King v. State
| Decision Date | 02 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | NO. 03-17-00276-CR,03-17-00276-CR |
| Parties | Donald Ray King, Appellant v. The State of Texas, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
NO. 15-1737-K26, HONORABLE DONNA GAYLE KING, JUDGE PRESIDING
Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence, appellant Donald Ray King pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, with intent to deliver. See Tex. Health & Safety Code § 481.112(e). The district court sentenced King to 55 years' imprisonment. In five issues on appeal, King asserts that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress and contends that the judgment of conviction should be modified to correct an erroneous description of the crime for which he was convicted. We will modify the judgment of conviction to correct its erroneous description of the offense and affirm the judgment as modified.
BACKGROUND
According to the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion to suppress,1 on the night of July 25, 2015, Officer Alex Wakim of the Cedar Park Police Department initiated a traffic stop on a vehicle occupied by Pamela Flowers, the driver, and King, the sole passenger. Following the stop, Officer Wakim "requested and was granted written consent to search the vehicle from Flowers." During that search, Wakim and another officer, Erik Detlefsen of the Cedar Park Police Department, found approximately 234 grams of methamphetamine inside the vehicle. The affidavit reflects that the methamphetamine was found in three plastic bags contained within a "Caselogic" satchel that was located in a "storage compartment under the back driver's seat." At some point "during his investigation," Wakim also seized an "LG Smartphone" that was "found to be in the possession of [King] and [Flowers] and was believed to be used by King and Flowers." Wakim then gave the phone to Sergeant William Mauer, also of the Cedar Park Police Department, who had assisted the officers with the investigation. The seizure and subsequent search of the LG cell phone is the focus of this appeal.2
The record further reflects that after the phone was seized, it was placed in storage at the Cedar Park Police Department, where it remained until December 2015, when the contents of the phone were searched pursuant to a warrant. In January 2017, King filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained from that search, contending, among other grounds, that neither the seizure northe search of the phone were supported by probable cause. A second search warrant was issued in March 2017, and the phone was searched again. King then filed a second motion to suppress, focused on the legality of the second search.3
During the suppression hearing, King made several arguments for suppressing the evidence obtained from the search of the phone, including that (1) the initial warrantless seizure of the phone was not supported by probable cause; (2) the delay between the seizure of the phone in July 2015 and the issuance of the second search warrant in March 2017 was unreasonable; (3) the search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that the phone would contain evidence of a drug crime; and (4) the affidavit contained deliberate misstatements such that the court should hold a Franks hearing to determine the truth or falsity of the representations made in the affidavit. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (). The district court denied King's request for a Franks hearing and concluded that there was "probable cause [] within the four corners of the affidavit to [] conduct the search of the phone requested to be searched." Following further argument from the parties, the district court also concluded, "after [its] review of . . . the March search warrant and the supporting affidavit," that there was "probable cause to believe that the phone was an instrument of a crime" so as to justify its warrantless seizure.
After also hearing evidence as to the legality of the initial traffic stop (an issue that King has not raised on appeal), the district court denied King's motion to suppress. King subsequently pleaded guilty to the offense of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver and was sentenced to 55 years' imprisonment as noted above. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (citing State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). "The record will be viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination, and the judgment will be reversed only if it is arbitrary, unreasonable, or 'outside the zone of reasonable disagreement.'" Id. (). Moreover, a trial court's ruling on the motion will be upheld if it is correct under any theory of law applicable to the case, regardless of whether the trial court based its ruling on that theory. Id.
Additionally, "[w]e review a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard." State v. Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d 270, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). "Under the appellate standard of review on Fourth Amendment claims, an appellate court is to afford almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts, and of application-of-law-to-fact issues that turn on credibility and demeanor, while reviewing de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues." State v. Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (citing Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89). In other words, the prevailing party in the trial court "gains the benefit of deference on factual findings made in [its]favor." Id. "However, whether the facts, as determined by the trial court, add up to reasonable suspicion or probable cause is a question to be reviewed de novo." Id.
ANALYSIS
Probable cause to seize and search the cell phone
We address King's first and third issues together, as they both concern the district court's probable-cause determinations. In his first issue, King asserts that the officers lacked probable cause to seize his phone without a warrant. In his third issue, King contends that the second search-warrant affidavit did not establish probable cause to believe that the phone would contain evidence of a drug crime so as to authorize the search of the phone.
We begin with the warrantless seizure of the phone. The Fourth Amendment provides in relevant part that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The "central requirement" of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness." Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)). "In the ordinary case, the [United States Supreme] Court has viewed a seizure of personal property as per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause and particularly describing the items to be seized." United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 701 (1983). However, "there are exceptions to the warrant requirement." McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330. "When faced with special law enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions,or the like, the Court has found that certain general, or individual, circumstances may render a warrantless search or seizure reasonable." Id.
"To suppress evidence on an alleged Fourth Amendment violation, the defendant bears the initial burden of producing evidence that rebuts the presumption of proper police conduct." Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). "A defendant satisfies this burden by establishing that a search or seizure occurred without a warrant." Id. (citing Bishop v. State, 85 S.W.3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)). "The burden then shifts to the State to prove the reasonableness of the seizure." State v. Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776, 779 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). "[T]he warrant requirement is not lightly set aside, and the State shoulders the burden to prove that an exception to the warrant requirement applies." Gutierrez v. State, 221 S.W.3d 680, 685 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 243 (1973) . "To meet its burden, the State may present the specific facts known to the officer at the moment the seizure occurred." State v. Woodard, 341 S.W.3d 404, 411-12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
The State stipulated in the court below that the phone was seized without a warrant. Thus, the State "shouldered the burden" at the suppression hearing to prove that the warrantless seizure fell within an exception to the warrant requirement. In this case, the exception on which the State relies is the "plain view" doctrine. "Under that doctrine, if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if theofficers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant."4 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); see State v. Rodriguez, 521 S.W.3d 1, 18 (...
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