Kingsbury v. Mattocks

• Decision Date: 18 February 1889
• Parties: KINGSBURY v. MATTOCKS.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

17 A. 126

81 Me. 310

KINGSBURY

v. MATTOCKS.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Feb. 18, 1889.

Report from supreme judicial court, Cumberland county.

This was a bill in equity brought by Henry Kingsbury against C. P. Mattocks, his assignee in bankruptcy, to determine the question whether the money collected from the Alabama court by the assignee, upon a judgment therein obtained for war premiums paid by the plaintiff, belonged to him or his creditors. The case was reported to the supreme judicial court.

Clarence Hale, for plaintiff. C. P. Mattocks, for defendant.

DANFORTH. J. In April, 1863, the plaintiff paid the sum of $1,233.12 as war premiums on certain vessels insured against capture or destruction by Confederate cruisers. In May, 1868, he was adjudicated a bankrupt, and the defendant was appointed his assignee. Under the act of congress of June 5, 1882, by which the court of commissioners of Alabama claims was re-established, he made application to that court for a reimbursement of the premiums so paid. Subsequently, by reason of a rule adopted by the court, the defendant as assignee came in, prosecuted the claim to judgment, and on September 15, 1886, received thereon the sum of $662.84. The only question involved is whether the defendant holds that sum in trust for the plaintiff, or as assignee for the creditors in bankruptcy. The fact that it was recovered in his name as assignee can have no effect upon the decision; for that was the result of adjudication by the commissioners beyond their jurisdiction, and therefore not conclusive. It must now be considered as well settled that claims allowed by that court under the act of June 23, 1874, or June 5, 1882, and in accordance therewith, for the capture or destruction of property by the Confederate cruisers, are such property as would and did pass by an assignment in bankruptcy bearing date after the capture or destruction, and before the allowance; or, more accurately stating it, the claim itself passed by the assignment, and the amount allowed referred back to the loss, took the place of the property so lost, and goes where that would have gone. Comegys v. Vasse, 1 Pet. 193; Leonard v. Nye, 125 Mass. 455; Grant v. Bodwell, 78 Me. 460, 7 Atl. Rep. 12; Pierce v. Stidworthy, 79 Me. 234, 9 Atl. Rep. 617. In these cases the principles involved and cases decided are so exhaustively discussed as to leave nothing to be added. In Comegys v. Vasse, which is the leading case in this country, Mr. Justice STORY, states this ground of assignability thus: "Vested rights ad rem and in re, possibilities coupled with an interest, and claims growing out of and adhering to property, may pass by assignment." This description presumably was not intended to include all classes of property assignable, but it clearly goes to the utmost limit of that represented by such claims as are the subject-matter of the cases cited. It may therefore be safe to assume that unless the claim under consideration comes within the above description it was not assignable, and the case at bar would be clearly distinguishable from those relied upon in defense.

The origin of the claim shows its nature. It comes from a simple contract between the plaintiff and his insurers. He paid them his money, and as a full consideration received their contract of indemnity in case of a loss. There were no expectations for the future, no foundation for any hope to get his money back, unless there was a loss. It was only a loss to or under which he could have any claim, or which could give rise to any "possibilities coupled with an interest." It was only a destruction or capture of the property insured by the Confederate cruisers which could give rise to any claims "growing out of and adhering to property." Here was no loss or destruction or capture of the property. Hence the whole thing began and ended with the contract. There was, indeed, an increase in the premium...