King v. Mississippi
| Decision Date | 11 April 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 4:17CV61-MPM-JMV,4:17CV61-MPM-JMV |
| Parties | JASON KING PETITIONER v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, ET AL. RESPONDENTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi |
This matter comes before the court on the pro se petition of Jason King for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The State has moved to dismiss the petition as untimely filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Mr. King has not responded to the motion, and the deadline to do so has expired. The matter is ripe for resolution. For the reasons set forth below, the State's motion to dismiss will be granted and the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus dismissed as untimely filed.
Jason King pled guilty to the crimes of capital rape (Count I); fondling (Count II); sexual battery (Count III); and sexual battery (Count IV) in Bolivar County Circuit Court Cause No. 7691. See Exhibit A. He also pled guilty to the crimes of sexual battery (Count I); fondling (Count II); sexual battery (Count III); fondling (Count IV); and sexual battery (Count V) in Bolivar County Circuit Court Cause No. 7692. See Exhibit B.
On May 25, 1993, the circuit court sentenced King in Cause No. 7691 to life imprisonment for capital rape (Count I); ten years for fondling (Count II); thirty years for sexual battery (Count III); and thirty years for sexual battery (Count IV) with Counts II through IV to run concurrently with the life sentence imposed in Count I.1 See Exhibit A. That same day, thecircuit court sentenced King in Cause No. 7692 to thirty years for sexual battery (Count I); ten years for fondling (Count II); thirty years for sexual battery (Count III); ten years for fondling (Count IV); and thirty years for sexual battery (Count V) - all to run concurrently with the life sentence imposed in Count I in Cause No. 7691. See Exhibit B. By statute, there is no direct appeal from a guilty plea. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-35-101. Accordingly, Mr. King's judgments of conviction became final on Thursday, June 24, 1993, thirty days after he was sentenced on his guilty pleas.2
However, Mr. King's convictions predate the April 24, 1996, enactment of the AEDPA's one-year limitations period; as such, that period did not immediately begin to run against him. Instead, federal habeas corpus petitioners whose convictions became final before April 24, 1996, are entitled to a one- year grace period until - April 24, 1997, to seek federal habeas corpus relief. See Grillete v. Warden, Winn Correctional Center, 372 F.3d 765, 768 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, all judgments of conviction entered before April 24, 1996, are deemed final as of April 24, 1996, for purposes of the AEDPA's period of limitations. Therefore, Mr. King's federal petition became due on or before April 24, 1997.
On April 5, 1995,3 Petitioner submitted a motion for post-conviction relief (PCR) entitled "Motion to Vacate Conviction and Sentence" in Bolivar County Circuit Court Cause Nos. 7691 and 7692. See State Court Record (SCR), Mississippi Supreme Court Cause No. 97-M-1072. On November 18, 1997, the circuit court entered an order denying King post-conviction relief. Id. The electronic docket of the Mississippi Supreme Court, as shown on that court's website, reflects that Mr. King did not appeal the circuit court's decision.
Thus, the federal habeas corpus limitations period was tolled from April 24, 1996, the AEDPA's effective date, through November 18, 1997, the date the circuit court ruled on Mr. King's PCR motion. Petitions for a writ of mandamus do not qualify to toll the limitations period under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). See Moore v. Cain, 298 F.3d 361, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2002.) Therefore, Mr. King's federal habeas corpus petition became due on or before Wednesday, November 18, 1998, (November 18, 1997, plus one year).
King next submitted identical pleadings entitled "Motion for a Post Conviction or in the alternative; Petition for a Conditional Release," in Bolivar County Circuit Court Cause Nos. 7691 and 7692, which were signed on May 5, 2011, and stamp-filed on May 9, 2011.4 See Exhibit D. On July 27, 2011, the circuit court entered an order (which ruled upon both the motions in their respective cases) dismissing the motions as both procedurally barred andwithout merit. Id. The circuit court also denied King's request for conditional release. Id. The dockets of both the Bolivar County Circuit Court (see Exhibits A and B) and the Mississippi Supreme Court, as shown on that court's website, reflect that Mr. King did not appeal that decision. As these pleadings were submitted well after the date that the federal habeas corpus limitation period expired, Mr. King is not entitled to additional statutory tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) while those state post-conviction actions were pending. Thus, the deadline for Mr. King to file the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus remained Wednesday, November 18, 1998.
Decision in this case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d), which provides:
As discussed above, absent equitable tolling, Jason King's federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus was due on November 18, 1998. "The doctrine of equitable tolling preserves a [petitioner's] claims when strict application of the statute of limitations would be inequitable." United States v. Patterson, 211 F.3d 927, 930 (5th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (internal quotations omitted). The one-year limitations period of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") in 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f) is not jurisdictional; thus, it is subject to equitable tolling. United States v. Wynn, 292 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir.2002). For this reason, a district court may toll the AEDPA limitations period. Id. at 229-30.
The decision whether to apply equitable tolling turns on the facts and circumstances of each case. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Alexander v. Cockrell, 294 F.3d 626, 628 (5th Cir.2002) (per curiam). However, a court may apply equitable tolling only "in rare and exceptional circumstances." Davis v. Johnson, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir.1998); see also Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 666-67 (4th Cir.2000) () (quotation omitted).
The petitioner bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling is warranted. See Phillips v. Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508, 511 (5th Cir.), modified on reh'g, 223 F.3d 797 (2000) (per curiam). In order to satisfy his burden, the petitioner must show "(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way" of timelyfiling his § 2255 motion. Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 127 S.Ct. 1079, 1085, 166 L.Ed.2d 924 (2007). A petitioner's delay of even four months shows that he has not diligently pursued his rights. Melancon v. Kaylo, 259 F.3d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 2001). Mr. King has not shown that an extraordinary circumstance, external to him, caused him to seek habeas corpus relief so long after the deadline expired. As such, he does not enjoy the benefit of equitable tolling of the habeas corpus limitations period.
Dist. Attorney's Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 71-72, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321, 174 L. Ed. 2d 38 (2009). The Supreme Court has since held that "actual innocence, if proved, serves as a gateway through which a petitioner may pass whether the impediment is a procedural bar ... or, as in this case, expiration of the statute of limitations." McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2...
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