Knott v. City of Flint

• Decision Date: 29 June 1961
• Docket Number: J,Nos. 12,13,s. 12
• Citation: 109 N.W.2d 908,363 Mich. 483
• Parties: Walter KNOTT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. CITY OF FLINT, a Municipal Corporation, and Emery A. Sherwood, as Treasurer of the City of Flint, Defendants and Appellants. Carl HOYDIC and Louise Hoydic, his wife, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. CITY OF FLINT, a Municipal Corporation, and Emery A. Sherwood, as Treasurer of the City of Flint, Defendants and Appellants. anuary Term.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 908

109 N.W.2d 908

363 Mich. 483

Walter KNOTT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. CITY OF FLINT, a Municipal Corporation, and Emery A.

Sherwood, as Treasurer of the City of Flint,

Defendants and Appellants.

Carl HOYDIC and Louise Hoydic, his wife, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellees, v. CITY OF FLINT, a Municipal Corporation, and Emery A.

Sherwood, as Treasurer of the City of Flint,

Defendants and Appellants.

Nos. 12, 13, January Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 29, 1961.

William J. Kane, Don W. Mayfield, Wade D. Withey, Flint, for defendants and appellants.

Cline & George and John W. Thomas, Flint, for plaintiffs and appellees.

Before the Entire Bench.

CARR, Justice.

These cases were treated as class suits in circuit court, were tried together, and have been submitted in like manner on appeal. They are the result of projects undertaken in 1946 to widen Davison road and Dort highway in the city of Flint. Each of said thoroughfares is a trunkline, Davison being designated M-21 and also being a link in a Federal arterial highway system running east and west across the lower peninsula of Michigan. It was built originally at the sole expense of the State of Michigan. Dort highway is a part of US-10 and was, it appears, constructed in the first instance as a by-pass to said trunkline through the city. It does not appear that either said city or the abutting owners contributed directly to the cost of the original installation.

In the year mentioned agreements were made and plans adopted for the widening of said roads. The cost of each project was divided among the Federal government, the State of Michigan, and the city of Flint, the latter to pay one-fourth of the expense. The respective amounts allocated to defendant city were $33,504.87 for the widening of Davison road and $25,703.38 for Dort highway. To cover its share of the cost of the projects the city determined to create special assessment districts along each thoroughfare, and to levy special assessments on the property fronting the respective roads. Apparently charter provisions were complied with in the procedure taken and special assessment rolls were preparedThe Davison roll being designated as Special Assessment Roll No. 701 and the cost of the Dort highway improvement being covered by Special Assessment Roll No. 702. Properties of the plaintiffs in the present suits were assessed, but the payments so contemplated were not made. Suits were started in the circuit court of Genesee county to enjoin the collection of the assessments and to declare the municipal action invalid. Temporary injunctions were issued and remained in force and effect until 1955 when the suits were dismissed for lack of progress.

Following the dismissal of the suits originally instituted on behalf of those specially assessed the city indicated its intention of enforcing collection in accordance with the special rolls. The present suits were then brought by plaintiffs in April, 1956. Following certain interlocutory proceedings not material to any issue involved in either suit a hearing was had in circuit court. A number of exhibits were introduced in evidence for the purpose of showing the general situation insofar as set forth in official records, and also to place before the court certain details involving facts thought to be material. In part the showing thus made had reference to traffic conditions on the highways in question following the widening thereof. It was the claim of the plaintiffs as set forth in their pleadings that the improvements made by joint action of the Federal and State governments and the city of Flint were not beneficial to abutting properties but, on the contrary, were detrimental to the use thereof. It was further claimed that the projects were related to the general welfare and that accordingly the city's portion should have been met from municipal funds rather than by special assessments.

In support of their claims plaintiffs, following the introduction of their exhibits, stated to the court that they had witnesses available who would testify that a number of the properties named in the assessment rolls were assessed at amounts greater than their valuation for tax purposes for the year 1946 according to the records in the city assessor's office; that the traffic, particularly the through traffic, on both Davison and Dort had increased greatly as a result of their widening; that ingress and egress to and from places of business were rendered difficult and in some instances impossible because of the traffic; that the properties along the highways could not be sold because of the situation that had developed; that a used-car lot was forced to discontinue its business because potential customers could not readily enter or leave the premises; that other places of business had similar difficulties; that certain properties assessed could not be sold for the amount of the special assessment thereon; and that an expert witness would testify, if examined as a witness, that the widening of the roads depreciated values generally along each thoroughfare, except as to specific properties having means of ingress and egress other than on Dort highway or Davison road. It was stipulated by counsel for defendants that the witnesses, if produced, would testify in accordance with the statement of plaintiffs' counsel.

In order to meet the suggested proofs available to plaintiffs, defendants, through their counsel, called attention to exhibits indicating an increase in the assessed valuations of properties on both thoroughfares in question during the period from 1946 to 1958, and stated that the city assessor would testify, if his oral testimony was desired, that a portion of such increase was due to the widening of the streets and the commercial advantages afforded by the facility for vehicular traffic. It was further stated that the city planner was prepared to testify that the property along Dort highway was zoned either as commercial or industrial, and that property on Davison road was in part commercial. It was stipulated that the available witnesses mentioned would testify as indicated if they were called, and the controversy was submitted to the court on the basis of the pleadings, the exhibits, and the stipulated testimony of the witnesses that the respective parties to the cases offered to call.

The circuit judge sustained the claim of the plaintiffs that the city's portion of the cost of widening Davison road and Dort highway was not properly assessable to the owners of the abutting properties. The conclusion reached as to the merits of the controversy was summarized as follows in the opinion filed:

'It cannot be successfully maintained that this improvement was made for the convenience and benefit of the abutting owners; nor that the expense levied is in any reasonable ratio to the advantages accruing to the property in consequence of the improvement. The proofs in these cases, to the contrary support the finding that the improvements wree for the benefit of the general public, and resulted in actual burdens to the abutting owners. These improvements were necessitated by the tremendous increase in vehicular traffic, the growth in population in the city, county and state, and for the accommodation of their inhabitants and the users of the two highways. The ipse dixit of the legislative body of the City of Flint will not suffice in law, any more than it does in fact. What any resident of the City of Flint knows, a court cannot and should not plead ignorance of. The common knowledge of the community is supported by the proofs, that the abutting owners here involved received minor, if any, benefits from the improvements, and suffered and will continue to suffer burdens and detriments far outweighing the former. It is not right, it is not fair, and, we must add, it is not lawful, to make the few foot the cost for what is a benefit to the many. To inflict upon the abutting owners the added burden of paying for the widening of these two roads would, in the Court's opinion, amount to unconstitutional confiscation of their property.'

We are not prepared to say that the conclusion of the trial judge as to the factual situation presented on the record in these cases was not well-founded. Both of the highways involved in widening proceedings were parts of the general trunkline system, and as such were designed to accommodate the traveling public. The improvements involved in the widening operations were presumably deemed necessary to prevent congestion, and incidentally to relieve traffic conditions on other thoroughfares of the city. The completion of the projects doubtless operated to the benefit of the people of the State and of the city at large. The proffered testimony on behalf of plaintiffs was such as to indicate that the abutting properties embraced within the assessment districts were not benefited. It seems apparent that a part of such properties, at least, sustained material detriments affecting their use, and consequently their value. It is quite possible, of course, that there were exceptions and that some parcels may have received benefits, but we are dealing here with the imposing of the city's portion of the cost of the improvements on all abutting parcels of real estate. The record before us supports and justifies the findings of the circuit judge, and the decrees entered in accordance therewith.

The situation here presented is analogous to that in Fluckey v. City of Plymouth, 358 Mich. 447, 100 N.W.2d 486. Involved there was the validity of a special assessment of the cost of improving a certain highway by the construction of a reinforced concrete pavement 9 inches thick, and by widening the road in order to accommodate special traffic. As in the present case, it was claimed by the plaintiffs that the project was not beneficial to their properties and was actually detrimental thereto. The trial court found the facts to be as...