King v. State
| Decision Date | 22 January 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. A97A2522,A97A2522 |
| Citation | 496 S.E.2d 312,230 Ga.App. 301 |
| Parties | , 98 FCDR 531 KING v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Louis M. Turchiarelli, Marietta, for appellant.
Garry T. Moss, District Attorney, for appellee.
Stanley King appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine in his bodily fluid. See OCGA § 16-13-30(a). He contends the trial court erred by allowing introduction of evidence concerning a similar transaction regarding a 1984 conviction for sale of methamphetamine; that the trial court erred by its charge on similar transaction; and the trial court also erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict. Held:
1. King first contends the trial court erred by allowing introduction of evidence concerning his 1984 convictions for sale of methamphetamine because the transactions were not so similar that proof of the 1984 offenses proved anything about the present offense. The trial court, however, permitted the State to introduce evidence of the 1984 drug sales because the court found that "both charges involve the possession of methamphetamine, and the Court finds that proof of one tends to prove the other and that the evidence is offered for the purpose of showing intent, bent of mind, motive, and course of conduct." On appeal, the State contends that the evidence was properly admitted to prove intent and that there is no requirement that the similar transaction and the offense being tried be identical. See Cantrell v. State, 212 Ga.App. 288, 441 S.E.2d 879; Woolfolk v. State, 202 Ga.App. 59, 413 S.E.2d 242. Indeed, (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Maggard v. State, 259 Ga. 291, 293, 380 S.E.2d 259. Harris v. State, 222 Ga.App. 52, 54, 473 S.E.2d 232.
Consequently, proof of a distinct, independent, and separate offense is never admissible unless there is some logical connection between the separate offense and the offense for which the accused is on trial so that proof of the separate offense establishes the offense for which the accused is on trial. Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640, 641, 409 S.E.2d 649. To assure a defendant a fair trial on this issue, before evidence of independent offenses or acts may be admitted in evidence, the trial court must hold a hearing pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3(B) at which the State must show affirmatively as to each independent offense or act it seeks to introduce: (1) the evidence of the independent offense or act is not intended to raise an improper inference about the accused's character, but will be introduced for a purpose which is an exception to the general rule against inadmissibility, e.g., a system of mutually dependent crimes, or to show guilty knowledge, or identity, or articles connected with the offense, or prior attempts by the accused to commit the same crime upon the same victim, or to prove malice, intent, motive, or state of mind, if such is an element of the offense now charged; (2) there is sufficient evidence to prove the accused committed the independent offense or act; and (3) there is a sufficient connection or similarity between the independent offense or act that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. After the hearing, the trial court must find specifically on the record that the State has made a satisfactory showing that each of these elements has been made as to each independent offense or act. Williams v. State, supra at 642, 409 S.E.2d 649.
Further, the State must show facts establishing both that the accused committed the independent offense or act and the connection or similarity between the independent offense or act and the offense now charged is sufficient so that proof of the former tends to prove the latter. Stephens v. State, 261 Ga. 467, 468-469, 405 S.E.2d 483. "Proof of crimes which are similar or are closely connected to the crime charged does tend to establish the crime charged." (Emphasis in original.) State v. Johnson, 246 Ga. 654, 655, 272 S.E.2d 321.
Considered in this light, we find that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of King's 1984 convictions for sale of methamphetamine and other drugs. Even though methamphetamine was involved in the crime at bar and in some of the other drug offenses, that is the end of the similarities among the offenses. The other offenses involved sales and not use of the drug.
We cannot agree with the trial court's determination. The facts testified to at trial show that other than the fact that the earlier offenses to some extent involved methamphetamines, there are no significant similarities between these offenses. In the earlier offenses, the drugs were sold to an undercover officer. In the present case, King was charged with possession of the methamphetamine in his bodily fluid. Thus, he was using, not selling the drug or possessing the drug for sale. Although the prosecutor urged, and the trial court found, that the prior crime was introduced to prove "intent, bent of mind, motive and course of conduct," there is nothing about the earlier offense that proved the second. Stephens v. State, supra. Now on appeal the State argues that the prior offense was admissible to prove intent, but the State does not explain...
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