1993); see also, Int'l Union United Auto., Aerospace & Agriculture Implement Workers of America v. BVR Liquidating, Inc., 190 F.3d 768, 772 (6th Cir.1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1067, 120 S.Ct. 1674, 146 L.Ed.2d 483 (2000).

The party opposing the motion may not "rely on the hope that the trier of fact will disbelieve the movant's denial of a disputed fact" but must make an affirmative showing with proper evidence in order to defeat the motion. Street, 886 F.2d at 1479. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must designate specific facts in affidavits, depositions, or other factual material showing "evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the non-moving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct....

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