Ritz Carlton Hotel Co. v. Revel

• Decision Date: 14 February 1995
• Docket Number: No. A94A2197,A94A2197
• Citation: 454 S.E.2d 183,216 Ga.App. 300
• Parties: RITZ CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY v. REVEL et al.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

Page 183

454 S.E.2d 183

216 Ga.App. 300

RITZ CARLTON HOTEL COMPANY v. REVEL et al.

No. A94A2197.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Feb. 14, 1995.

Certiorari Denied May 5, 1995.

Long, Weinberg, Ansley & Wheeler, J. Kenneth Moorman, John C. Bonnie, Atlanta, for appellant.

Mundy & Gammage, P.C., Gerry E. Holmes, Cedartown, for appellees.

ANDREWS, Judge.

We granted the Ritz Carlton Hotel Company's application for interlocutory appeal to review the superior court's denial of its motion for summary judgment. The Ritz' motion to unseal the record is granted since the documents under seal are necessary to this court's consideration of this matter.

Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Revels, as respondents, the facts are the following: On the afternoon of November 23, 1990, Carolyn Revel was staying as a guest at the Ritz Carlton Buckhead in Atlanta. At about 6:00 p.m., she ordered room service, which was delivered to her room by a female room service attendant. About an hour later, she heard a knock on the door and what she thought were the words "room service." She looked though the peephole in the door, which was also equipped with a door lock, a deadbolt lock and a safety chain, and saw a male wearing a white jacket. Through the peephole, the man appeared clean-cut and clean-shaven. Revel assumed that the man had come to retrieve her tray and she unlatched the safety chain on the door and opened the door.

Upon opening the door, Revel was hit by the door as the person entered the room. She saw then that he was not an employee of the Ritz. She noticed that he was disheveled, that his jacket was not starched and pressed, and that his appearance did not conform to that of the other Ritz employees. The man threatened to kill Revel and then physically and sexually assaulted her and robbed her. At one point he stated that he was "tired of you rich bitches coming in here." He fled and was never apprehended.

On April 3, 1992, Revel filed suit against the Ritz contending that the hotel had failed to exercise ordinary care for her safety. Her husband, David Revel, sued for loss of consortium. On November 2, 1993 the Revels amended their complaint and included various allegations regarding the alleged deficiencies in the hotel's security procedures. They alleged that the hotel had failed to deny access to the hotel to the general public; that the hotel had failed to adequately monitor access to guest room corridors and rooms; and that the hotel had failed to perform walking patrols of the guest room corridors. They also alleged that the hotel had breached its pledge to provide Carolyn Revel with the finest personal service, since it failed to provide necessary security.

The Ritz filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that there was no liability for Revel's injuries since there had been no substantially similar occurrences on the property. Specifically, the hotel argued that there had never been a rape, sexual assault, or armed robbery committed against anyone on the Ritz premises. The hotel contended that the only crimes against the person which had been committed inside the hotel involved assaults by guests on other guests in the room. ¹ The Ritz argued that since the act was not foreseeable, there was no duty to protect Revel.

In opposing the motion, the Revels asserted that once the Ritz undertook to protect its guests by employing a broad-based security system, it had a duty to operate the system in a non-negligent fashion. They claimed that this duty was breached and that the security system fell beneath acceptable standards of care in the industry.

The superior court denied the Ritz' motion. In its order, the court stated: "[d]efendant is also correct in its assertion that foreseeability exists where substantially similar acts have occurred on the premises. However, Plaintiff correctly states the alternative imposition of liability in cases where a broad-based security system is intact." The court concluded that factual issues remained as to whether the Ritz was negligent in providing security to Revel. The court stated: "[f]acts such as the perpetrator's access to the employee uniform, the prior sighting of a suspicious individual fitting his description, the simultaneous acts of Plaintiff ordering room service and the perpetrator appearing at her room under the pretense of room service, inter alia, suggest that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the Defendant operated its security system in a non-negligent manner." The court also found that, based on OCGA § 24-4-22, the unavailability of the videotape of the surveillance cameras on the date of the incident raised factual issues, since the lost videotape contained information which might resolve negligence issues.

1. " 'It is the duty of [the] proprietor to protect an invitee from injury caused by the misconduct of employees, customers, and third persons if there is any reasonable apprehension of danger from the conduct of said persons or if injury could be prevented by the proprietor through the exercise of ordinary care and diligence. Ordinarily, even where the proprietor's negligence is shown, he would be insulated from liability by the intervention of an illegal act which is the proximate cause of the injury. However, the above rule has been held inapplicable if the defendant (original wrongdoer) had reasonable grounds for apprehending that such criminal act would be committed.' " Camelot Club Condo. Assn. v. Bonner, 207 Ga.App. 634, 635(1), 428 S.E.2d 625 (1993), quoting Savannah College of Art, etc., v. Roe, 261 Ga. 764, 765(2), 409 S.E.2d 848 (1991).

The requisite knowledge for imposition of liability may be demonstrated by evidence of the occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents. Savannah, supra. In the instant case, it is undisputed that there had been no prior rapes or sexual assaults at the Ritz. It is undisputed that there had been no previous armed robberies at the hotel. It is undisputed that there had been no robberies in a guest's room prior to this incident, except in situations in which the robber had been invited into the room by a guest. It is undisputed that, prior to this incident, there had never been a violent crime committed at the hotel upon anyone. In fact, the Revels' own expert witness admitted that the particular attack upon Mrs. Revel was unforeseeable.

Nevertheless, there was evidence in the record of incidents of other crimes, including thefts on the premises and crimes to the person occurring at the surrounding shopping areas. Moreover, although the Revels concede that this particular crime was not foreseeable, they contend that Revel, as a woman traveling by herself, was a member of a class of persons where the crime was foreseeable.

In its first enumeration of error, the Ritz contends that the superior court erred in denying its motion for summary judgment. We agree and reverse. "In light of the dearth of evidence of the occurrence of prior substantially similar incidents, the [Ritz] was entitled to summary judgment because there was no evidence sufficient to create a factual issue as to whether the [Ritz] knew or should have known that [its guests] were at risk of a violent criminal sexual attack. Adler's Package Shop v. Parker, 190 Ga.App. 68, 70 (378 SE2d 323) (1989)." Savannah, supra, 261 Ga. at 766, 409 S.E.2d 848. The evidence regarding the other crimes was irrelevant, because none of the incidents was substantially similar to the sexual assault which was the basis of this litigation. See Savannah, supra. Those incidents did not serve as notice for this crime. "As a matter of law, [the Ritz] owed no duty to protect [Carolyn Revel] from the attack at issue. [Cits.]" Woods v. Kim, 207 Ga.App. 910, 911, 429 S.E.2d 262 (1993); Taylor v. Atlanta Center Ltd., 208 Ga.App. 463, 430 S.E.2d 841 (1993); compare Killebrew v. Sun Trust Banks, 216 Ga.App. 159, 453 S.E.2d 752 (1995); Matt v. Days Inns of America, 212 Ga.App. 792, 443 S.E.2d 290 (1994), cert. granted 214 Ga.App. 909 (1995).

2. The Ritz also claims that the superior court erred in concluding that its undertaking to provide security on the premises raised a factual issue as to whether this undertaking was exercised non-negligently. The Ritz contends that because there were no prior substantially similar crimes, there was no duty to provide security against this specific type of attack. Again, we agree.

Knowledge of a dangerous condition giving rise to the incident is necessary in order to show the existence of even an initial duty to provide preventive security measures for this type of attack. Bishop v. Mangal Bhai Enterprises, 194 Ga.App....