Key v. State, 96-614

• Decision Date: 22 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 96-614,96-614
• Citation: 577 N.W.2d 637
• Parties: Melvin KEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 637

577 N.W.2d 637

Melvin KEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Iowa, Appellee.

No. 96-614.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 22, 1998.

Philip B. Mears of Mears Law Office, Iowa City, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Forrest Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Considered by McGIVERIN, C.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, NEUMAN, and TERNUS, JJ.

McGIVERIN, Chief Justice.

Applicant, Melvin Key, an inmate at the Iowa State Penitentiary (ISP), was found guilty by a prison disciplinary committee of violating certain prison rules. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Key filed an application for postconviction relief in district court. See Iowa Code §§ 822.2(6), 822.3 (1995). The district court denied Key relief and he appealed. We affirm.

I. Background facts and proceedings.

On January 28, 1995, Key was removed from the general population at ISP and placed in investigative segregation for alleged violations of ISP rules. He remained in that status for thirty-three days until March 2 when prison officials issued a disciplinary report against him, alleging he had violated various prison rules related to his actions in asking another inmate for oral sex, sending red star envelopes to that same inmate, ¹ and attempting to make arrangements for that inmate to give Key his television set. As a result of the disciplinary report being issued against him, Key was placed in summary segregation pending a disciplinary hearing concerning the allegations. ²

On March 29, 1995, a disciplinary hearing was held before a prison disciplinary committee concerning Key's alleged violations of prison rules. The disciplinary committee found Key guilty of violating disciplinary rule thirty-three (bartering/selling goods) ³ and rule forty-three (attempt or complicity), ⁴ and sanctioned Key to ninety days of restriction to a cell in maximum security, but no loss of good conduct time, nor loss of credit for time served.

After exhausting his administrative remedies, Key filed an application for postconviction relief in district court challenging the committee's ruling and asserting three grounds for relief: (1) inadequate notice of the nature and time of alleged violations; (2) improper reliance on unreliable confidential information; and (3) improper detention in investigative segregation in excess of thirty days, in violation of ISP policy.

After a trial, the district court denied Key's application for postconviction relief. Key appealed and raises the same issues before us.

II. Standard of review.

Key contends that the disciplinary notice does not comport with due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. He further contends that the prison disciplinary committee's decision was not supported by "some evidence." Since these claims involve constitutional challenges, we review them "in light of the totality of the circumstances and the record upon which the postconviction court's ruling was made." Giles v. State, 511 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Iowa 1994). This is the functional equivalent of de novo review. James v. State, 541 N.W.2d 864, 869-70 (Iowa 1995); Hinkle v. State, 290 N.W.2d 28, 30 (Iowa 1980). Since Key does not raise a constitutional challenge regarding the length of his confinement in investigative segregation, our review on this issue is for errors of law. Harpster v. State, 569 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Iowa 1997).

III. Notice of disciplinary charges.

Key first contends that the disciplinary notice did not specify the dates and times of the alleged disciplinary violations. He therefore asserts that he had insufficient information to prepare a defense against the charges and thus was deprived of his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court rejected Key's contentions on this issue, holding that the notice sufficiently apprised him of the alleged violations.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that prison officials give an inmate subject to discipline proper notice of the charges against him. Backstrom v. District Ct., 508 N.W.2d 705, 707-08 (Iowa 1993) (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2978, 41 L.Ed.2d 935, 936 (1974)). Specifically, "the notice must contain (1) the date, general time, and location of the incident; (2) a general description of the incident giving rise to the charges and citation to the rules allegedly violated; and (3) the identity of other persons involved in the incident." Shortridge v. State, 478 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Iowa 1991). "The adequacy of the notice hinges on whether it allows the inmate to 'marshal the facts' and prepare a defense." Freitas v. Auger, 837 F.2d 806 (8th Cir.1988); accord Love v. State, 551 N.W.2d 66, 69 (Iowa 1996). In examining this issue, we consider such factors as the time, place and nature of the alleged activity. Backstrom, 508 N.W.2d at 708.

With respect to the information that must be included in the disciplinary notice, we have stated that prison officials may delete certain facts from the notice if disclosure would threaten the security of the institution. Id. (citing Morris v. Auger, 414 N.W.2d 858, 861 (Iowa App.1987)). The decision whether to disclose the identity of confidential informants is a matter of discretion for prison officials. Howard v. State, 439 N.W.2d 193, 194 (Iowa 1989). If facts are deleted from the notice because of security concerns, prison officials must state this fact in the disciplinary notice. Backstrom, 508 N.W.2d at 708.

Our review of the disciplinary notice issued to Key causes us to conclude that the notice contained sufficient information to apprise Key of the charges against him and to give him an opportunity to defend himself against those charges. First, the notice informed Key that the charges were based on confidential information and that the name(s) of the confidential informants would remain so because of safety concerns for other inmates. ⁵ Second, the notice also identified the victim's name and thus Key knew who was making the complaints against him.

Third, the notice was sufficiently detailed as to the date or general time frame as to when each alleged violation occurred. For instance, the notice indicated that the incident with respect to the television occurred on January 8, 1995. The notice also stated that Key sent red star envelopes to the victim for a period of ninety days when the victim was in lockup. Key obviously knew when this ninety-day period was, as evidenced by the fact that he sent the envelopes to the victim in lockup. Additionally, the notice stated that in mid-August 1994, Key asked the victim for sex.

The fact that the notice did not specify the exact date of each violation does not mean that the notice is deficient. See Freitas, 837 F.2d at 809 (notice charging inmate with planning an escape during a sixty-day period was sufficient); James, 541 N.W.2d at 871 (notice charging inmate with involvement in gang activity during four-month period was sufficient); Hair v. State, 401 N.W.2d 198, 199-200 (Iowa App.1986) (notice charging inmate with assault and other violations during six-month period was sufficient). This is especially true where, as here, certain information was omitted from the notice in order to protect the identity of the confidential informants. See Backstrom, 508 N.W.2d at 708 (confidential information may be omitted if disclosing such information would threaten prison security). Indeed, if the notice had contained information that was too specific with respect to the alleged violations, then the identity of the confidential informants might have been disclosed.

As a whole, we believe that the information listed in the notice was sufficient to inform Key of the charges against him to allow him to prepare a defense. We thus conclude that the notice satisfies the requirements of due process with regard to notice of alleged prison disciplinary violations. The district court properly refused to grant Key postconviction relief on this issue.

IV. Whether adequate evidence supports the committee's decision.

Key further contends that the disciplinary committee improperly relied upon confidential information in finding him guilty of violating prison rules. He claims that the confidential information in this case does not meet the "some evidence" test because it was unreliable and not sufficiently corroborated. As support for this argument, Key points out that the committee rejected some of the confidential information by finding him innocent of several charges. The district court rejected these claims.

On appellate review of a prisoner's challenge to the evidentiary support of a disciplinary matter, we ask whether the committee had "some evidence" to support its decision. Id. at 709. Under this standard, " 'the relevant [legal] question is whether there is any evidence in the record' that could support the disciplinary committee's decision." James, 541 N.W.2d at 874 (quoting Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2774, 86 L.Ed.2d 356, 365 (1985)). Confidential statements of informants standing alone are sufficient under the "some evidence" standard to support a prison disciplinary committee's decision. Id. (citing James v. State, 479 N.W.2d 287, 291 (Iowa 1991)). In considering this issue, "we largely defer to the committee's findings, refraining from a de novo review of the proceedings." Backstrom, 508 N.W.2d at 709.

Although prison officials may rely on confidential information as a matter of discretion, we have stated:

When an inmate is disciplined on the basis of confidential information, however, his interest in a fair hearing requires that there be some indication of the confidential informant's reliability. Howard, 439 N.W.2d at 195. To that end, there must be sufficient information in the record to convince a reviewing authority that the disciplinary committee undertook such inquiry and...