Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc.

Decision Date12 January 1995
Docket NumberNo. A94A2233,A94A2233
Citation216 Ga.App. 159,453 S.E.2d 752
PartiesKILLEBREW v. SUN TRUST BANKS, INC.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

Robert C. Koski, Atlanta, for appellant.

Webb, Carlock, Copeland, Semler & Stair, Fred M. Valz, III, William G. Pike, Jr., Phillip P. Taylor, Atlanta, for appellee.

POPE, Presiding Judge.

Plaintiff, a customer of defendant bank, was shot in the course of an attempted robbery in the bank's parking lot. Plaintiff then brought this action against the bank, alleging that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care in keeping its premises and approaches safe (OCGA § 51-3-1), and further alleging that the bank's security guard negligently inflicted emotional distress upon him when the guard drew his gun and pointed it at plaintiff after the assailant shot plaintiff and escaped. The trial court granted summary judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed. We reverse in part and affirm in part.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, it appears that plaintiff went to one of defendant's branches to withdraw money from an automatic teller machine ("ATM") at approximately 10:00 p.m. on a Friday. Plaintiff knew the bank had a security guard, and he saw the guard when he drove into the bank parking lot. Unbeknownst to plaintiff, however, the guard had been hired to keep non-customers from parking in the lot and did not consider protecting customers to be part of his job. Because the ATM was located in a vestibule of the main bank building, plaintiff had to park in a fairly dark area and leave his truck to reach the machine. As plaintiff returned to his vehicle, a car pulled in beside his truck and someone got out. While he was unlocking his truck, that person jumped on his shoulder. Plaintiff was able to flip the assailant over and onto the ground, but the assailant then pulled a gun. Seeing the weapon, plaintiff started running around the truck and down the sidewalk toward the back of the parking lot where the security guard was located. The assailant shot at plaintiff several times, hitting him once.

The security guard approached plaintiff where he had fallen into the bushes, but instead of immediately helping plaintiff, he pulled his gun and pointed it at him, telling him not to move. Another person then came up, and that person gave plaintiff a tourniquet and called an ambulance.

1. Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff's claim that defendant negligently failed to keep its premises safe, and we agree. Among other things, plaintiff suggests defendant should have located its ATM so that a customer could use it without getting out of his vehicle, and that the parking lot should have had better lighting.

"Where an owner or occupier of land, by express or implied invitation, induces or leads others to come upon his premises for any lawful purpose, he is liable in damages to such persons for injuries caused by his failure to exercise ordinary care in keeping the premises and approaches safe." OCGA § 51-3-1. But a landowner may be liable for damages caused by the criminal act of a third party on his property only if he has reasonable grounds for expecting that such a criminal act would be committed. Savannah College of Art & Design v. Roe, 261 Ga. 764(2), 409 S.E.2d 848 (1991). Knowledge of an "unreasonable risk of criminal attack is a prerequisite to recovery under OCGA § 51-3-1, and may be demonstrated by evidence of the occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents. [Cit.]" Id. at 765, 409 S.E.2d 848.

Although defendant acknowledges that plaintiff was an invitee on its property, it contends it cannot be liable for the criminal attack because it did not know of any reason to expect such an attack. However, five months prior to the incident at issue here, another customer using the same ATM after hours was robbed in the same parking lot, by an assailant who threatened to hit the customer with a half-gallon bottle of vodka if he did not cooperate. Defendant asserts it was unaware of this robbery. But the knowledge giving rise to the landowner's duty may be constructive as well as actual. S...

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6 cases
  • Deese v. NationsBank of Georgia, N.A.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 28, 1996
    ...of any later independent cause. It is not "unreasonable, as a matter of law, to resist an assailant." Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, 216 Ga.App. 159, 161(1), 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v. Killebrew, 266 Ga. 109, 464 S.E.2d 207 Further, the fact that ......
  • Ford v. Whipple
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 13, 1997
    ...663, 666(2)(A), 386 S.E.2d 146 (1989); Carroll v. Rock, 220 Ga.App. 260, 262(2), 469 S.E.2d 391 (1996); Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, 216 Ga.App. 159, 161(2), 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995) (rev'd on other grounds, 266 Ga. 109, 464 S.E.2d 207 (1995)); Powers v. Latimer, 215 Ga.App. 245, 248(4), 450 ......
  • Ritz Carlton Hotel Co. v. Revel
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • February 14, 1995
    ...911, 429 S.E.2d 262 (1993); Taylor v. Atlanta Center Ltd., 208 Ga.App. 463, 430 S.E.2d 841 (1993); compare Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, 216 Ga.App. 159, 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995); Matt v. Days Inns of America, 212 Ga.App. 792, 443 S.E.2d 290 (1994), cert. granted 214 Ga.App. 909 2. The Ritz al......
  • Sun Trust Banks, Inc. v. Killebrew
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • December 4, 1995
    ...so as to require it to take reasonable precautions to protect customers from similar risks. See Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, Inc., 216 Ga.App. 159, 160-161(1), 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995). We conclude that knowledge of the risk of criminal activity is not created under the circumstances of this ......
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1 books & journal articles
  • Torts - Cynthia Trimboli Adams and Charles R. Adams Iii
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 47-1, September 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...the pursuit." O.C.G.A. Sec. 40-6-6(d)(2) (Supp. 1995). 162. 265 Ga. 235, 454 S.E.2d 507 (1995). 163. Id. at 236, 454 S.E.2d at 508. 164. 216 Ga. App. 159, 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995). 165. Id. at 160, 453 S.E.2d at 753. In the following survey period cases, the lack of foreseeability of the third......

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