Kerrethers v. State
| Decision Date | 15 February 1984 |
| Docket Number | No. 67029,67029 |
| Citation | 169 Ga.App. 832,315 S.E.2d 46 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | KERRETHERS v. The STATE. |
Theresa M. Clyne and Jack H. Affleck, Jr., Athens, for appellant.
Harry N. Gordon, Dist. Atty., B. Thomas Cook, Jr., Asst. Dist. Atty., for appellee.
Appellant appeals his convictions of voluntary manslaughter and recidivism.
Although the evidence presented at appellant's trial was conflicting, the trior of fact was authorized to find the following: Appellant, the victim, and others were at the home of Curtis Johnson. Most of the people there, including appellant and the victim, were drinking, and the victim was extremely intoxicated. A verbal altercation ensued, although it is unclear exactly who was involved. According to appellant, Johnson threatened him with a knife, and the victim threatened to beat him. Appellant was told to leave Johnson's home. He walked to his own home, where he obtained a butcher knife. Concealing the knife either in his pants or behind his back, appellant returned to the area of Johnson's home and engaged in a confrontation with the victim. It is not certain whether the victim, who was unarmed, first advanced upon appellant, or whether appellant was the aggressor. In any event, appellant stabbed the victim once in the heart and the victim retreated. He subsequently died from loss of blood. Appellant ran away from the scene, and the police were summoned. The police located appellant, who was hiding behind the screen door of an apartment building. They drew their weapons and instructed appellant to come out with his hands up. As appellant did so, he said to the police, The police immediately warned appellant not to say anything else. Appellant was then handcuffed, and his Miranda rights were read to him. Appellant stated that he understood those rights and that he wanted a lawyer. When appellant thus invoked his rights, the arresting officers asked him no further questions.
Officer Ramsey, who had not participated in the arrest, transported appellant to the police station. Officer Ramsey had been told that appellant had been advised of his rights, and she asked him no questions. While in the police car, however, appellant made several spontaneous statements, apparently talking to himself. Officer Ramsey told appellant that he needed a lawyer and that he should not be talking. Nonetheless, appellant continued to mumble incriminating remarks: "I didn't mean to kill Mo. I didn't mean it."
At the police station, appellant was again advised of his Miranda rights. He again stated that he understood them, and he asked for a lawyer and for his father. He was not interrogated, nor was he encouraged to make any statements whatsoever. However, he continued to state that he did not mean to kill Mo. He told the police that he and Mo were good friends and drinking buddies. He also said that Mo was not even involved in the fight, and that Mo had swung at him and missed before he "stuck" Mo. He further stated that, after the incident, he threw the knife away in the woods.
When appellant made these remarks, the police reminded him that he had invoked his right to remain silent, and asked whether he had changed his mind and would like to make a statement. Appellant replied in the negative and restated his desire for a lawyer. However, appellant made no attempt to procure an attorney at that time, nor did he ask to use the telephone, which was reasonably available.
A pre-trial Jackson v. Denno hearing was held to determine the admissibility of appellant's statements. After hearing evidence, the trial court determined that the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny did not apply to the voluntary statements made by appellant simultaneously with his arrest. The trial court further found that appellant's custodial statements made after his being advised of his Miranda rights were "freely and voluntarily made without the slightest hope of benefit or the remotest fear of injury."
At his trial for murder, appellant's statements were admitted into evidence over objection. Appellant admitted stabbing Mo and attempted to establish that he did so in self defense. The jury found appellant guilty of voluntary manslaughter.
1. Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of appellant's incriminating statements.
Appellant's spontaneous remark, "I didn't mean to kill him," made as soon as he was apprehended by police, clearly was admissible. Caito v. State, 130 Ga.App. 831(6), 204 S.E.2d 765 (1974). The other incriminating statements were made after appellant had been advised of and had invoked his right to counsel. Under Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983), such statements were not admissible unless they were made after the accused himself had initiated communication with the police, and unless there had been a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver or relinquishment of the right to silence and the right to counsel. Whether there was such a valid waiver depends on the totality of circumstances of the particular case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused.
In the instant case, there is nothing in the record to suggest that appellant was mentally incapacitated or had any special susceptibilities. Although appellant had been drinking, he was not intoxicated. Additionally, appellant had been convicted of crimes on several previous occasions and thus had experience in dealing with law enforcement officials.
It is clear that appellant...
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Stevens v. State
...(police conduct in pursuing investigation within well-established exception to rule against hearsay). 25. Kerrethers v. State, 169 Ga.App. 832, 834(1), 315 S.E.2d 46 (1984); Holbrook v. State, 162 Ga.App. 400, 401-402(1), 291 S.E.2d 729 ...
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Phipps v. State
...that he made such statements, it was inadmissible hearsay under the line of cases exemplified by Smith. See Kerrethers v. State, 169 Ga.App. 832, 835(2), 315 S.E.2d 46 (1984); see generally Momon v. State, 249 Ga. 865, 294 S.E.2d 482 Appellant also argues that the exclusion pursuant to a pe......
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